Category: Car Accident

  • Could the Foreseeable Have Been Unforeseen? Deciphering Liability in Accidents

    Some accidents are unpredictable, while others appear to be accidents waiting to happen. Having reliable witnesses, qualified experts, and an excellent attorney in either unpredictable or predictable cases could be the dividing line in determining your liability when an accident arises. For Larry Jeane, Sr. (“Mr. Jeane”), the deceased party in a two-car accident along Louisiana Highway 107, whose vehicle crossed the centerline and collided with another car carrying six adults and one minor, the courts were positioned to consider his liability after the accident. 

    Mr. Jeane was transported by ambulance to Rapides Regional Medical Center (“RRMC”) after the accident. He reportedly had no recollection of the accident. Mr. Jeane had a history of heart disease and type-II diabetes, but it was likely his injuries from the accident that resulted in his death less than a week later. While at RRMC, his attending physician, Dr. Jeremy Timmer (“Dr. Timmer”), noted that Mr. Jeane had been on the phone with a friend and started talking “funny,” possibly due to low blood sugar when he collided with the other vehicle.  The seven passengers of that other vehicle, namely Sarah Barber, Jamie Turner, Racheal Spivey, Elizabeth Spivey, Dana Spivey, Wallace Spivey, Racheal Spivey, and Jamie Turner on behalf of the minor, Abigail Turner (collectively “the plaintiffs”) eventually sued Mr. Jeane’s estate and his insurance company for damages resulting from the accident. 

    Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of liability. To support the motion, the plaintiffs submitted three supporting documents: (1) an affidavit from Sandra Shannon (“Ms. Shannon”), who was driving the vehicle directly in front of the plaintiffs and witnessed the accident; (2) an affidavit from Sarah Barber (“Ms. Barber”), who was driving the other vehicle involved in the accident; and (3) a record of the deposition taken of Pineville City Marshal, Sarah A. Smith (“Ms. Smith”), who responded to the scene after the accident occurred. Ms. Shannon’s affidavit stated that she saw “[Mr. Jeane] was slumped over” at the wheel as his vehicle “veered gently.” Ms. Barber testified in her affidavit that she saw Ms. Shannon’s vehicle swerve off the road “suddenly, without any prior warning” before she saw Mr. Jeane’s vehicle approaching her, but she could not avoid the collision. Finally, Ms. Smith noted that she did not witness the accident but rode with Mr. Jeane to the hospital when he told her he did not know what happened. 

    In addition to the statements mentioned above from witnesses, the plaintiffs also included the certified medical record of Dr. Timmer in support of their partial motion for summary judgment. In opposition, counsel for Mr. Jeane submitted an affidavit from Dr. Brabson Lutz (“Dr. Lutz”), an internal medicine and infectious disease physician and certified medical expert in Louisiana. After reviewing the supporting documents submitted by the plaintiffs, Dr. Lutz reached a different explanation of Mr. Jeane’s condition and conclusion for the accident. According to Dr. Lutz, prior health records pre-accident and laboratory reports post-accident indicated that Mr. Jeane suffered a cardiac arrhythmia that suddenly deprived his brain of oxygen, which caused him to lose consciousness. This condition, Mr. Lutz concluded, was unforeseeable.

    Once the district court reviewed the plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment, including the evidence presented by both sides, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. Specifically, the district court found that because Mr. Jeane alleged an affirmative defense, which was that he experienced a medical condition that was so sudden, unexpected, and unforeseeable that he could not have reasonably prevented the accident, he had to prove this condition by clear and convincing evidence. The district court ruled that Mr. Jeane did not meet this burden. In turn, counsel for Mr. Jeane appealed. 

    In personal injury law, the legal principle of foreseeability refers to the level of predictability when an accident occurs. If the injury that results from a party’s actions is considered foreseeable, then that party can be held liable for damages caused to the injured party. Conversely, the party may not be held responsible if the injury is unforeseeable. Foreseeability is an essential element in personal injury cases, so proving that a party’s actions were unforeseeable could be an affirmative defense that precludes that party’s liability. 

    On appeal, the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit recognized the record of supporting documents provided by both sides at the district court that it is possible Mr. Jeane’s actions were unforeseeable. Specifically, the Court wrote, “Ms. Shannon’s statement that she saw Mr. Jeane slumped over as his truck passed her supports Dr. Lutz’s opinion [“that Mr. Jeane suffered a sudden, unforeseeable cardiac arrhythmia that deprived his brain of oxygen and rendered him unconscious”].” Moreover, the Court emphasized that “the day before the accident,” Mr. Jeane was bragging about how he was cleared by his heart doctor and received a clear call from his blood sugar and diabetes reports, which “indicate[d] that any event like arrhythmia opined by Dr. Lutz was not foreseeable.”

    Therefore, this Court acknowledged the discrepancy in the record between Dr. Lutz’s affidavit provided by Mr. Jeane’s counsel and the supporting documents provided by the plaintiffs and concluded that since a genuine issue of material fact existed in the record, the district court erred in granting the plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment. Since a genuine issue material, fact precludes a court from granting summary judgment as stated in La. Code Civ.P. art. 966 (D)(1), the Court reversed the district court’s decision. 

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that it would be up to Mr. Jeane’s counsel to prove at trial whether the foreseeability of his actions were reasonable or his condition’s unforeseeability could absolve him of any liability altogether.

    In the intricate landscape of personal injury law, the concept of foreseeability stands as a pivotal determinant in the attribution of liability. This nuanced principle draws the line between incidents that could have been reasonably anticipated and those that appear as unforeseeable twists of fate. The case of Mr. Jeane vividly underscores the significance of foreseeability, as it oscillates between predictable and unexpected factors. As legal proceedings progress, the question of whether the foreseeable could have been truly unforeseen becomes a central enigma to unravel. The saga of Mr. Jeane’s tragic collision stands as a testament to the complex interplay of circumstances that mold the boundaries of liability, illustrating the need for experienced legal representation.

    Additional Sources: SARAH BARBER, ET AL. VERSUS LOUISIANA MUNICIPAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY GROUP SELF-INSURED FUND, ET AL.

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Gina McKlveen

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Foreseeability: Louisiana Department of Transportation Avoids Liability in Multi-Car Pile-Up Case

  • How Are Liability and Damages Allocated In A Complex Car Accident?

    Allocating fault in a car accident is especially difficult when involving multiple individuals. This case illustrates how the allocation of fault affects how damages are awarded and illustrates what type of expenses are compensable. 

    While driving on Highway 28 East in Louisiana, Erin Wright rear-ended Christina Dauzat. Before they reached the intersection where the accident occurred, an unrelated accident occurred involving Joanne Marlow and Darrell Paulk. Paulk refused to move his car, which resulted in one of the lanes of traffic being blocked. Before the accident, a truck driven by an unknown driver drove towards Dauzat as it tried to go around the Marlow/Paulk accident. 

    Dauzat filed a lawsuit against Wright and her insurer, State Farm. At a trial, the court allocated 80% fault to Wright, 10% to the unnamed truck driver, and 10% to Paulk. The trial court awarded general damages of $8,000 (after the 20% reduction from the fault of the unnamed truck driver and Paulk, neither of whom Dauzat filed a lawsuit against) and $9,741.51 in special damages. These damages did not include the $1,440.86 cost of transporting Dauzat via ambulance following the accident. Both Dauzat and Wright appealed.

    Both Dauzat and Wright argued the trial court erred in allocating the fault. Dauzat claimed Wright should have been found 100% liable for the accident, whereas Wright argued Dauzat should have been assigned some percentage of fault. La. C.C. art. 2323 governs how fault is allocated between different individuals. When a rear-end collision occurs, there is a presumption the driver who rear-ended the other was negligent and followed the other vehicle too closely. See Berthiume v. Gros

    The appellate court found the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s findings that Wright and the unnamed driver’s actions contributed to the accident. However, the appellate court disagreed Paulk had contributed to the accident. Although Paulk refused to move his car after he was in an accident, a subsequent accident was not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the Dauzat-Wright accident was not within the scope of the duty he breached. The appellate court also agreed Dauzat had acted reasonably and was not partially at fault for the accident. 

    Dauzat also argued the trial court erred in its award of $10,000 for general damages and failure to award the cost of her ambulance transport following the accident. Wright argued the general damages should have been even lower. Wright also argued the trial court erred in not reducing the special damages award based on the percentage of fault allocated to others. In its judgment, the trial court specifically noted Dauzat was not a credible witness. 

    Based on the testimony from Dauzat’s physicians and the trial court’s credibility determination regarding Dauzat, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s general damages award. However, the appellate court found Dauzat should have been awarded the $1,440.86 cost of the ambulance that transported Dauzat to the hospital following the accident. The appellate court explained even if this transportation was unnecessary, Wright was still liable as there was no evidence Dauzat acted in bad faith in requesting ambulance transport. Additionally, the trial court agreed under La. C.C. art. 2323(B), the trial court should have reduced the special damages award by the amount of fault allocated to others besides Wright, who were not parties in the lawsuit. 

    Certain aspects of the appellate court’s ruling ended up both hurting and helping both Dauzat and Wright. This case underscores the value of seasoned legal counsel, capable of dissecting the intricate threads of liability and advocating for comprehensive compensation. In this intricate choreography of fault and recovery, a skilled attorney can serve as a guiding compass, helping individuals navigate the tumultuous waters of multi-party car accident litigation.

    Additional Sources: Christina Mink Dauzat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Car Accidents: When Car Accidents Get Messy: How Clear Language and Resolved Claims Can Help You Win Your Lawsuit

  • What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible?

    What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible? One possible option is seeking coverage under your uninsured motorist insurance policy. However, questions can arise about what, if any, coverage you are entitled to if it appears the accident did not cause your injuries. Determining the scope of injuries caused by the at-issue accident can be especially complicated if you have previously been involved in other car accidents that injured you or if you have other preexisting conditions. The following case helps shed some light on these issues.

    Jacqueline Gaspard was rear-ended while she was stopped at a red light. She filed a lawsuit against the drivers and insurers of the cars that were also involved in the accident and Allstate Insurance Company, her uninsured motorist insurer. She claimed the damages exceeded the liability coverage of the other individuals involved in the accident. 

    The second vehicle’s driver behind Gaspard was found to be 100% at fault for the accident. She settled the claims against that driver and his insurer for $50,000, the limits of that driver’s liability policy. She then dismissed her claims against the vehicle’s driver and insurer. 

    Gaspard then proceeded with her lawsuit against Allstate. She submitted a demand for coverage under her uninsured motorist policy. She included documentation of her injuries and associated treatment. Allstate did not respond to her demand. The trial court ruled Gaspard’s injuries were an aggravation of injuries from a prior automobile accident she had been involved in. It awarded her $8,000 in general damages and $3,314.37 in medical expenses. Gaspard appealed.

    On appeal, Gaspard argued the trial court erred in finding most of her damages were aggravation of injuries from her prior accident. Gaspard had the burden of proving her injuries resulted from the at-issue car accident. Numerous medical doctors, including those that had treated Gaspard, testified at trial. The medical evidence showed Gaspard’s complaints to her doctor following the at-issue car accident were the same as those she complained about from her first accident before the at-issue accident. Although there was some varying testimony from the medical doctors about whether and to what extent the at-issue car accident had aggravated Gaspard’s injuries from her prior accident, the doctors noted even before the at-issue accident, Gaspard’s complaints and conditions had waxed and waned. The doctors did not attribute any changes in Gaspard’s condition to the at-issue car accident. Therefore, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that most of Gaspard’s alleged injuries from the at-issue car accident were aggravations of injuries from her first accident. 

    This legal journey is a testament to the multifaceted nature of car accident claims, where the interplay between past injuries and present damages can blur liability lines. In a landscape where preexisting conditions and prior accidents come into play, pursuing justice demands a comprehensive understanding of medical evidence, legal standards, and the nuances of insurance coverage. Gaspard’s experience underscores the importance of having a knowledgeable advocate by your side – one who can adeptly navigate these complexities and ensure that your rights are vigorously upheld in the face of adversity.

    Additional Sources: Jacqueline J. Gaspard v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Court Finds Uninsured Motorist Coverage Waiver Valid, Denies Coverage for Injured Worker Injured

  • Sufficient Evidence Essential To Establish Damages From Car Accident Lawsuits

    In the aftermath of a car accident, the quest for justice often extends beyond determining fault, delving into the intricate realm of calculating damages. Even when the liability is undisputed, securing compensation can be laden with legal complexities. The following case unveils the story of Shelley Cooley, a collision victim navigating the labyrinth of litigation to ascertain the rightful compensation for her injuries. The journey sheds light on the indispensable role of compelling evidence, from medical testimony to personal accounts, in establishing the magnitude of damages in the aftermath of an accident.

    Shelley Cooley was involved in a car accident where her car was hit from behind by a car driven by Timothy Adgate, who worked for the City of Shreveport. Cooley had to obtain medical treatment after the accident for pain in her knee, back, and neck. Cooley filed a lawsuit against Adgate and the City of Shreveport. The parties agreed the City of Shreveport was liable because Adgate was completely responsible for the accident while working as a police officer. The only issue at trial was the amount of damages owed to Cooley.

    Cooley was the only witness to testify at trial. Medical evidence was presented through the deposition transcripts of various doctors. The trial court ruled the accident had exacerbated Cooley’s pre-existing medical issues but declined to award any damages for future medical expenses because the evidence about future medical expenses was speculative. The trial court awarded Cooley $50,000 in general damages and $79,508.66 for past medical expenses. Cooley filed an appeal.

    On appeal, Cooley argued she should have been awarded more than $50,000 in general damages because her injuries from the car accident required medical treatment for over four years. Someone who is injured because of another is entitled to full compensation for the resulting damages. See La. C.C. art. 2315. General damages are not required to be exactly established and include things like inconvenience, loss of physical enjoyment, and mental and physical pain. See Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 

    The appellate court reviewed the evidence presented at trial, including Cooley’s testimony about the pain and suffering that resulted from the injuries caused by the car accident. Based on the evidence, the appellate court found the trial court’s award of $50,000 in general damages was not an abuse of discretion. 

    Cooley also argued the trial court erred in not awarding her any damages for future medical expenses. She claimed the medical evidence and expert testimony supported an award of damages for future medical expenses. To recover for future medical expenses, the plaintiff must establish that such expenses are probable with supporting medical testimony. See Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co. Because a tortfeasor (here, Adgate) takes the victim (here, Cooley) as they come, the fact Cooley had pre-existing medical issues at the time of the car accident did not preclude her from recovering for future medical expenses. 

    In reviewing the medical evidence presented, the appellate court found Cooley had provided sufficient evidence to establish she would likely have future medical expenses from her injuries in the car accident and the probable amount of those expenses. Therefore, the appellate court amended the judgment to award Cooley $269,129 for future medical expenses. 

    As seen here, sufficient evidence is essential to establish the damages to which you are entitled A good attorney can advise you on what evidence you should present to support your claim for damages. 

    Additional Sources: Shelley Cooley v. Timothy Adgate and City of Shreveport

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Evidence Required for Future Medical Expense Damages: Make No Mistake, Medical Testimony Is Required For Juries To Award Damages For Future Medical Expenses

  • How To Determine Personal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Car Accident Lawsuit

    If you’ve been involved in a car accident and are considering filing a lawsuit, it’s essential to be aware of one crucial aspect often overlooked – the appropriate court venue. Venue refers to the location where a lawsuit is filed, and getting it right is crucial for the court to have jurisdiction, granting it the legal authority to issue judgments in the case.

    Cea Tillis was involved in a car accident on Frenchmen Street. He filed a lawsuit against the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident, Jamal McNeil, and his insurance company (the defendants) in the Second Parish Court for the Parish of Jefferson. Tillis asserted Jefferson Parish was the proper venue under La. C.C.P art. 74, which allows a lawsuit to be brought in the location where the accident occurred or where the damages were sustained. 

    McNeil countered Jefferson Parish was not the proper court because the accident occurred outside the court’s jurisdiction, and Tillis did not live in the applicable area. The defendants argued the court did not have personal or subject matter jurisdiction and could not enter a judgment in the case. The Second Parish Court eventually transferred the case to the First Parish Court. The First Parish Court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding there was no personal or subject matter jurisdiction. The court then dismissed Tillis’ lawsuit, and he appealed. 

    The appellate court noted the trial court transcript indicated the trial court granted the exceptions of lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction because the accident occurred and Tillis lived in Orleans Parish, which was outside the court’s territorial bounds. However, the appellate court explained these arguments about where the accident occurred and where Tillis lived related to venue, not personal jurisdiction. 

    Here, First Parish Court had personal jurisdiction because a resident of Louisiana properly brought the lawsuit. Therefore, the First Parish Court had personal jurisdiction over the case. The appellate court then considered La C.C.P. art  4847 to determine whether the First Parish Court had subject matter jurisdictionLa C.C.P. art 4847 establishes limits for the jurisdiction of parish courts. 

    The type of case (a car accident) and amount of damages at issue in the lawsuit were within the statutory limit, so the First Parish Court also had subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the First Parish Court’s grant of the exceptions for lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction and reversed the dismissal of Tillis’ claims against McNeil and his insurer. 

    Filing a lawsuit in the proper court is crucial to ensure that the court has jurisdiction to hear and rule on your case. A skilled lawyer can help you navigate the complexities of court jurisdiction, venue selection, and other procedural requirements, ensuring your lawsuit is filed in the appropriate court and giving your case the best chance of success.

    Additional Sources: Cea Tillis v. Jamal McNeil & General Ins. Co. of Am.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Venue: Vermilion Parish Car Accident Case Hangs on Thread Over Improper Venue

  • Injured Dump Truck Driver Deemed 50% At Fault For Collision On Job Site

    Workplace accidents can strike unexpectedly, leaving individuals injured and grappling with the complex question of who bears responsibility. However, when such accidents involve heavy machinery and contractual relationships, determining fault can become even more challenging. In the case of Clark Nixon, a dump truck driver at Terrebonne Levee & Conservation District (TLCD), the lines blurred further when an incident unfolded on the job site. As Nixon seeks justice for his injuries, the lawsuit shines a light on the intricate interplay of liability, contractual obligations, and the need for skilled legal representation to recover medical costs and hold those at fault accountable.

    Nixon worked a contract job as a dump truck driver at Terrebonne Levee & Conservation District (TLCD). Nixon’s duties as a dump truck driver included delivering dirt to TLCD, where the surplus would eventually be used to build a levee. Specifically, Nixon would back his truck up to the dirt mound and unload the dirt from his truck. Once finished, a bulldozer truck would follow by pushing the dirt mound up a ramp, then reversing down the ramp to make room for the next dump truck. On the TLCD job site, there was also an individual known as the “spotter,” who verified the dirt being dumped and directed the dump truck driver where to unload their pile of dirt. 

    After a spotter verified the dirt in Nixon’s dump truck, Nixon began to back his truck towards a specific dirt pile to unload. David Danos was handling a bulldozer at the same time. As Nixon was reversing toward the dirt pile, his truck collided with Danos’ bulldozer, which was traveling down the ramp after moving the dirt. 

    Nixon filed a lawsuit, alleging he was injured from the collision and that the negligence of Danos and TLCD caused the collision. The defendants denied Nixon’s allegations, contending the collision was 100% Nixon’s fault. The trial court ultimately found a combination of fault from all parties, Nixon, TLCD, and Danos caused the incident. The lower court allocated 50% fault to Nixon and the other 50% to TLCD and Danos. After totaling Nixon’s damages to just under $345,000, the lower court reduced it by 50% based on the allocation. 

    Nixon then promptly appealed the judgment, contending TLCD and Danos were the only parties at fault for the collision. TLCD and Danos also appealed the judgment, arguing the opposite, that Nixon was solely responsible and that he should be allocated 100% fault. Upon review and based partly on the reasoning of TLCD and Danos’ companion appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, finding “no manifest error” in the lower court’s factual determinations and allocation of 50% fault to Nixon. 

    Workplace accidents can happen at any time, whether or not it is due to any fault of your own. When there is a resulting injury from such an accident, an experienced attorney can help you get treatment expenses covered and on the road to recovery much more quickly. 

    Additional Sources: Clark Nixon vs. Terrebonne Levee & Conservation District, Arch Insurance Company and David Danos 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Kate Letkewicz

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Workplace Accidents: Louisiana Court Bars Recovery for NOPD Officer Who Tested Positive for Morphine on the Job; When Coworkers Attack: Negligence Claims for Intentional Workplace Injuries

  • Demonstrating Injuries to Children in Auto Accidents: Understanding the Requirements and Legal Proceedings

    When accidents involve children, gathering factual information regarding their physical health becomes even more crucial for building a solid case. This is particularly evident in a vehicle collision that took place in Lafayette, Louisiana. The case highlights the specific requirements for demonstrating injuries to children in an auto accident and what is and isn’t required to prove injuries to a child.

    On January 19, 2015, Bradley Quoyer was backing out of a driveway onto a street in Lafayette, Louisiana, when his vehicle collided with the rear passenger side of Neosha Robertson’s vehicle. At the time of the collision, Ms. Robertson’s two minor children were in the back seat. She filed a lawsuit against the driver, Clement Bradley Quoyeser,  and his insurance company on behalf of herself and her children, claiming that they both suffered injuries.

    Quoyer filed a motion asking that the children be dismissed from the lawsuit, and the trial Court granted this motion. Robertson disagreed with the ruling and therefore appealed.  

    At the The Court of Appeal Third Circuit Quoyeser argued that expert testimony is required to prove the injury of the children. Because Quoyeser challenged whether the children were injured at all, he contended that there must be proof by a doctor. 

    Hoping to support this argument, Quoyeser attached records of letters from Dr. Mack, who saw the children nine months after the accident and reported the collision did not cause either child’s changed behavior. Robertson then pointed the appeals court to testimony from her deposition, where she explained the children were “shaken up in the wreck, were crying, and suffered injuries” due to the impact. 

    The appellate Court explained that this testimony did create a factual dispute regarding the children’s injuries, in addition to the excerpt from her deposition stating that Quoyer struck the part of the car where her children were riding. Robertson also noted testimony that showed how the children were affected by the accident and exhibited abnormal behavior, like nightmares and crying after the accident occurred.

    The Appeals Court explained that, as Carrier v. Nobel Ins. Co. points out that whether an accident caused a person an injury is a question of fact. Here, the Appeals Court found the testimony of abnormal behavior and severe changes to the children’s day-to-day lives was sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and ruled in favor of Robertson, allowing the children’s claims to proceed. 

    The appeals court did not rule that deposition testimony proved the children were injured. It also did not endorse Quoyser’s argument that expert testimony would be required to prove the children’s injuries. The appeals court ruling stated that facts concerning their injuries remained in dispute, allowing them to be presented at trial. 

    Ultimately, this case reveals that courts still value the importance of knowing specifics regarding injuries from a vehicle crash, especially when children are involved. It’s essential, however, to make sure you hire the best attorney when these kinds of legal matters arise to ensure you AND your children receive the legal justification they deserve.

    Additional Sources: NEOSHA ROBERTSON, ET AL V. THE NETHERLANDS INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Brianna Saroli

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on the presentation of facts at Trial in Louisiana: How Genuine Issues of Material Facts Can Impact a Personal Injury Case & Judicial Notice of Facts, When Can and Can’t it Be Used in Louisiana Trials

  • The Role of Expert Witnesses in Accident Claims: Resolving Conflicting Testimony

    If you have been involved in a motorcycle or car accident, you might not know how an expert witness could help support your claim in court. What happens if there is conflicting testimony from each party’s expert witness about the cause of the accident?

    Robert Murphy was driving his motorcycle along Louisiana Highway 538 in Shreveport, Louisiana, while Shauntal Savannah was driving her car in the opposite direction. When Savannah turned left in front of Murphy, Murphy’s motorcycle hit Savannah’s passenger-side door in the lane Murphy had been in before the collision. 

    Murphy and his wife, Pamela Murphy, filed a lawsuit against Savannah, her automobile insurer State Farm, and the State of Louisiana through the Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”). They claimed DOTD was at fault because it did not warn motorists about the dangerous condition or remedy the intersection’s deadly design. DOTD responded and denied knowing about any unsafe conditions. The Murphys settled with Savannah and State Farm. 

    DOTD later filed a summary judgment motion, claiming Savannah was solely responsible for the accident and the Murphys did not have any evidence against DOTD. As evidence, DOTD provided deposition transcripts from Murphy and Savannah and affidavits from a DOTD engineer and an expert engineer. 

    The Murphys claimed the intersection’s angle of construction made it unreasonably dangerous. The Murphys provided an affidavit from an engineer supporting their argument. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of DOTD. The Murphys appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of DOTD because there were genuine factual issues about whether the intersection’s design caused the accident.

    An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant a summary judgment motion de novo, meaning it does not have to defer to the trial court’s judgment. Under La. C.C.P 966, a motion for summary judgment should be granted if there are no genuine issues of material fact. An expert can testify in the form of an opinion when the expert’s specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact understand the evidence or determine a factual issue. See La. C.E. art. 702. To defeat a summary judgment motion, the expert’s opinion must be more than just a conclusory assertion about the case’s ultimate legal here. 

    In support of the DOTD’s summary judgment motion, the DOTD’s expert claimed Savannah was solely responsible for the accident. He testified that the at-issue intersection was not unreasonably dangerous. In contrast, the Murphys’ expert claimed the intersection’s layout contributed to the accident. Because of this conflicting expert testimony regarding causation, it was improper for the trial court to grant summary judgment. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DOTD.

    Expert witnesses are critical in accident claims, providing specialized knowledge and opinions to assist the trier of fact. When expert testimonies conflict, they become a significant factor in determining the outcome of a case. If you have been involved in a motorcycle or car accident, it is crucial to seek the guidance of a skilled attorney who can advise you on the evidence required to support your claim, including the potential testimony of expert witnesses. Their expertise can help strengthen your case and increase your chances of a favorable outcome in court.

    Additional Sources: Robert G. Murphy and Pamela Murphy v. Shauntal Savannah; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co, AKA State Farm; State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Expert Witnesses: Outcome of Edgerly Case Dependent On Qualification and Use of Expert Witnesses

  • Legal Boundaries and the Scope of Employment: Vicarious Liability Challenges in Car Wreck Cases

     

    In the aftermath of a vehicle collision, the impact reverberates beyond the immediate parties involved, leaving a trail of injuries and legal complexities. Such was the case for Cody Johnson, a passenger on an RTA bus when it collided with another vehicle. Seeking full compensation for her damages, she pursued a vicarious liability claim against the driver’s employer. However, the court’s assessment of the driver’s scope of employment would determine the outcome of her pursuit of justice.

    At 6:00 am, one hour before he was scheduled to be on call, Mr. Molbert was summoned into work by his boss. Molbert worked for Anesthesia Consultants of the South, LLC, and that morning ACS needed Molbert to help perform an appendectomy. At 6:30 am, 15 minutes sooner than usual, Molbert collided with an RTA bus on the way to the hospital. Ms. Johnson, a passenger on the bus, sued Molbert, ACS, and RTA to recover damages for her injuries. 

    ACS filed for a directed verdict, arguing that Molbert was not within his scope of employment at the time of the accident. This kind of argument is typically referred to as a vicarious liability argument. The trial court granted the motion, finding that ACS was not liable as an employer because Molbert was commuting to work at the time of the accident. The trial court relied on the seven Mclin v. Industrial Specialty Contractors, Inc. factors to make this determination. 

    On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals looked to La. C.C. art. 2320 for guidance on the issue of vicarious liability. Employers are liable in Louisiana through vicarious liability “for a tort committed by his employee (servant) if, at the time, the servant is acting within the scope of his employment— acting, as our Civil Code Article 2320 phrases it, ‘in the exercise of the functions in which . . . employed.’” LeBrane v. Lewis. Furthermore, employers can be held accountable for the negligent acts of employees “when the conduct is so closely connected in time, place, and causation to the employment duties of the employee that it constitutes a risk of harm attributable to the employer’s business.” Orgeron v. McDonald.  Ultimately, the course and scope of employment determination is extremely fact specific to every case.

    The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals determined that the most relevant rule from Orgeron was the “coming and going” rule. This rule holds an employee commuting to and from work is generally outside the course and scope of employment. Johnson relied upon this exception to make her appeal. 

    To make her case, Johnson argued that (1) the coming and going rule was inapplicable because Molbert was responding to an emergency and (2) that the special mission exception applies in this case. Johnson primarily relied on Matlock v. Hankel, a case in which a firefighter was responding to an emergency. The Court in Matlock held that the firefighter’s actions fell within his course and scope of employment because he was responding to an emergency. The underlying rationale in Matlock held that firefighters are ‘at work’ when responding to emergencies, not commuting to work. 

    The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals did not find Johnson’s analogy to Matlock convincing. This determination primarily stemmed from the lack of urgency in Molbert’s commute. While Molbert perceived heightened urgency, the Fourth Circuit held that this perception was unfounded because he was neither on call nor had any time constraints on his commute to work. Thus, the special mission exception did not apply to the facts of this case, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed the trial court’s directed verdict. 

    While vicarious liability claims can provide a promising avenue for seeking compensation in the aftermath of accidents, the legal boundaries of the scope of employment can present significant challenges. Ms. Johnson’s pursuit of vicarious liability against the driver’s employer highlights the nuanced nature of such claims. Seeking the guidance of skilled attorneys remains crucial in navigating the complexities of vicarious liability and securing just outcomes for the injured parties involved.

    Additional Sources: Johnson v. Molbert 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Riley Calouette

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  • Can a parent recover when their child is injured on a school field trip?

    School field trips are supposed to be fun. However, after an unfortunate incident, Darius Baheth’s experience was less than idyllic. Can a parent recover when their child is injured on a school field trip? The following lawsuit, out of Lafayette, Louisiana, answers that question.

    When Darius was thirteen years old, he was allegedly injured while attending a school field trip to a movie theater in Lafayette, Louisiana. Darius had an Individualized Education Plan (“IEP”) because he had autism. While the teachers and students were leaving the bus to go across the street to the movie theater, Darius started running around. Some teachers placed restraints on him to prevent him from hurting himself or others. He then received medication and was able to participate in the field trip. 

    His mother, Dorothy Baheth, filed a lawsuit against the Lafayette Parish School Board for the injuries Darius purportedly suffered on the field trip. She argued the injuries happened when the teachers placed restraining gear on Darius. She also claimed the teachers did not timely administer Darius’ medication. 

    The School Board filed a summary judgment motion, arguing it was immune from the lawsuit under the Education Opportunities for Students with Exceptionalities statute, La. R.S. 17:1941-1947. Under this law, schools and their employees are only liable for damage to individuals when they act intentionally or with gross negligence. The School Board also argued it had not breached its duty and Darius had not been injured on the field trip. The trial court granted the School Board’s summary judgment motion. Baheth appealed.

    On appeal, the court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a summary judgment motion de novo, which means it uses the same criteria as the trial court used. Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact. See La. C.C.P. art. 966. Baheth claimed the trial court erred in granting the School Board’s summary judgment motion because of multiple material factual disputes. The School Board argued Baheth did not show or allege that it, or any of the employees or other representatives, acted with intent to harm Darius or with gross negligence.  

    The appellate court explained that even if the Board had breached a duty and was not immune under the Education Opportunities for Students with Exceptionalities, Baheth had not provided sufficient evidence to prove damage Darius had suffered any damage. Specifically, the medical records provided did not support a finding that the incident on the school field trip caused Darius’ injuries. Further, much of the medical history was only provided by his mother and was not objective. Objective evidence such as the CT scan and MRI did not establish a connection between the incident on the school field trip and Darius’ purported injuries. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of the School Board’s summary judgment motion. 

    This case highlights the challenges parents face when seeking accountability for their child’s injuries on a school field trip. Despite the alleged negligence and breach of duty, the appellate court’s affirmation of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the Lafayette Parish School Board demonstrates the importance of presenting compelling and objective evidence to establish a connection between the incident and the injuries sustained. If your child has suffered harm at school, it is crucial to consult with a skilled attorney who can help you navigate the legal landscape and gather the necessary evidence to support your claim. While the path to justice may be complex, diligent legal representation can provide invaluable guidance and support in pursuing a fair resolution for your child’s well-being.

    Additional Sources: Dorothy Baheth, et al., v. Lafayette Parish School System, et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm 

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