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Category: Car Accident

  • Baton Rouge Car Dealer Escapes Vicarious Liability Claim in Accident Involving Motorcyclist

    It’s a common scenario:  a potential buyer visits a car lot, finds a vehicle he’d like to test drive, and heads out onto the road with the salesperson in the passenger seat. What happens, though, if an accident occurs during the test drive? Suppose the potential buyer loses control of the vehicle while driving — who is responsible for injuries and property damage that result?

    On October 27, 2007, Ronald Branstetter was riding his motorcycle on Airline Highway in Baton Rouge when he was allegedly forced off the highway. Branstetter states that defendants Beal and Rives were test-driving a 1988 Ford Bronco when Beal lost control of the truck. To avoid a collision, Branstetter swerved off of the highway, causing him to suffer injuries. Branstetter brought a lawsuit against Beal and Rives to recover damages from his injuries, alleging that the injuries were caused by Beal’s and Rives’s negligence. Branstetter also named Millenium Auto Sales (“Millenium”) as a defendant in the case, alleging that Millenium owned the Ford Bronco and that the company employed Rives, giving rise to a vicarious liability claim.

    Under Louisiana law, employers are generally responsible for the damage caused by their employees, but only if the employee is acting within the course and scope of his employment. La. C.C. art. 2320. A “servant,” or employee, is considered to be a person under the control of another employed to perform services. On the other hand, a non-servant agent may contribute to the employer’s business but is not under the employer’s control. In determining if there is a master-servant relationship, courts often look to factors including compensation, the status of the employee, performance of a specific mission, the intensity of the relationship, control, the role of the employer in exercising control, and the direct benefit to the company. See Cason v. Saniford, 148 So. 3d 8 (La. Ct. App. 2014). 

    Millenium filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact and seeking dismissal of Branstetter’s claims. Millenium attached a deposition from Rives, who averred that he, and not Millennium, owned the Ford Bronco and that he was not an employee of the car dealer on the date of the accident. Rives also stated that there was no written agreement for a commission to be paid to him for the Bronco’s sale. In opposition to Millenium’s motion, Branstetter submitted evidence that Rives’s father, Eric Anders, owned Millenium and that Anders allowed Rives to display the Bronco on Millenium’s car lot to generate more sales interest.

    The trial court granted Millenium’s motion for summary judgment, which dismissed Branstetter’s claims, finding that there was no vicarious liability because Rives was not an employee of Millennium. The court also found that Millenium did not have ownership of the Ford Bronco because Rives’ deposition testimony showed that there was no specific compensation amount to be paid. Branstetter appealed to Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeal.

    On review, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court correctly determined that the evidence did not establish a master-servant relationship; therefore, Rives was not an employee of Millenium at the time of the accident. Because Rives was not an employee, the company could not be vicariously liable for Branstetter’s claims. Additionally, the Court of Appeals affirmed the finding that Millenium was not the owner of the Bronco and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. 

    Vicarious liability is a complex legal issue that balances different factors. On the one hand, Louisiana jurisprudence is well settled that employers are responsible for the actions of their employees; on the other, liability should not be assumed to attach to an “employer” without sufficient evidence to establish a legitimate employer-employee relationship. Due to the complexity of the issue, anyone injured by someone who appears to be operating within the scope of his employment at the time of the incident should obtain the services of an experienced attorney.

    Additional Sources:  BRANSTETTER v. RIVES.

    Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer:  Madyson Hopkins

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Vicarious Liability:  Bienville Parish Auto Accident Raises Questions of Vicarious Liability

  • Monroe Car Accident Shows Importance of Proper Strategy in the Trial Court

    Lawsuits resulting from car accidents can raise many difficult questions. Determining the precise events that led to an accident can be complicated and require courts to make close calls about witnesses’ credibility. Furthermore, parties may question whether they are entitled to certain damages if they prevail in their lawsuit. These questions arose in a lawsuit involving a car accident in Monroe, Louisiana. 

    On January 4, 2015, Bernice Amos and her daughter were driving Amos’s car on Ruffin Drive. They were involved in an accident with Dorothy Taylor, who was driving her car on Highway 165, which crossed Ruffin Drive at an intersection regulated by a traffic signal. Amos claimed that Taylor entered the intersection while the traffic light was red, and Taylor alleged that Amos had the red light. A sheriff’s deputy who happened to be nearby reported that he was uncertain whether Taylor or Amos had the right-of-way when the collision occurred. Given this uncertainty, the police officer who responded to the scene could not determine who was at fault and did not issue a citation. Amos and her daughter suffered severe personal injuries to their backs, necks, and shoulders due to the accident. 

    After a bench trial, the trial court ruled that Taylor was 100% at fault for the accident because she entered the intersection against a red traffic signal. The trial court, therefore, awarded Amos damages for medical expenses, general damages, and attorney’s fees. Taylor appealed to Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal based on two issues:  whether the trial court correctly allocated fault and whether the trial court adequately awarded Amos’ attorney’s fees. 

    The appellate court began its analysis by noting that allocating fault is a question to be decided by the trial court. The trial court must determine the fault split between all persons contributing to a loss. See La. C.C. art. 2323. A trial court’s factual findings must be respected by an appellate court  unless they are “manifestly erroneous” or “clearly wrong.” Solomon v. American Nat. Property & Cas., 175 So.3d 1024 (2015). Where a conflict exists in the testimony of witnesses, “reasonable evaluations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact [by the trial court] should not be disturbed upon review.” Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840 (La. 1989). At trial, conflicting testimony was given about precisely what occurred at the intersection of Ruffin Drive and Highway 165; Amos and Taylor believed the other had a red light. Given this conflicting testimony and a lack of anything in the record to suggest the trial court’s finding was clearly wrong, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s result that Taylor was at fault and ran the red light.

    Under Louisiana law, attorney’s fees are considered special damages. This means that if they are not explicitly asked for in the complaint, they cannot be awarded by the court unless the relevant statute or contract allows them. See La. C.C.P. art. 861. Amos did not request attorney’s fees in her complaint against Taylor. Nor is there any provision for awarding attorney’s fees in any of the statutes relevant to Amos’s claims. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the award of attorney’s fees. 

    If you have been involved in a car accident, you must consult with an experienced attorney immediately to maximize your recovery. Certain types of awards, such as attorney’s fees, must be specifically prayed for in the original petition for the trial court to award them. Generally, a plaintiff cannot amend a petition to include a request for attorney’s fees if the fees are inadvertently left out of the original filing. In this case, although Amos still prevailed in the appeal, her recovery was reduced by the amount she had to pay her attorney. Similarly, the evaluation of witness credibility is almost always a “one-shot deal” in the trial court, as appellate courts will not substitute their own judgment on witness credibility without showing clear error on the part of the trial court. Here, Taylor could not rely on the dispute between the parties, genuine as it may have been, as a means for the appellate court to overturn the trial court’s judgment.

    Additional Sources: AMOS v. TAYLOR 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Allocation of Fault: Court Amends Damages, Allocation of Fault in Car Accident Appeal

  • Injured Driver Wins Favorable Jury Verdict and Still Appeals in Ouachita Parish Car Accident Case

    Car accidents are unfortunate but commonplace occurrences in modern life. The resulting lawsuits can involve complicated arguments over the allocation of fault between the drivers involved and the appropriate amount of damages awarded by the Court. Such questions arose in a lawsuit involving a car accident in Ouachita Parish, Louisiana. 

    In November 2013, Terany Goldsby drove her niece to a U.S. Navy recruitment office on Perryville Highway 554. The highway is a two-lane road with “no passing” lane markings at the point that Goldsby pulled up behind a Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”) dump truck that was stopped in her lane. The truck was being driven by David Blocker, a DOTD employee. Goldsby waited for the truck to advance, but the truck backed up, colliding with Goldsby’s vehicle. This collision crushed Goldsby’s car’s front end, injuring Goldsby.

    The DOTD truck was stopped on the highway because Blocker had overshot the pothole he and two other DOTD employees were sent to patch; Blocker reversed the truck to better position it relative to the pothole. Blocker admitted that neither of the other DOTD employees presented “spotted” for Blocker before he reversed the truck, as is required by the DOTD. The police officer who responded to the accident cited Blocker as “at fault.” Blocker’s manager also reprimanded him for not following the DOTD truck reversing the policy. 

    Goldsby filed a lawsuit against the DOTD and Blocker. After a five-day trial, the jury allocated 95% of the fault to Blocker and the DOTD and the remaining 5% to Goldsby. The jury awarded Goldsby both general damages and medical expenses. 

    On appeal to Louisiana’s Second Circuit Court of Appeal, Goldsby first argued that the jury erred in allocating her 5% of the fault. The allocation of fault to Goldsby was based on her stopping too close behind the DOTD truck at a distance of only one or two feet. In the jury’s view, this contributed to the collision and Goldsby’s injuries. The Court, reluctant to disturb a trial court’s exercise of its duty to determine the allocation of fault between relevant parties through its firsthand observation of the witnesses and evidence, affirmed the trial court’s judgment of fault. See La. C.C. art. 2323. 

    As to Goldsby’s argument that the jury’s damages award was too low and inconsistent with the presented medical evidence, the Court noted that in personal injury cases, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation between the alleged injury and the accident. In this case, an unrelated, subsequent collision in which Goldsby was involved, in which she was also injured, created significant uncertainty about which injuries resulted from the crash with the DOTD truck. Therefore, the Court found no grounds to reverse the trial court’s award of what the evidence showed were reasonable damages.  

    Another issue raised by Goldsby on appeal was that the trial court erred when it failed to provide the jury with a curative instruction after a lawyer for the DOTD alluded in his opening statement to a settlement that could have covered some of Goldsby’s medical costs. Generally, evidence of a compromise or settlement involving the plaintiff is inadmissible at trial. A trial judge must instruct jurors on the applicable law and provide instructions to reduce confusion. See La. C.C.P. art. 1792. In this case, the trial judge did not instruct the jury concerning the settlement reference, and Goldsby claimed that the Court’s failure to do so resulted in an excessively low award of damages. The Court observed that under Louisiana law, an appellate court should only overturn a jury verdict when the jury instructions, or the lack thereof, prevented the jury from dispensing justice. Here, the Court noted that the trial court took measures to address the potentially inappropriate statement by sustaining Goldsby’s counsel’s objection to it and directing the jury that lawyers’ opening statements were not evidence or factual determinations. Therefore, the Court held that there was no obligation that the trial court provide specific jury instructions related to the comment. 

    Although it may seem odd that Goldsby would appeal a verdict in which she was held only 5% at fault and from which she was awarded damages, it is a fair point that any allocation of fault, no matter how small, will necessarily reduce the amount of damages ultimately awarded. Anyone who has been the victim of another driver’s negligence where there is a suggestion of fault should consult with an experienced attorney to ensure maximum recovery. 

    Additional Sources: GOLDSBY v. BLOCKER 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Allocation of Fault: Court Amends Damages, Allocation of Fault in Car Accident Appeal

  • Louisiana Court Holds that Bicycles are Not “Motorized Vehicles” Under Louisiana Law Following Ponchatoula Collision

    Sometimes words that we think have clear meanings become less than clear when used in the law. For instance, if a state statute prohibits cars from driving on park grounds, we would naturally conclude that a regular passenger vehicle is forbidden from entering the park. However, what about a toy car? Would a toy car be banned as well? It would be ridiculous to think that the legislature intended to forbid toy cars and passenger vehicles from park property. In some cases, courts are called upon to apply statutes to situations that, based on the plain language of the law, are not entirely clear. On the other hand, in cases where the rule is clearly written, Louisiana courts favor a direct application of the law. 

    William Foster, Jr. was riding his bicycle westbound on Pine Street in Ponchatoula, Louisiana, when he was struck by a Toyota Sequoia driven by Carol Kinchen. At the hospital, Foster was treated for the injuries he sustained in the collision. The hospital staff also did blood work and found that Foster had a blood alcohol content of 0.084% at the time of the accident. Foster filed a lawsuit seeking to recover for personal injuries against Kinchen, arguing that the accident was caused by Kinchen’s negligence.

    Kinchen filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that, according to Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:2798.4, she was free from liability because Foster was intoxicated when the accident occurred. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit, and Foster appealed to Louisiana’s First Circuit Court of Appeal. He argued that the trial court’s decision was improper because the statute relied upon by Kinchen concerned the operation of “motor vehicles” while under the influence of alcohol, yet, Foster was riding a bicycle at the time of the accident.  

    According to Louisiana law, a “motor vehicle” is a self-propelled vehicle or a vehicle that runs on electric power from overhead trolley wires. Louisiana law does not include motorized bicycles under this definition. La. R.S. 32:1. When a statute’s language is clear and unambiguous, a court will apply the language as written without any further interpretation or search of the legislature’s intent. La. R.S 1:4.

    On appeal, Kinchen argued that a bicycle was a motor vehicle because specific statutes in Louisiana require that bicyclists be given all the rights that a motor vehicle driver enjoys. Kinchen also cited a law designating a bicycle or a ridden animal as a “vehicle.” However, the Appellate Court was not convinced by Kinchen’s arguments and noted a difference between a “motor vehicle” and a “vehicle.” And that the statute that Foster cited specifically referred to motor vehicles, not vehicles. Because Louisiana Revised Statutes 32:1 defines “motor vehicles” to exclude motorized bicycles, the Court concluded that non-motorized, pedaled bicycles were also excluded. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in Kinchen’s favor and remanded the case for further proceedings.

    In general, judges will not go out of their way to interpret a clear and unambiguous statute. Otherwise, judges will essentially become legislators themselves, disrupting the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the Louisiana government. Still, legislative interpretation is far from an exact science, so anyone involved in a personal injury lawsuit that turns on the specific wording of a statute to establish liability would be well advised to retain an experienced attorney.

    Additional Source:  FOSTER v. KINCHEN 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer:  Peter Lee

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Statutory Interpretation:  Strict Construction of Statute Flattens Timber Theft Case Out of DeSoto Parish

  • Lawsuit Over Car Accident Involving Louisiana State Employee Dismissed After Three Years of Inactivity by Plaintiff

    Anyone involved in a lawsuit knows that litigation can take months or even years to resolve. Though courts try to expedite the process, the parties involved are also responsible for moving the case forward expediently. If the plaintiff in a lawsuit files a complaint and fails to take further action for a certain amount of time, the defendant may file a motion to dismiss on the grounds of abandonment. The case below is an example of how the abandonment of a lawsuit by the plaintiff resulted in the dismissal of the action. 

    Deborah Allen was an employee of the Louisiana Department of Social Services (“LADSS”). On February 2, 2007, she was riding as a passenger in a LADSS vehicle struck from behind by a car driven by Matthew Humphrey. Allen filed a lawsuit against Humprey and his automobile insurer, Imperial Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, seeking compensation for the injuries she received in the crash. Shortly after that, Louisiana’s Division of Administration, Office of Risk Management (“ORM”) filed a petition of intervention, seeking reimbursement from the defendants for workers’ compensation payments made to Allen. You can think of an intervenor as being a replacement or substitute plaintiff in an action who has a related claim against the defendants. 

    Because Humphrey was underinsured, Allen filed a lawsuit against LADSS. However, LADSS claimed that it had no underinsured motorist coverage and that Allen was only entitled to workers’ compensation from LADSS. LADSS was successful in securing a dismissal of Allen’s lawsuit. In early 2013, Allen and LADSS settled Allen’s workers’ compensation claims. On February 8, 2013, Humphrey and Imperial Fire filed a motion to reduce the jury bond, which is money to procure a jury. In 2014, Humphrey and Imperial Fire sent a settlement letter to Allen, but neither Allen nor the ORM responded to the letter. In 2016, Humphrey and Imperial Fire filed a motion to dismiss Allen’s lawsuit on the grounds of abandonment. After the trial court granted the defendants’ motion, ORM appealed. 

    In Louisiana, a lawsuit is considered abandoned if the parties fail to take any action in furtherance of prosecution or defense in the trial court for three years. La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(1). A trial court will not automatically file a formal order deeming a lawsuit abandoned. Only when one of the interested parties files a motion asking for abandonment will the trial court issued the formal order. La. C.C.P. art. 561(A)(3). To prevent abandonment, a party must take some steps toward resolving the lawsuit, which is recorded with the clerk of court, and that step must be taken within three years of the last action taken in the case by either party. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 785 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 2001). However, abandonment exceptions exist even if the plaintiff has not fulfilled the above requirements. One way is if the plaintiff could not prosecute the case because of circumstances beyond his or her control. The second way is if the defendant waived the right for the lawsuit to be abandoned by taking action incompatible with the intent of abandonment. 

    In this case, Louisiana’s Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit concluded that Allen’s lawsuit was abandoned because the last motion was filed by the defendants on February 8, 2013; neither Allen nor the ORM as intervenor has filed any motion since then. Though ORM stated that the letter it received from the defendants in 2014 showed that the defendants did not intend to abandon the lawsuit, the Appellate Court ruled that the letter was informal and nothing tangible, like the exchange of money, transpired due to the letter. Thus, the letter did not show that the defendants waived their right to request dismissal due to abandonment. 

    Allen’s original lawsuit was resolved more than ten years after it was initially filed. Though Allen received workers’ compensation payments, the ORM as the intervenor, likely regretted its inaction. Anyone involved in a lawsuit should retain experienced, competent counsel who can keep careful track of the case’s timeline to ensure that it is not dismissed due to inadvertent latency.  

    Additional Source:  ALLEN v. HUMPHREY 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer:  Peter Lee

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Lawsuit Abandonment:  Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal Considers Lawsuit Abandonment

  • Driver Injured in Truck Accident in Caddo Parish Raises Credibility Concerns

    Car accident cases often involve conflicting stories from each person involved, as no one generally wants to admit fault. When these cases get brought to court, the court must decide which party is telling the truth. The following case examines how a court determines the credibility of two individuals involved in a motor vehicle accident in Caddo Parish.  

    Larry Fuller alleged that he sustained multiple injuries and property damage when Leman Bissell’s Chevy hit his Ford truck. Fuller contended that he exited the parking lot of the Country Market store on Hearne Avenue and pulled into the right-hand lane, where his truck unexpectedly stalled, leaving him stranded. Fuller also claimed that he gestured to other drivers who were able to swerve around him. However, Bissell’s vehicle pulled up quickly and ran into the driver’s door of Fuller’s truck. Fuller further alleged that the accident injured his lower back and caused radiating pain down one leg, forcing him to undergo two months of treatment with a neurologist and several sessions with a physical therapist. Bissell’s insurer, State Farm, asserted that Bissell did not have time to avoid hitting Fuller and was faced with a sudden emergency as Fuller’s vehicle lurched into traffic. The following case was on appeal from the Louisiana First Judicial District Court for the Parish of Caddo and was heard by the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. 

    At the first trial, the District Court found several inconsistencies in Fuller’s testimony, including the number of accidents he had been involved in before the accident with Bissell, his history of drawing disability, and the number of times his Ford engine had stalled. However, the District Court also found no inconsistencies in Bissell’s testimony. Therefore, the District Court rejected Fuller’s claims and granted State Farm’s motion for involuntary dismissal. Fuller subsequently appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal. 

    Under Louisiana law, when the court has tried an action without a jury, any party may withdraw the action on the grounds that the plaintiff had shown no right to relief. La. C.C.P. art. 1672. Under this motion, the court will then evaluate the evidence that the plaintiff had presented and render a decision based on a preponderance of the evidence, which is a standard of proof that indicates the evidence shows a fact or cause of action is more probable than not. See Hebert v. Rapides Parish Police Jury, 974 So.2d 635 (La. 2007). Furthermore, the court will not reverse an involuntary dismissal if there was no manifest or legal error. See Town of Arcadia v. 5 Arcadia Chamber of Commerce,195 So. 3d 23 (La. Ct. App. 2016).

    In cases where documents or objective evidence contradict the witness’s testimony or when the testimony is inconsistent or implausible, the court may find manifest error if a reasonable factfinder would not credit the testimony. However, when these factors are not present, and when the factfinder’s findings were based on the credibility of one or more witnesses, the findings will generally not be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. See Robinson v. Board of Supervisors, 225 So. 3d 424, 347 (La. 2017).  

    In this case, Fuller argued that the District Court 1) failed to recognize Bissell’s multiple inconsistent statements and 2) did not consider that his vehicle was stalled when Bissell was approaching. The Court of Appeal indicated that Fuller failed to offer documentary evidence to contradict Bissell’s testimony and that Bissell’s alleged inconsistencies did not detract from the main thrust of his account. Overall, the Court of Appeal found Fuller’s first argument lacking merit. 

    As for Fuller’s second argument, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the District Court was wrong to discredit Fuller’s claims that he was without fault. The Court of Appeal found that the trial court was correct in disbelieving Fuller’s account that his truck stalled inopportunely seconds before Bissell drove by. The court was weary of this statement, given Fuller’s frequency of automobile accidents, injury claims, health issues, and disability claims. Further, Fuller was not entitled to a special duty of care under La. R.S. 32:141(B) or when finding that Fuller had a duty to yield to approaching vehicles under La. R.S. 32:124. 

    This case demonstrates the importance of providing ample evidence and credible testimony when in court, especially when another witness is available to discredit your statements. Hiring an experienced attorney can help you gather this crucial evidence. 

    Additional Sources: LARRY FULLER VERSUS LEMAN BISSELL AND HIS INSURER, STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, JOINTLY AND INSOLIDO

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Samantha Calhoun

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Credibility Concerns and Conflicting Testimony: Trial Court Oversteps Authority when Determining the Accuracy of Plaintiff’s Account in Orleans Parish — Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog — February 21, 2020

  • Confusion Involving Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Policy Leaves Woman in Caddo Parish Without Coverage

    Before purchasing motor vehicle insurance, it is vital to fully understand what the policies will cover. For instance, some policies may not cover your medical bills if you were involved in a single-vehicle accident. Understanding what is covered and what is not may help you avoid legal action in the future.

    Randy and Brenda Mills, husband, and wife, purchased separate uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) coverage from State Farm on three of their vehicles: a Kawasaki motorcycle, a GMC Envoy, and a Chevy pickup. The policies on each of the three vehicles also included liability coverage. However, the UM and liability insurance policies for the motorcycle were in Randy’s name only, while the UM and liability insurance policies for the other two vehicles included Randy’s and Brenda’s names. 

    One morning, Randy was driving the motorcycle with Brenda as a passenger when he lost control, went off the road, and entered a ditch. Brenda alleged that she suffered severe injuries and was hospitalized for three days. She claimed that, as a result of these injuries, her medical bills exceed $42,545. She also claimed lost wages, loss of employment benefits, emotional damages, and loss of enjoyment of life. State Farm then paid Brenda the $50,000 policy limit owed under the liability policy purchased by Randy on the motorcycle. However, State Farm declined to pay her for any of the UM benefits under the three separate policies. 

    Brenda brought a claim for UM coverage to the Louisiana First Judicial District Court for Caddo, asserting the liability policy amount was insufficient to cover her losses. State Farm filed a motion for summary judgment. The District Court granted State Farm’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Brenda’s claim for UM coverage, finding that UM coverage did not apply to one-vehicle accidents. Brenda appealed this decision to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. 

    According to Louisiana law, a court must grant a motion for summary judgment if the evidence shows no genuine issue as to a material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966. Additionally, an insurance policy is a contract between the two parties, and the words and phrases of the policy are to be construed using their plain, ordinary meaning. La. C.C. art 2047. In Brenda’s case, the Court of Appeal found no ambiguous terms in the policy. 

    For her first argument on appeal, Brenda claimed that the UM statute in the contract with State Farm allows a guest passenger of an at-fault vehicle to recover under the driver’s UM coverage when the driver’s liability coverage is inadequate to cover the guest’s damages. The Court of Appeal, however, found the applicable law repeated State Farm’s policy exclusion that UM coverage does not apply when the insured was injured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by the insured. La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(e). 

    Furthermore, the Court of Appeal found the motorcycle was purchased during Brenda and Randy’s marriage, which makes it community property, meaning it is property acquired during marriage that is divided equally, 50/50, between the spouses. Property owned by one spouse but not the other would be considered separate property. The Court of Appeal found the motorcycle to be community property. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the UM statute did not support coverage. 

    For her second argument, Brenda claimed that the literal interpretation of the UM Insuring Agreement provided UM coverage. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal found that Brenda failed to consider the definition of an uninsured motor vehicle and the exclusion provision of the agreement. State Farm’s policy excluded vehicles whose policy provided liability coverage, which the motorcycle did, and an uninsured motor vehicle also excluded a vehicle owned by the insured or resident relative. Therefore, the Court of Appeal held that the insurance agreement did not support UM coverage for Brenda as a resident relative of the insured.   

    Next, the Court of Appeal found that the District Court was correct in denying Brenda’s attempt to recover under the UM provision of the motorcycle’s policy, as the motorcycle cannot act as both an insured and uninsured vehicle for a single policy. State Farm paid Brenda damages under the liability provision but was not required to pay her under the UM provision. The Court of Appeal also denied Brenda’s claim that she has a right to recover under other UM policies since Louisiana law makes clear that insureds cannot stack UM coverage under more than one policy.  La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c). As a result, Brenda was precluded from recovering under the UM provisions of the GMC or Chevy.  

    This case demonstrates the need to understand insurance policies and their exclusions on every motor vehicle you own. In addition, understanding said policies might help you avoid lengthy and expensive legal trials. If you have an insurance contract dispute, however, you may need the help of an experienced attorney.         

    Additional Sources: BRENDA MILLS VERSUS RANDY MILLS AND STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS., CO

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Samantha Calhoun

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Insurance Disputes and Contract Confusion: Insurance Contract Confusion Leads to Louisiana Lawsuit

  • Louisiana Car Accident Victim Fails To Establish Causation Through Housley Causation Presumption

    Although car accidents are common, they are still stressful. When you suffer a medical injury from an accident, you must have evidence to prove your injuries. One way to do so in Louisiana is using the “Housley” causation presumption. The following case helps answer the question, what exactly is the “Housley” presumption?

    Burleigh Ruiz was driving a car that backed out of a parking space and hit a car occupied by Eurie Marie. Ruiz and Marie disputed what had happened. Although Ruiz claimed he was going slowly, Marie estimated Ruiz was driving about twenty to thirty miles per hour at the time of the accident. Marie told Ruiz he was not hurt but may need medical treatment in two or three weeks because his health was not that good. Marie had an extensive medical history, including multiple surgeries, severe diabetes with complications, and back pain. He had been disabled for eight years and sought treatment for neck pain approximately five months before the car accident. 

    Marie went to the emergency room at Terrebonne General Hospital three weeks after the car accident. He complained of pain from his neck to his knee and mentioned the automobile accident. He also went to a chiropractor and was examined by an orthopedic surgeon. After more conservative treatments failed, the doctor recommended surgery. 

    Marie sued Ruiz and Ruiz’s insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, for compensation for his neck, back, and left knee injuries. All parties agreed that Ruiz had caused the accident. The remaining issue of whether the accident injured Marie went to a jury trial.

    At trial, Marie was the only witness to testify in person. He offered little testimony to establish the cause of the juries and only said that his knees hit the dashboard during the accident. He said he had not gone to a doctor sooner because he had not felt anything was wrong with him. However, he admitted that he had first noticed swelling in his left knee about two weeks after the accident after he fell while cutting grass. In addition, his testimony had multiple inconsistencies with his medical records and his prior deposition testimony. While some doctors performed independent medical examinations and testified, they said that their conclusion Marie had suffered injuries in the car accident depended on the accuracy of the medical history Marie had provided. 

    The jury found that Marie had not suffered any injury caused by the automobile accident. Marie appealed. On appeal, Marie argued that the jury erred in finding no causation and failing to award him damages.

    In a personal injury lawsuit, under Louisiana law, the plaintiff (here, Marie) must prove the existence of both his injuries and a causal connection between the injuries and the accident. See Richardson v. Bridgefield Cas. Ins. Co., 181 So. 3d 61 (La. Ct. App. 2015). This means the plaintiff’s injuries cannot result from a separate or independent cause. 

    On appeal, the appellate court does not decide if the jury was right or wrong. Instead, the appellate court determines whether the jury’s finding was based on a reasonable factual basis and is not clearly erroneous. A jury’s determination of whether or not there was causation is a factual finding that should not be reversed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. See Detraz v. Lee, 950 So. 2d 557 (La. 2007).

    While Marie argued that the doctors at trial established that he was injured in the accident, the appellate court noted that all of the doctors’ opinions were premised on the accuracy of Marie’s history. The appellate court also stated that Marie’s credibility had been attacked numerous times with inconsistencies in his statements, conflicting testimony, and omissions in his medical history. For example, Marie failed to disclose his pre-accident back pain and treatment to some of his doctors. Based on these factors, the appellate court held that the jury’s finding of no causation was not clearly wrong. 

    The second issue that Marie raised on appeal was whether the trial court judge erred in failing to instruct the jury on the “Housley” causation presumption. Under Louisiana law, the “Housley” causation presumption states that a plaintiff’s disability is presumed to be caused by an accident if, before the accident, the injured person was in good health and after the accident, the adverse symptoms appear, provided that the medical evidence shows a reasonable possibility of a causal connection between the accident and the disabling condition. See Housley v. Cerise, 579 So. 2d 973 (La. 1991). 

    Louisiana law requires that the trial judge instructs jurors on the law applicable to the issues submitted to them to decide. La. C.C.P. Art. 1792(B). The trial court must try to reduce the possibility of confusing the jury. Jury instructions are adequate when they fairly and reasonably point out the issues and provide correct principles of law the jury can apply to the issues at hand. While the trial court does not have an obligation to give the jury any specific instruction that either party submits, if the trial court does not provide an instruction on an applicable, essential legal principle, the case may be reversed.

    Here, Marie argued that the trial court’s failure to give the Housley instruction was especially problematic because so much of the evidence presented focused on his supposedly good state of health before the car accident. Marie also pointed out that every doctor who testified said there were no preexisting issues. 

    The appellate court rejected Marie’s argument, noting that Marie’s claim of good health prior to the accident could not be reconciled with his medical record before the accident. His medical history showed that he had undergone multiple neck surgeries, been disabled for eight years, and had been treated for chronic neck and back pain in the years before the accident. Therefore, Marie could not be characterized as a “person in good health” before the accident. Thus, the trial court did not fail in providing a Housley instruction.

    If you are involved in a car accident where you believe you have suffered a medical injury, it is important to understand what evidence is required to establish causation, especially if you have any preexisting conditions. If you cannot connect your injury with the car accident, you might not recover anything, just like what happened to Marie in this case. An excellent attorney can help you navigate the legal landscape after you or a loved one is involved in a vehicle accident and help you provide sufficient proof of injury causation. 

    Additional Sources: Eurie Mari v. Allstate Insur. Co. and Burleigh J. Ruiz

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Causation: Crowley Auto Accident Gives Rise to Causation Examination in Louisiana Auto Case