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Category: Accidents

  • What is Decretal Language, and Why is it Important?

    In the legal world, every word holds significance. Clarity and precision are of the utmost priority because even the slightest bit of ambiguity can have dire consequences. This is a truth that Terry Gotch would later find out after he filed suit against Scooby’s ASAP Towing LLC following a vehicular accident in Louisiana.

    On February 8th, 2013, Joseph DeRousselle was backing out of a driveway and almost hit the car Terry Gotch was a passenger in. The driver took evasive maneuvers, which led to the vehicle leaving the road and crashing into a ditch. Gotch was injured as a result of the accident. At the time of the accident, DeRousselle was an employee of Scooby’s ASAP Towing. Gotch then filed a lawsuit against Scooby’s ASAP Towing, claiming vicarious liability of the employer for DeRousselle’s negligence. A judgment was made following a jury trial in favor of Scooby’s ASAP Towing, absolving them of any negligence, and Gotch’s claim was disregarded.

    Gotch, understandably unhappy with the verdict, orally moved for a mistrial. This motion was denied a short time later following a hearing. Still unsatisfied, Gotch filed an appeal on October 23rd, 2017. A written judgement was issued; however, it was insufficient in that it lacked decretal language.

    Decretal language is generally defined as the portion of a court’s decision in which an official statement as to what the court is ordering is contained. As outlined in Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., “An appellate court cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless a valid final judgment properly invokes their jurisdiction. That judgment must be precise, definite, and certain.” Further, “the specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without referencing an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment.” Input/Output Marine.

    Here, the trial court found no negligence on behalf of DeRousselle’s involvement in the car accident. A judgment was released in correspondence with that finding. Additionally, the trial court’s final judgment would also represent Gotch’s mistrial motion denial. However, the judgment does not indicate the trial court’s final disposition on the matter.

    Gotch conceded this judgment alone was insufficient and wanted his appeal to be dismissed and remanded to the trial court so they could enter a judgment containing the correct decretal language required. The appellate court did just that, dismissing the appeal without prejudice and remanding it to the trial court with the purpose of decretal language being added so Gotch could later appeal.

    This case outlines the importance of every word in a legal proceeding. If a court leaves out the proper decretal language, which is required, even seemingly obvious cases may not be reviewable on appeal. This is why it is essential to get a lawyer experienced in navigating the various intricacies of the legal system. A sharp eye can mean the difference between a quick, viable appeal and a much longer, dragged-out appeal.

    Additional Sources: TERRY GOTCH VERSUS SCOOBY’S ASAP TOWING, LLC, ET AL.

    Article Written By: T.J. Reinhardt

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Decretal Language and Judgments: Appealing a Court Judgment in Louisiana: Why Decretal Language Matters

    Judgment In Lawsuit From Garage Sale Injury Lacked Necessary Decretal Language

  • Who Is Responsible For Damages In Accident Involving Borrowed Car And Inadequate Maintenance?

    It is common to borrow a car from a family member or friend. If you are unfortunately involved in an accident while driving a borrowed car, who is liable for damages if the accident results from inadequate maintenance? 

    While Holly Fontenot was driving a car owned by Patricia Neil and her husband, the parents of Fontenot’s fiancé, she was involved in a single-car accident when she lost control and hit a utility pole. Fontenot had the Neils’ permission to drive their car. There were also two minors in the car with her. 

    Fontenot and the mother of the two minor children passengers filed a lawsuit against Safeway Insurance, who insured the Neils’ car. Fontenot claimed the accident occurred because of a lack of maintenance. She claimed the car went off the road because it had a broken tie road, which caused the car’s steering mechanism to fail. 

    Safeway moved for a directed verdict under La. C.C.P. art 1672(B), claiming Fontenot had not presented evidence sufficient to show she was entitled to any relief. The court granted Safeway’s motion and dismissed Fontenot’s claims. Fontenot appealed.

    The appellate court explained the trial court had granted Safeway’s motion for a directed verdict because Fontenot had not established what caused the car to go off the road and had not provided sufficient evidence there had been insufficient maintenance on the vehicle. Under King v. Louviere, the vehicle’s owner, not a driver who has been given permission to drive the car, is liable when an accident occurs because of a defect with the vehicle. 

    Fontenot testified she had been driving the Neils’ car with permission, within the speed limit, when she heard a pop and the car’s steering mechanism failed, which resulted in her losing control and hitting a utility pole. Fontenot could not provide specific details about the timeline of what happened after she heard the pop. One of the investigating police officers testified it appeared to him like the crash resulted from something in the front area of the car’s drive train. The police officer did not think the accident could have resulted from a tire blowout.

    Furthermore, there was no evidence Fontenot was speeding or otherwise driving erratically at the time of the accident. Based on this testimony and evidence, the appellate court held Fontenot had provided sufficient evidence to survive Safeway’s motion for a directed verdict. 

    Once Fontenot presented evidence that she had lost control of the car because of a broken tie rod, the burden shifted to the Neils to provide evidence the accident resulted from a defect it was not aware of and did not result from their improper maintenance of the vehicle. The only evidence they presented was speculated the tie rod might have broken when the car hit the utility pole or curb. The Neils also did not present evidence Fontenot had been given the right or obligation to maintain the vehicle. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Fontenot’s claims. 

    If you have been involved in an accident while driving a borrowed car, a good attorney can advise you on who is liable and what evidence you need to present in support of your claim. 

    Additional Sources: Holly Fontenot et al. v. Safeway Ins. Co. of Louisiana

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Involuntary Dismissals: The Complexities of the Involuntary Dismissal of a Claim

  • How Is Coverage Divided When Multiple Insurance Policies Are Involved?

    If you are involved in an automobile accident, it can be difficult to navigate insurance claims and coverage. The situation becomes even more complicated when there are multiple insurance policies involved. How is coverage allocated between multiple relevant insurance policies?

    Sonya Theriot was unfortunately in an automobile accident in Lafayette, Louisiana. The other driver involved in the accident, Todd Sparks, was working for Thermal Technologies at the time of the accident. He was driving a rental car Thermal Technologies had paid for when he rear-ended Theriot while she was making a right-hand turn. 

    Thermal Technologies had a business automobile insurance policy with State Farm, a commercial general liability policy, and an umbrella insurance policy with Owners Insurance. Sparks had a personal automobile insurance policy with Travels Home Insurance Company. Theriot filed a lawsuit against State Farm, Sparks, and Thermal Technologies. She later added Travelers and Owners to the lawsuit. 

    The parties disputed how to rank the multiple insurance policies involved. Travelers and State Farm both claimed their policies only provided excess coverage. They claimed Owners’ commercial general liability policy provided primary and excess coverage. Owners claimed its commercial general liability policy did not provide any coverage her, but its umbrella policy provided coverage. 

    Theriot filed for declaratory judgment to determine the rank and coverage of the various involved insurance policies. The trial court declared Travelers provided primary coverage, State Farm provided secondary coverage, and Owners provided excess coverage. State Farm filed an appeal, arguing it was not the second layer of coverage because the policies had “other insurance” clauses that should require the other insurers to share coverage pro rata. 

    “Other insurance” clauses define an insurer’s responsibility and how liability should be divided when there is other applicable insurance coverage. Under a pro rata “other insurance’ clause, the insurers divide the responsibility among themselves. When the words of an insurance contract, including “other insurance” clauses, are clear, courts must interpret the contract as written. See La. C.C. art. 2046 and 2047. 

    Here, the Owners commercial general liability policy included an explicit exclusion for damages resulted from a car accident and did not cover rented vehicles like the one involved in the accident. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s holding that the commercial general liability policy provided coverage but affirmed affirmed the trial court’s judgment that Owners was liable for excess coverage. 

    Given the multiple “other insurance” clauses in the various insurance policies, the court tried to find an interpretation that would reconcile the various clauses. The appellate court disagreed Travelers had primary coverage and State Farm had secondary coverage. Rather, the appellate court found under La. R.S. 22:1296, which applies to coverage for rental cars, both policies provided primary coverage. Therefore, the appellate court allocated liability pro rata between Travelers and State Farm, based on their respective policy limits.

    This case illustrates the complexities that can arise in dividing coverage when multiple insurance policies are involved.  A good attorney can help you navigate these complexities so you receive the coverage to which you are entitled.

    Additional Sources: Sonya Theriot v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Insurance Policy Coverage: Understanding Recovery in Excess of Insurance Coverage in Car Accident Cases in Louisiana

  • Car Accident Case Dismissed For Improper Venue

    If you are considering filing a lawsuit, it is essential that you file it in the correct venue. Otherwise, the court may lack authority to hear your claim and will not be able to consider the merits of your case. 

    While driving in Terrobonne Parish, Louisiana, Joanna Gilbert had a single car accident on Highway 3011. The accident occurred where the road ended. When she went onto the unpaved pat of the road, she ran off the unpaved area and went into the water. 

    Gilbert filed a lawsuit in Iberia Parish, where she lived, against the State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development (“DOTD”). She alleged the car accident had occurred because of DOTD’s negligence, which resulted in her injuries. Gilbert later added her uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance carrier as a defendant. 

    Gilbert argued the inclusion of her insurer made the venue of the Parish of Iberia, where she lived, proper. The DOTD filed a motion arguing venue was improper, which the trial court granted. Gilbert filed an appeal.

    On appeal, Gilbert argued the trial court erred in grant DOTD’s motion arguing venue was improper. La. C.C.P. art. 41 defines venue as the parish where a lawsuit can be properly brought and tried. La. R.S. 13:5104 outlines the mandatory venue provisions in lawsuits brought against state agencies, including DOTD. It requires that all lawsuits brought against a state agency or Louisiana itself must be filed in the court where the state capitol is located or in the location where the cause of action arose – here, Terrebonne Parish.

    Gilbert filed her lawsuit against DOTD in Iberia Parish, which is where she lived. She claimed that was the appropriate venue, because she later added her uninsured/underinsured motorist insurance carrier as a defendant. DOTD argued the facts and theories of why DOTD was liable in Gilbert’s petition all occurred outside of Iberia Parish. 

    Although Gilbert claimed her later addition of her uninsured/underinsured motorist related back to her initial lawsuit, DOTD argued those facts were not the operative facts in the lawsuit. The court agreed with DOTD’s position.

    In reviewing the record, the appellate court noted all of DOTD’s acts of purported negligence occurred in Terrebonne Parish. Additionally, DOTD is a state entity covered by La. R.S. 13:5104. Therefore, it was mandatory for Gilbert to file her lawsuit against DOTD in the district court that had jurisdiction in the parish where the events giving rise to the cause of action occurred – here, in Terrebonne Parish. Therefore, the appellate court agreed the trial court had properly granted DOTD’s motion arguing there was improper venue. 

    It is important to consult with a knowledgeable attorney who can advise you on the appropriate venue in which to file your lawsuit. This is especially true if there are special venue statutes applicable to your case, such as if you are filing a lawsuit against a state agency. If you do not file your lawsuit in the proper venue, then the court will be unable to consider the merits of your case.

    Additional Sources: Joanna Gilbert v. State of Louisiana, through the Department of Transportation and Development

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Venue: Vermilion Parish Car Accident Case Hangs on Thread Over Improper Venue

  • Prior Mistake Does Not Waive Insurer’s Defense In Subsequent Claim

    If you are in a car accident and your insurance pays your claim, you likely expect the same thing will happen if you are subsequently in a similar accident. What happens if your insurer paid your prior claim, but tries to deny a subsequent claim? 

    Brandon Forvendel was injured in a car accident. When the accident occurred, he was driving a car he owned and was insured by State Farm. Forvendel had uninsured motorist coverage. After the accident, Forvendel recovered under his uninsured motorist policy. 

    When the accident occurred, he was living with his mother, who also had insurance through State Farm. Forvendel also tried to recover under his mother’s uninsured motorist policy, which had higher policy limits. State Farm denied his attempt to recover under both his and his mother’s policies under the anti-stacking provisions in La. R.S. 22:1295(1)(c). Forvendel then filed a lawsuit against State Farm. 

    He claimed this situation was similar to what occurred when he was involved in another accident years earlier and State Farm had allowed him to recover under both his and his mother’s uninsured motorist policies. State Farm representatives testified they had not considered the anti-stacking statute at the time of the prior accident. 

    The district court found in favor of Forvendel, noting State Farm had previously interpreted the policy to cover Forvendel under his mother’s policy, based on State Farm paying Forvendel when the prior accident occurred. State Farm appealed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in holding State Farm had waived any defenses to the current claim by having paid Forvendel when the prior accident occurred. 

    The Louisiana Supreme Court noted Forvendel did not dispute that the anti-stacking provision applied here. However, he argued State Farm waived its right to this defense by paying out his prior claim. In Steptore v. Masco Constr. Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held an insurer waives its right to coverage defenses if they assume and continue to defend the insured even when there are facts they had the right to deny coverage. 

    However, the court distinguished Steptore from the situation here. In Steptore, the waiver was based on the insurer’s actions with respect to a specific incident. In this case, Forvendel tried to rely on State Farm’s actions from a claim years earlier. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court held the insurer had not waived its defenses to Forvendel’s current claim by paying out the claim associated with his accident years earlier and reversed the appellate court’s holding State Farm had waived its defenses by having paid the prior claim. Otherwise, the court noted State Farm would never be allowed to use the anti-stacking statue as a defense against subsequent claims.

    This case illustrates how just because your insurance policy paid out one claim, does not mean your insurer will have have to pay a subsequent similar claim. A good attorney can advise you on what your insurance policy does and does not qualify and what to do if your insurer denies your claim.

    Additional Sources: Brandon Forvendel v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Insurance Coverage: Understanding Recovery in Excess of Insurance Coverage in Car Accident Cases in Louisiana

  • Who Is Covered By A Settlement Agreement Release?

    A settlement agreement can be an efficient way of resolving a claim and receiving compensation without a lengthy trial process. However, it is essential to understand what a settlement agreement does and does not cover to avoid surprises down the road if you later try to bring related lawsuits against other parties. 

    Kerry Maggio was injured in a car accident when he was hit by a vehicle driven by James Parker, who worked for Sandwich Kings. Brenda Parker owned the vehicle, which was insured by the Louisiana Farm Bureau. Maggio filed a lawsuit against James Parker, Sandwich Kings, and their insurers. 

    Maggio signed a settlement agreement and release of all claims with Brenda Parker and the Louisiana Farm Bureau. Neither James Parker nor Sandwich Kings was specifically mentioned in the release. Sandwich Kings and its insurer filed a summary judgment motion, arguing Maggio’s release applied to them because it released “all other persons” who were or might be liable for his injuries from the accident. 

    Maggio claimed Sandwich Kings was not covered by the release. The district court denied defendants’ summary judgment motion. The appellate court agreed with the district court’s judgment, explaining there was no clear intention for the release to benefit Sandwich Kings as a third-party beneficiary. 

    The Louisiana Supreme Court explained because the release’s language was clear and unambiguous, it could not consider evidence outside the corners of the release. See La. C.C. art. 2046. Settlement agreements and releases are governed by general principles of contract interpretation. See La. C.C. art. 3071. However, there is an exception that allows parties to introduce extrinsic evidence to the court to determine the scope of a settlement agreement, such as in the dispute here. The release explicitly stated it released “all other persons.” However, the release did not specifically name or reference Sandwich Kings or James Parker. 

    Maggio negotiated the release with Brenda Parker and Farm Bureau, neither of whom were defendants in the litigation. Further, the defendants were not involved in negotiating the release and were not specifically named. Additionally, there was nothing in the release about dismissing the ongoing lawsuit against Sandwich Kings and James Parker.

    The defendants were also unable to demonstrate that they received any third-party benefit through the release. Therefore, Maggio sufficiently showed evidence about the scope of what the parties intended to cover in their settlement agreement. Further, summary judgment is not the appropriate stage to make determination about subjective intent. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial and appellate court’s denial of defendants’ summary judgment motion because the release did not show a clear intent to benefit the defendants as third-party beneficiaries.

    Much of the conflict in this lawsuit about what the release covered could have been avoided if the release had been more precisely drafted. If you are considering signing a settlement agreement, it is important to consult with an attorney, so you understand what is covered by the agreement and you are not releasing more than you intend to. 

    Additional Sources: Kerry Maggio v. James Parker et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Settlement Agreements: Can a Settlement Agreement Preclude Future Lawsuits? Not Always: A Case Study

  • Presumption of Negligence in Rear-End Accidents Does Not Always Lead To Summary Judgment Victory

    Under Louisiana law, there is a presumption the driver of a car that rear-ends another car acted negligently. However, this presumption of negligence can be overcome in certain situations, such as if the driver of the vehicle that was rear-end shifted lanes soon before the accident.

    While Tammy Bloxham was stopped at a red light in her car, she was hit from behind by Andy Gibbs Jr. At the time of the accident, Gibbs was driving a tractor-trailer owned by 31 Energy. Bloxham filed a lawsuit against Gibs, 31 Energy, and 31 Energy’s insurer. Bloxham argued 31 Energy had been negligent in hiring Gibbs and not inspecting its vehicle’s brakes. The defendants filed a summary judgment motion, claiming Bloxham had not reported this claim in her pending bankruptcy. Bloxham also filed a summary judgment motion, claiming Gibbs was liable under La. R.S. 32:81 A and the presumed negligence of the driver of a following vehicle who hits the rear of another vehicle.

    The trial court granted Bloxham’s summary judgment motion given the presumption that a following driver who rear ends another vehicle is negligent. The court held this applied even if Bloxham had changed lanes immediately before the accident. The defendants filed an appeal.

    At the summary judgment stage, a court cannot make credibility determinations or decide between differing accounts of what transpired. Even if the rear-end presumption of negligence applies, a court must still determine if the driver in front contributed to the accident. See Matherne v. Lorraine.

    On appeal, the defendants argued the courts should have assessed comparative fault, even if there was a presumption of negligence because Gibbs had rear-ended Bloxham. Specifically, defendants argued Bloxham could have been partially at fault for having changed lanes just before the accident occurred. Defendants argued drivers who change lanes on a highway have a duty to determine whether they can do so without endangering oncoming traffic, so if Bloxham had changed lanes immediately before the accident, she could be partially at fault.

    The court agreed summary judgment is not appropriate in all cases involving a rear-end accident. Here, the deposition testimony from various witnesses presented conflicting accounts of what had transpired. For examples, Gibbs’ deposition indicated it had looked to him like Bloxham had tried to change lanes immediately prior to the incident. Bloxham argued Gibbs had admitted he was solely at fault for the accident as he testified he was not blaming anyone else for the accident. This led to a a factual issue about Bloxham’s conduct immediately before the accident and whether it made her partially at fault for the accident. Given the outstanding factual issues, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of Bloxham’s summary judgment motion. 

    If you have been involved in a rear-end accident, a knowledgeable attorney can advise you on what evidence you should present given Louisiana’s presumption of negligence for the driver who rear-ended the other vehicle. As seen here, the mere fact one driver rear-ended another vehicle does not necessarily mean that driver is completely at-fault for the accident. 

    Additional Sources: Tammy Bloxham and Christophe Odgen v. HDI-Gerling America Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Rear-End Accidents: If Your Car is Rear Ended in An Accident Who is Presumed to be at Fault in Louisiana?

  • Can an Independent Contractor collect Workers’ Compensation Benefits?

    The distinction between independent contractors and employees has always been something of a balancing test. This distinction becomes vital in workers’ compensation issues, where employees generally enjoy peace of mind with workers’ compensation in the event of an injury, whereas independent contractors usually do not. But are there some cases where an independent contractor can collect workers’ compensation benefits? The answer to this question is illustrated in the following appeal from the New Orleans Office of Workers’ Compensation.

    Federico Espinoza Martinez and four others were hired by Jaroslov Rames to lower a washer/dryer combination unit to the first floor of an apartment building. During the lowering of the unit, Mr. Martinez received a laceration on his hand when one of the ropes used snapped. Despite a broken rope and cut hand, Mr. Martinez and the others completed the job. Afterward, Mr. Rames drove Mr. Martinez to the emergency room, paying five hundred dollars to ensure proper treatment was administered. Mr. Martinez later attempted to collect his pay from Mr. Rames. Mr. Rames informed him that he had deducted the five-hundred-dollar emergency room fee from Mr. Martinez’s check and planned to deduct the remainder of the hospital fee from his future earnings.

    Mr. Martinez filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits he believed Mr. Rames owed him. The issue was heard by the Office of Workers’ Compensation (henceforth “OWC”), and it was found that Mr. Martinez was not an employe of Mr. Rames, but rather an independent contractor. Benefits were denied based on this finding. Mr. Martinez appealed, maintaining that the OWC failed to apply the manual labor exception outlined in La. R.S. 23:1021(7). The OWC found the manual labor exception did not apply to the set of facts, denying benefits again for Mr. Martinez.

    La. R.S. 23:1021(7) states, “An independent contractor is covered by the provisions of workers’ compensation when a substantial part of their work time is spent performing manual labor.” In Lushute v. Diesi, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that “an independent contractor must show that a substantial part of their work was spent doing manual labor to carry out the terms of their contract and that the work was vital to the trade, business, or occupation of the principal to the contract.”In determining what constitutes manual labor, the courts have consistently held it to be work where the work’s physicality outweighs the work’s mental element. “Whether an activity is part of the principal’s trade, business, or occupation must be determined on the facts of each unique case.”

    Mr. Martinez’s work for Mr. Rames consisted of carpentry and maintenance. A reasonable person would find these types of labor to be more physical than mental. The court then turned to whether the work being performed at the time was part of Mr. Rames’ trade, business, or occupation. Mr. Rames owned and managed several apartments which he had available to rent through the popular lodging website Air BNB. Mr. Martinez had worked for Mr. Rames at his apartments several times. On the day of the incident, Mr. Martinez was moving a washer/dryer unit at one of Mr. Rames’ apartments with the purpose of making room to open up a wall to increase space for a bigger unit.

    The court reasoned that accommodation of renters’ needs via maintenance and improvements is a necessary task in owning and operating a rental business. From these findings, the court held that the OWC should have applied the manual labor exception to Mr. Martinez.

    When an employee or independent contractor sustains an injury while on the job, determining eligibility for compensation can be very confusing, factors like circumstances surrounding the incident, laws of the specific jurisdiction, nature of the employee’s work, and the type of business the employer runs can all play a part. Those navigating this complex process should seek the guidance and expertise of an experienced attorney.

    Additional Sources orkers’O ESPINOZA MARTINEZ v. JAROSLAV RAMES / WORLD OF TASTE, LLC

    Article WriWorkers’ T.J. Reinhardt

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Workers’ CompensationWorkers’ An Employee Entitled To Select A Physician For A Workers’ Compensation Claim?

  • Louisiana Jury Did Not Err In Apportioning Fault For Car Crash

    In the heart of Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, tragedy struck on Interstate 10 as a routine drive turned fatal. Arthur Huguley, behind the wheel of a tractor-trailer for AAA Cooper Transportation, found himself in a situation that would forever alter the lives of those involved. A blown-out tire, a series of events, and a wrongful death lawsuit brought forth by Curley Mouton’s surviving family members set the stage for a courtroom drama that unfolded with unexpected twists. In the end, a jury assigned fault, but the defendants, Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer, were not ready to accept the verdict without a fight. This article explores the intricacies of their appeal, shedding light on the compelling arguments presented and the complexities of apportioning fault in a tragic accident.

    Arthur Huguley was driving a tractor-trailer in Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, on Interstate 10 while working for AAA Cooper Transportation (“AAA Cooper”).  Huguley heard a bang and worried he might have blown out a tire. While performing a maneuver to see if he had blown out a tire, the tire that had blown out came apart and flew into the air. Curley Mouton was driving in a truck behind Huguley when debris from the tire started flying through the air. The debris hit Mouton’s truck, causing him to hit a guardrail, flip over, and crash. Mouton died in the crash. 

    Mouton’s surviving spouse and son filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Huguley, AAA Cooper, and their insurer. A jury found in favor of Mouton’s family and assigned 10% fault to Huguley and 90% to AAA Cooper for putting a defective tire on its truck. The defendants appealed, claiming the jury had erred in its ruling.

    On appeal, the defendants raised multiple issues about the trial court’s ruling. The defendants first argued that the jury erred in not assigning Mouton any fault and assigning 10% of fault to Huguley. An appellate court must defer to the jury’s division of fault. See Dupree v. City of New Orleans. If there are two reasonable ways to view the evidence, then the jury’s allocation cannot be manifestly erroneous, so the appellate court cannot overturn the division of fault. See Stobart v. State, Dep’t of Transp. and Dev.

    The appellate court reviewed the evidence related to the jury’s decision to allocate Mouton no fault for the accident. At trial, the driver who had been driving behind both Huguley and Mouton when the accident occurred testified about the events that gave rise to the car accident. The driver testified in his view, Mouton had not done anything wrong. Another witness to the accident also testified she did not think Mouton had done anything improper. The witnesses thought Mouton was safely and carefully operating his vehicle at the time of the accident. Therefore, the appellate court held the jury did not err in allocating no fault to Mouton.

    The appellate court next considered whether the jury had erred in assigning 10% fault to Huguley. At trial, Huguley had testified about why he had performed the maneuver to see if one of his tires had blown out instead of pulling over and inspecting the tires.  He also testified he had gone an additional two miles after hearing the loud bang before checking if one of the tires on the truck had blown out. The evidence also showed the at-issue tire was at least six years old and had been retreaded and plugged multiple times. AAA Cooper was aware of the tire’s history but decided to continue using it instead of replacing it. Therefore, the appellate court held that the jury did not err in assigning 10% of the fault to Huguley and the remaining 90% to AAA Cooper. 

    On appeal, the defendants also argued the trial court erred by allowing the Plaintiffs’ expert, Michael Gillen, to testify about accident reconstruction. An appellate court can only overturn a trial court’s decision on whether to qualify an expert witness if the trial court abused its discretion. See State v. Castleberry. 

    The appellate court reviewed the record about Gillen’s training and experience. The evidence showed Gillen had extensive training and experience. He had also been qualified as an expert in multiple prior lawsuits. A prior case before the Louisiana Supreme Court, Cheairs v. State ex rel. DOTD noted Gillen’s extensive experience. Based on the evidence of Gillen’s experience and training, the appellate court held the trial court had not erred in permitting Gillen to testify as an expert witness. 

    Finally, the defendants argued plaintiffs did not plead a valid cause of action against AAA Cooper, who owned the tractor-trailer Huguley was driving at the time of the accident. The appellate court noted that the plaintiffs’ petition claimed that AAA Cooper did not properly maintain their tractor-trailer and did not adhere to reasonable safety standards. The appellate court found those allegations set forth the plaintiffs’ theory that AAA Cooper was responsible for the failed tire. Additionally, the plaintiffs noted the defendants did not object to including a blank for AAA’s fault at trial on the form provided to the jury. 

    Under La. C.C. art. 1793(c), if a party does not object to a jury instruction at trial, it waives its right to object to the charges at trial. Further, AAA Cooper had stipulated Huguley was in the course and scope of his employment with them when the accident occurred. As a result, because of vicarious liability, AAA Cooper would be responsible for the entire judgment amount the jury allocated to it and Huguley. Therefore, the appellate court found any error in how the jury allocated fault between AAA Cooper and Huguley would have been harmless because it would not have affected the amount AAA Cooper owed.

    The journey through the legal labyrinth, as seen in the appellate battle following Curley Mouton’s tragic accident, highlights the multifaceted nature of seeking justice. While the appellate court ultimately upheld the jury’s allocation of fault, the defendants’ efforts to challenge the judgment underscore the importance of legal expertise in navigating the intricate world of appeals. This case is a stark reminder that the pursuit of justice is not merely about the trial but extends to the post-trial battleground, where skilled attorneys play a pivotal role in defending or contesting verdicts. Mouton’s family prevailed in their pursuit of accountability, but their struggle on appeal illuminates the challenging terrain that litigants must traverse to secure justice in the face of adversity.

    Additional Sources: Linda and Cory Mouton v. AAA Cooper Transportation, et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Apportioning Fault: Iberville Parish Car Crash Shows Court’s Role in Apportioning Fault

  • Management Company Not Qualified As Additional Insured In Cleaning Company’s Insurance Policy

    It can be challenging to interpret insurance policies, especially when they involve complex provisions such as coverage for an additional insured. Before signing an insurance policy, it is imperative to understand its language and what it does and does not cover. Here, the plain language of the insurance policy proved instrumental in the appellate court’s ruling.

    Pamela Sloane was injured while working for Integrity Cleaning Services (“Integrity”) at Forestwood Apartments. She was cleaning a ceiling fan while standing on a ladder. She inadvertently touched an exposed wire, which electrocuted her, and she fell from the ladder. Sloane filed a lawsuit against CLK Multifamily Management (“CLK”) and others. Sloane claimed CLK had not adequately maintained the premises or warned of the dangerous condition of the exposed wire. CLK filed its answer to the lawsuit, denying the allegations, and added Travelers Indemnity (“Travelers”) to the lawsuit.  CLK claimed Integrity was contractually required to have a general liability insurance policy that covered CLK as additional insureds. 

    Travelers filed a summary judgment motion, claiming CLK was not an additional insured under the policy. Travelers attached a copy of the relevant insurance policy to its summary judgment motion. CLK disagreed and claimed it was indeed an additional insured.  The trial court concluded CLK was not qualified as an additional insured and granted Travelers’ summary judgment motion. 

    An insurance policy is a contract interpreted using general contractual interpretation rules.   Under La. C.C. art. 2045, the court’s role is to determine the parties’ common intent.  To do so, courts look first at the insurance policy’s language. See La. C.C. art. 2046. Here, CLK had the burden of proving the applicable insurance policy covered it because it was the party claiming to be covered by the insurance policy. 

    The court analyzed the additional insured provision of the insurance policy. While CLK and Travelers did not disagree that Integrity had agreed to have its insurance cover CLK as an additional insured, they disputed the scope of coverage and whether CLK qualified.  In interpreting the plain language of the insurance policy, the court concluded the policy only applied to CLK when Integrity would have been vicariously liable for something Integrity had done or had failed to do. 

    In this case, Sloane’s allegations would have involved something CLK had independently done or failed to do, not an act or omission of Integrity. Given the circumstances of Sloane’s injuries involving the exposed wire, Integrity could not be liable for her injuries, such as if Integrity had not properly trained Sloane how to clean a ceiling fan.  Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of Travelers’ summary judgment motion.

    As seen in this case, it was insufficient for CLK to confirm the insurance policy had an additional insured provision. Instead, CLK needed to read and understand the specific requirements for applying the provision. An experienced insurance claim attorney can help advise you on insurance policies so you know what the policy does and does not cover. 

    Additional Sources: Pamela Sloane v. Forestwoods Apartments/Baton Rouse, LTD., CLK Multifamily Management, LLC and Aspen American Ins. Co.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Insurance Coverage: Understanding Insurance Exclusions: A Case of Property Damage Coverage for Borrowed Cars