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Category: Accidents

  • Who’s At Fault if your car is stolen then involved in a wreck? The Thief, Victim, or Third Party Owner? (One Judges Dissenting Opinion)

    In the legal system, dissenting opinions, i.e., opinions delivered by one or more judges who disagree with the decision, play a crucial role in shaping the interpretation and application of the law. They provide valuable insights into alternative viewpoints, often sparking discussion and debate and ultimately leading to the evolution of jurisprudence. One such notable dissenting opinion can be found in the case of Christopher Blanchard v. Demetrius J. Hicks et al., authored by Justice Cooks. In this blog post, we look at the case, the arguments made in the dissent, and the importance of dissent in the legal landscape.

    The case of Christopher Blanchard v. Demetrius J. Hicks et al. arose from an incident in which Officer Blanchard’s patrol car was struck by a stolen truck. The plaintiff, Officer Blanchard, alleged that the defendant, Demetrius J. Hicks, was negligent in leaving his vehicle unattended with the keys in the ignition and the engine running, thereby facilitating the theft that led to the accident.

    The majority of the court relied on the precedent set by the Supreme Court’s decision in Racine, which held that leaving keys in a vehicle does not create liability for the motorist if a thief steals the car and causes injury to a third party. However, Judge Cooks dissented from the majority’s opinion, arguing that Racine does not dispose of the factual matter at hand.

    Judge Cooks pointed out that Racine’s circumstances differed from the present case. The vehicle was not parked on a public street or roadway in Racine. Thus, it did not fall under the scope of the statute that prohibits leaving a motor vehicle unattended without stopping the motor, locking the ignition, and removing the key. Conversely, in the present case, the stolen vehicle was parked on a public roadway with the keys in the ignition and the engine running.

    Judge Cooks disagreed with the majority’s reliance on prior cases, such as Roach v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., Berlochaux v. Employers Mutual of Wausau, and Call v. Huffman. These cases, according to the dissent, did not involve a violation of the statute in question and were not directly applicable to the current matter.

    Judge Cooks also emphasized that the law on this issue was far from settled. He argued that a duty/risk analysis should be conducted to determine whether Hicks’ actions breached the duty imposed by the statute and contributed to Officer Blanchard’s injuries. This, he argued, should be decided by a fact finder after a full trial on the merits.

    Judge Cooks stressed modern principles of negligence and comparative fault, suggesting that Hicks may bear some degree of comparative fault for his negligent behavior in leaving his keys in the car on a public road, making it easy for a thief to steal the vehicle and cause harm to others. He argues that the statute has always emphasized its purpose of preventing theft. Therefore, the owner of the vehicle had a duty to prevent the theft of his vehicle and, in breach of that duty, owed some degree of comparative fault to the plaintiff.

    Dissenting opinions such as Judge Cooks’ play a crucial role in the legal system. They offer alternative interpretations and analyses of the law, providing a dissenting view that can shape future legal developments. Judge Cooks sheds light on the case’s complexity by raising important questions about the applicability of previous precedents and emphasizing the need for a duty-risk analysis.

    This case is a prime example of the importance of dissenting opinions in the legal system. Judge Cooks’ dissent challenges the majority’s reliance on prior cases and calls for a comprehensive analysis of the applicable law. The dissent encourages critical discussion that can influence future decisions and contribute to the ongoing development of the law. As the legal landscape evolves, dissents will remain essential to the judicial process, ensuring a robust and dynamic legal system.

    Additional Sources: APPEAL FROM THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 257,487

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Liability: Who’s At Fault if your car is stolen then involved in a wreck? The Thief, Victim, or Third Party Owner?

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Oprah Jerome 

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Car Accidents: A Life-Altering Car Accident Ignites a Legal Feud

  • Louisiana Court Says Trampoline Injury Not Caused by Defect in Shreveport Trampoline Park

    Sometimes, those delightful recreational activities we all enjoy carry an inherent risk. Often, we assume the risk of those injuries when we engage in that potentially reckless conduct. Knowing your legal options following these injuries is necessary, mainly because recovering for these somewhat ordinary injuries can be difficult. What does it look like when a party cannot recover for a recreational injury–here, an injury from a trampoline park visit?

    Kurt and Tabitha Perkins visited a Shreveport indoor trampoline park, Air U. Kurt was injured while at Air U, and he was relatively young, had no known or apparent medical issues before the injury, and had done some time with the U.S. Marine Corps. The Perkinses filed a lawsuit against Air U and other parties, namely insurance companies and Air U’s unidentified employees. 

    Kurt stated in a deposition that he did not know why his left knee gave out when jumping on the trampoline, as he had no other injuries or treatment to his left leg. The other patrons at the trampoline park, mostly young kids, had no trouble jumping on the trampoline. Kurt and Tabitha stated that they did not notice any defects on the trampoline and that Kurt jumped normally when he was hurt. Tabitha also said that an Air U employee did not call an ambulance because he was not a manager. 

    One of Air U’s owners, Mr. Murphy, stated that the other owners had vast experience with trampolines, but Air U did not have liability insurance when Kurt was injured. Murphy further said that patrons at Air U are repeatedly shown the park’s rules and must sign a waiver, which Kurt did. Additionally, Murphy stated that Air U trampolines are tested twice weekly for proper tension every day and for proper structure. 

    Dr. Gerald George, a Ph.D. in biomechanics, inspected Air U for the plaintiffs and stated in his affidavit that Kurt’s injuries were consistent with what one could expect from the unreasonably dangerous activity of jumping on trampolines. 

    Air U filed a motion for summary judgment. At the motion’s hearing, the Perkinses argued that the design of the trampoline park was inherently defective and dangerous, particularly the mounting of the wall trampolines at angles. Air U argued in response that the defects alleged by the Perkinses were irrelevant because Kurt was jumping up and down on a floor trampoline when he was injured. 

    The trial court, Parish of Caddo, partially granted Air U’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed part of Perkins’ claims. The Perkinses appealed that decision by the trial court and brought the case to the Second Circuit. 

    A court should grant a motion for summary judgment if the record shows no genuine issue of material fact. La. C.C.P. art. 966. The party moving for summary judgment is burdened with no factual support for at least one element of the other party’s claim. Upon that showing, the nonmoving party must produce factual support for that questionable element to prevent summary judgment. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1). Appellate courts reviewing summary judgment rulings should use the same criteria used by the trial court and assess the record anew to determine if summary judgment was appropriate.

    In their appeal, the Perkinses argued that the possible defective design, installation, and inspection of the Air U trampolines were all still disputed and could have created an unreasonable risk of harm. The Perkinses further argue that they have sufficient evidence to support this claim and show a dispute of material fact, thus barring summary judgment. The Perkinses’ claim of the trampoline’s risky defects is outlined in La. C.C. arts. 2317 and 2317(1). Ultimately, a plaintiff seeking damages caused by a defect has to prove four things: (1) the defecting thing was in the defendant’s control, (2) the thing unreasonably risked harm to others due to a defect, (3) the defect caused the damage or injury, and (4) the defendant knew, or should have known, that the defect existed. Wells v. Town of Delhi. 

    Determining whether the defective thing is in the defendant’s custody is determined by considering if the defendant has the right of direction or control over the thing and if there is any benefit the defendant gets from that thing. Barnes v. Riverwood Apartments P’ship. The Second Circuit determined that Air U was in custody of the potentially defective trampoline because Air U owns and maintains the trampolines and gets revenues from controlling those trampolines. 

    A thing is defective if there is a condition that creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others using ordinary care and caution. Lawrence v. Sanders. To assess if something creates an unreasonable risk of harm, the social value and utility of the thing must be weighed against its possible danger to others. This balancing test can be done through several factors, such as whether the possible danger is obvious to potential victims of that danger, or perhaps whether there is a history of accidents related to the alleged defect. Moore v. Oak Meadows Apartments. The Perkinses argued that the entire Air U park was dangerous and defective, so the Second Circuit had to consider whether the social utility of the park outweighed its potential harm to patrons. Evidence indicated that Air U had a high social utility for its 90,000 patrons of all ages and that Air U had a history of 88 documented injuries in its first nine months of operation, a rate below the national average in the trampoline park industry. Accordingly, the court determined that the park’s utility outweighed its harm, and thus, the Perkinses did not show a defect in Air U. Because the Perkinses failed to prove this second element of La. C.C. art, 2317(1), their claim fell short. 

    The Perkinses also claimed that the trial court failed to apply res ipsa loquitur when it granted summary judgment. Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine of negligence that applies when the plaintiff uses circumstantial evidence to show the defendant’s negligent conduct. Res ipsa applies when (1) the injury would not generally occur without negligence, (2) the evidence should sufficiently show that negligence was the cause of the injury, and (3) the defendant’s negligence must fall under the defendant’s duty owed to the plaintiff. Linnear v. Centerpoint Energy Entex/Reliant Energy. The court assessed the applicability of res ipsa to Kurt’s injury and found that an injury to the knee due to jumping on a trampoline is not such an extraordinary injury that it indicates the trampoline owner’s negligence. Accordingly, the Second Circuit determined that res ipsa did not apply to deem Air U negligent concerning their trampolines. 

    Everyday recreational activities often bear the risk of injury, but people still engage in those activities. When those people get injured during those activities, it is essential that they acquire counsel to help them navigate the problematic injury of recovery–both legal and monetary recovery, as well as physical. The areas of defective conditions and unreasonable risks are murky, and getting knowledgeable representation is vital to your best outcome in court. 

    Additional Sources: Perkins v. Air U Shreveport, LLC

    Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Defects: City’s Liability for a Child’s Fall on a Defective Sidewalk

  • Mere Possibility is Not Fact: Baton Rouge Negligence Claim Falls to Summary Judgment

    Summary judgment is designed to enable judicial expediency and cost-effectiveness in the courts. It is an important and complicated procedure that can occur repeatedly during litigation. When summary judgment is asserted repeatedly in the same case, how do parties prevail in their attempts to get or defeat summary judgment motions? The following case helps answer that question. 

    Ozark Motor Lines transported a packed Ozark trailer from Restoration Hardware to Baton Rouge. In Baton Rouge, Exel Inc. received the trailer, and Exel employee, plaintiff, Alex Talbert, was injured by the boxes being unloaded from the trailer. Talbert then brought a personal injury suit against Restoration Hardware and Ozark for damages, arguing that the trailer was negligently packed and thus caused Talbert’s injuries. 

    Restoration Hardware was dismissed from the lawsuit, and later, Ozark moved for summary judgment twice. The trial court denied the first motion, but the second motion was granted after Ozark submitted additional documents to the court. Talbert appealed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for Ozark, arguing that issues of material fact remained and that the court should not have heard Ozark’s second motion. 

     Appellate courts conduct a new assessment of evidence to decide whether the trial court’s summary judgment is appropriate. Summary judgment is an appropriate ruling if all the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact exists. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3). The party moving for summary judgment has the responsibility to show the court that no issues of material fact exist on the record. This responsibility, however, only applies to the issues that the moving party must show at trial. After the moving party shows the court that one or more elements of the other party’s claims lack support, the other party must provide evidence that summary judgment is still inappropriate. La. Code Civ. P. art 966(D)(1). 

    Talbert had the burden of proving Ozark’s breach of duty and the standard of care to support his negligence claim. The five requirements of this showing include (1) the defendant had a duty to conduct a standard of care, (2) the defendant did not meet this standard, (3) the defendant’s conduct actually caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (4) the defendant’s conduct legally caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (5) the existence of actual damages. Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana. The existence of duty is a question of law, and in negligence cases, there is a largely universal duty for the defendant to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc.

    Talbert argued that the second motion brought by Ozark was barred by issue preclusion because the motion was the same as the first denied motion. La. R.S. 13:4231. However, under Louisiana law, denial of an initial summary judgment motion does not prohibit a second summary judgment motion. Bozarth v. State LSU Medical Center/Chabert Medical Center. The appellate court rejected this argument. 

    Talbert also appealed, arguing the trial court incorrectly determined that no issues of material fact remained. Specifically, Talbert argued that there was still a genuine dispute as to whether Ozark had a duty to inspect the trailer’s safety and whether Ozark breached such a duty and caused Talbert’s injury. Ozark, in response, argued that there was no evidence of any duty, breach, or causation, particularly because Ozark was not involved in or present at the unloading of the trailer at Exel in Baton Rouge. 49 C.F.R. 392.9 provides that inspection duties do not apply to sealed commercial motor vehicles, and Ozark posited that the trailer was sealed such that Ozark did not have a responsibility to inspect the sealed trailer. 

    Testimony from Exel confirmed that the trailer was still sealed upon its arrival and that Exel has a policy to inspect the trailer once it is opened. Testimony from Ozark employees stated that Ozark’s driver was not permitted to inspect the trailer after picking it up for transport. Testimony from Restoration Hardware stated that Ozark drivers could inspect the trailer if they asked for Restoration Hardware’s consent, but that is extremely rare. 

    Based on the evidence, the court found that Ozark had no duty to inspect the trailer or the security of the trailer’s contents. The trailer was sealed, Ozark was instructed not to open the trailer, and Ozark’s only role in these events was transporting a sealed trailer. Talbert presented evidence that the trailer may have been poorly loaded; however, it takes more than a mere possibility to prove facts and defeat summary judgment. Hawkins v. Fowler. Because Ozark presented evidence that it did not owe Talbert a duty to inspect the trailer, and Talbert failed to provide support for the duty and standard of care elements,  the court affirmed summary judgment for Ozark. 

    Additional Sources: Talbert v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. 

    Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Motions for Summary Judgment: Appellate Court Affirms Second Motion for Summary Judgment After Rejecting the First

  • A Life-Altering Car Accident Ignites a Legal Feud

    Imagine, for a moment, living a life of normalcy, the humdrum of day-to-day routines, a steady job, a peaceful existence. Suddenly, an unexpected accident shakes your world, thrusting you into the tumultuous tides of legal proceedings. This is the daunting reality Patricia and Calvin Henderson found themselves in, initiating a monumental case against Amy Lashouto and her insurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm).

    In a startling sequence of events, Patricia and Calvin Henderson found themselves in a legal confrontation against Lashouto. The case revolves around Patricia’s car accident, where a motor vehicle driven by Lashouto rear-ended her. Following the accident, the Hendersons filed a lawsuit against Lashouto, her insurer, and State Farm, contending that they were insured under a policy that could compensate them for their losses. State Farm, however, countered this claim, maintaining that the policy did not provide uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) coverage for the accident.

    After Lashouto and her insurer settled their case with the Hendersons, the couple found themselves embroiled in a legal dispute with State Farm. The latter moved for summary judgment, arguing that Calvin Henderson had validly rejected UM coverage on the policy. Despite the Hendersons’ absence from the hearing, the trial court sided with State Farm, dismissing the UM coverage claims.

    Under Louisiana law, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted only if the evidence admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment shows there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. LA Code Civ. Pro 966. During their appeal, the Hendersons argue that neither Patricia nor Calvin received sufficient information to make an informed decision. 

    State Farm’s evidence includes a UM Coverage form, signed by Calvin, indicating the rejection of UM coverage. Further evidence includes excerpts from Calvin’s deposition, where he identified his signature on the rejection form. However, the Hendersons disputed these claims, presenting an affidavit by Calvin stating that he was instructed to sign an initial at certain places on the form to obtain maximum UM coverage. He further attests that his wife Patricia was never informed about this coverage.

    Based on Louisiana’s Court Civil Procedure, the Court of Appeals used the same criteria for rendering judgment as the trial court. Schultz v. Guoth. Considering the Hendersons’ absence, the Court further concluded that the affidavit is insufficient evidence to establish that the Hendersons will be able to satisfy their evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Despite Henderson’s assertions, the affidavit was inconsistent with his previous deposition testimony. Due to the inconsistencies and the absence of the Hendersons at the summary judgment hearing, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

    Overall, the case of Henderson v. Lashouto shines a spotlight on the intricacies of personal injury lawsuits, underlining the importance of understanding the specifics of insurance policies and the implications of informed consent. As such, it is advised to seek expert legal counsel to navigate such multifaceted scenarios and safeguard all parties’ interests.

    Additional Source: Henderson v. Lashouto

    Written by Brian Nguyen

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Insurance Dispute: Understanding Insurance Exclusions: A Case of Property Damage Coverage for Borrowed Cars

  • Louisiana Court Denies Workers Compensation for Injured Minor

    Injury in the workplace can usually be avoided with proper safety measures in place. Safety measures, however, become hard to enforce when minors and adults work in conjunction. This was the case for Austin Griggs, an illegally employed minor injured in a forklift accident while working.

    Bounce N’ Around Inflatables, LLC (BNA) supplies rentable party inflatables for personal or corporate events. When not in use, the inflatables are stored on racks that are 10 feet high. To move the inflatables, a battery-operated pallet jack was required. Griggs began working for BNA at the age of 14. BNA employed about 12 minors at the time Griggs was injured. Griggs testified that he had never been told that a work permit was required to work at BNA.

    On the day of injury, Griggs was helping another employee pick up and sort the inflatables. This required Griggs to get the inflatable onto the forklift, and then the other employee would use the forklift to move the inflatable into the rack. During this process, Griggs was required to use his weight to counterbalance the inflatable as the forklift lifted the inflatable upwards. Griggs testified that this was standard practice at BNA. During the lift, Griggs fell off the forklift. Then, the inflatable followed, landing on Griggs’s lower back. 

    When Ms.Griggs picked up Griggs from work, she immediately took Griggs to Ascension Urgent Care. Griggs was diagnosed with a closed metatarsal fracture and told to seek further evaluation and treatment with an orthopedist. Thus, Ms. Griggs took Griggs to Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic the following morning. Ms. Griggs called the owner of BNA to confirm that Griggs could be treated with BNA’s insurance through Louisiana Commerce & Trade Association Self-Insurers’ Fund. During the call, BNA’s owner instructed Ms. Griggs not to mention the forklift usage when utilizing the insurance. Griggs was seen by a doctor who later installed fixation hardware to Griggs’s fractured foot. 

    As a result of Grigg’s injuries, Ms. Griggs filed a lawsuit against BNA and their insurer. The trial court issued a judgment, holding that Griggs was illegally employed and engaged in illegal activities at the time of injury. The trial court found that Griggs could proceed with a tort claim despite this. This holding relied upon the reasoning in Ewert v. Georgia Casualty & Surety, Co. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Griggs for $125,000 for general damages and $ 24,517.93 for special damages, plus legal interest and all costs of the proceedings. The trial court further found that BNA’s insurer was entitled to reimbursement from Griggs for the sums paid for medical expenses, mileage, and lost wages, totaling $ 25,867.93.

    On appeal, BNA argued that the trial court’s general damages determination was an abuse of discretion and that the court improperly allowed Griggs to make a tort claim. Without the ability to make a tort claim, Griggs would be required to make a claim through the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. This Act, however, would not allow Griggs to make a claim because he was illegally employed and committing an illegal act when he was injured. The First Circuit agreed with BNA and reversed the trial court’s holding. The monetary damages were reversed, and all legal fees incurred on appeal by BNA were assessed to the Griggs family. 

    Austin Griggs’s case underscores the intricate nature of legal proceedings involving minors in the workforce and the complexities of tort claims in such scenarios. The appellate litigation brought forth various aspects of the case, including the implications of Griggs’s illegal employment status on his ability to pursue claims through the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The First Circuit’s decision highlighted the importance of understanding the legal landscape and the potential consequences of both plaintiff’s and defendant’s actions. When faced with complex legal scenarios like the Griggs case, securing the guidance of a proficient attorney becomes crucial in deciphering the nuances of the law and navigating the multifaceted terrain of appellate litigation.

    Additional Sources: Griggs v. Bounce N’ Around Inflatables L.L.C. 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Riley Calouette

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Workers Compensation: How Can You Get Workers Compensation When Your Employer Won’t Pay It?

  • Louisiana Court Finds Hospital Director Void of Liability in Medical Malpractice Suit Involving His Staff

    A visit to the hospital is a stressful and anxious time for patients and family members. Most people, however, assume that their doctors are competent and will administer the proper standard of care. This was not the case for Richard Smallwood. 

    Smallwood fell at his home and sustained bilateral patella tendon ruptures. He was admitted to the Ochsner-Baptist Hospital for surgery to repair the ruptures in his tendon. After a complicated postoperative course, Smallwood was discharged to another Oschner unit. After some time in the nursing unit, Smallwood died. The autopsy revealed that he had suffered a pulmonary embolism, a secondary result of his deep vein thrombosis (DVT). Since Smallwood had been in “generally good health” before the surgery, his sudden death was shocking. The petition for this case alleged that Smallwood was not given the appropriate prophylactic anti-coagulant medication in violation of the standard of care.

    Since pulmonary embolisms are a common secondary result of DVT, Dorothy Pennington alleged a medical malpractice claim against the doctors and nurses in charge of Smallwood’s care. This included Dr. Todd, Dr. Hawawini, Dr. Jones, Dr. Ulfers, and the Ochsner Clinic Foundation. After moving for a directed verdict, the trial court found that all parties except Dr. Hawawini were liable for medical malpractice. Since Dr. Hawawini acted as the Hospital Director at the time of Smallwood’s death, it was challenging to show that Dr. Hawawini had breached a standard of care. This case centered around whether Pennington had properly established the standard of care and breach with respect to Dr. Hawawini. 

    La. R.S. 40:1231.1 A(13) defines how medical malpractice occurs under Louisiana law. To allege a medical malpractice claim, the plaintiff must prove the three elements outlined in La. R.S. 9:2794 A. First, the plaintiff must establish the ordinary degree of knowledge, skill, or care exercised by physicians licensed to practice in Louisiana. Second, the plaintiff must establish that the defendant doctor lacked that degree of knowledge or skill or failed to exercise reasonable care. Finally, the plaintiff must also show that a lack of knowledge, skill, or reasonable care caused the plaintiff’s injuries. 

    Generally, expert testimony must “establish the applicable standard of care in medical malpractice cases. Schultz v. Guoth. Thus, Pennington retained Dr. Frangipane to testify as an expert to prove the applicable standard of care. Dr. Frangipane was a general surgeon and did not practice in the unique specialties of each named defendant. The trial court, however, allowed Dr. Frangipane to testify because he was qualified enough to be deemed an expert in the field. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Louisiana looked to determine whether the trial court ruled properly in allowing Dr. Frangipane to testify as an expert. 

    The Fourth Circuit determined that Dr. Frangipane’s expert testimony was proper because his knowledge overlapped the various disciplines of the named defendant doctors. Furthermore, the court indicated that “[g]enerally, the fact that a medical doctor is not a specialist in a particular field applies only to the effect on the weight to be given such testimony, not to its admissibility.” Hubbard v. State, 852 So. 2d 1097 (2003). The Fourth Circuit affirmed the directed verdict for Dr. Hawawini and reversed the directed verdict for the remaining defendants. 

    Home accidents are scary enough without the added fear of medical malpractice once you reach the hospital. A good attorney will fight to ensure that your doctor gives you the proper standard of care during your stay at the hospital or another affiliated facility. 

    Additional Sources: Pennington v. Ochsner Clinic Foundation, 245 So. 3d 58 (2018) 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Riley Calouette

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Medical Malpractice: Doctors Not Required To Act Perfectly: Determining The Applicable Standard of Care In Medical Malpractice Lawsuits

  • Could the Foreseeable Have Been Unforeseen? Deciphering Liability in Accidents

    Some accidents are unpredictable, while others appear to be accidents waiting to happen. Having reliable witnesses, qualified experts, and an excellent attorney in either unpredictable or predictable cases could be the dividing line in determining your liability when an accident arises. For Larry Jeane, Sr. (“Mr. Jeane”), the deceased party in a two-car accident along Louisiana Highway 107, whose vehicle crossed the centerline and collided with another car carrying six adults and one minor, the courts were positioned to consider his liability after the accident. 

    Mr. Jeane was transported by ambulance to Rapides Regional Medical Center (“RRMC”) after the accident. He reportedly had no recollection of the accident. Mr. Jeane had a history of heart disease and type-II diabetes, but it was likely his injuries from the accident that resulted in his death less than a week later. While at RRMC, his attending physician, Dr. Jeremy Timmer (“Dr. Timmer”), noted that Mr. Jeane had been on the phone with a friend and started talking “funny,” possibly due to low blood sugar when he collided with the other vehicle.  The seven passengers of that other vehicle, namely Sarah Barber, Jamie Turner, Racheal Spivey, Elizabeth Spivey, Dana Spivey, Wallace Spivey, Racheal Spivey, and Jamie Turner on behalf of the minor, Abigail Turner (collectively “the plaintiffs”) eventually sued Mr. Jeane’s estate and his insurance company for damages resulting from the accident. 

    Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of liability. To support the motion, the plaintiffs submitted three supporting documents: (1) an affidavit from Sandra Shannon (“Ms. Shannon”), who was driving the vehicle directly in front of the plaintiffs and witnessed the accident; (2) an affidavit from Sarah Barber (“Ms. Barber”), who was driving the other vehicle involved in the accident; and (3) a record of the deposition taken of Pineville City Marshal, Sarah A. Smith (“Ms. Smith”), who responded to the scene after the accident occurred. Ms. Shannon’s affidavit stated that she saw “[Mr. Jeane] was slumped over” at the wheel as his vehicle “veered gently.” Ms. Barber testified in her affidavit that she saw Ms. Shannon’s vehicle swerve off the road “suddenly, without any prior warning” before she saw Mr. Jeane’s vehicle approaching her, but she could not avoid the collision. Finally, Ms. Smith noted that she did not witness the accident but rode with Mr. Jeane to the hospital when he told her he did not know what happened. 

    In addition to the statements mentioned above from witnesses, the plaintiffs also included the certified medical record of Dr. Timmer in support of their partial motion for summary judgment. In opposition, counsel for Mr. Jeane submitted an affidavit from Dr. Brabson Lutz (“Dr. Lutz”), an internal medicine and infectious disease physician and certified medical expert in Louisiana. After reviewing the supporting documents submitted by the plaintiffs, Dr. Lutz reached a different explanation of Mr. Jeane’s condition and conclusion for the accident. According to Dr. Lutz, prior health records pre-accident and laboratory reports post-accident indicated that Mr. Jeane suffered a cardiac arrhythmia that suddenly deprived his brain of oxygen, which caused him to lose consciousness. This condition, Mr. Lutz concluded, was unforeseeable.

    Once the district court reviewed the plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment, including the evidence presented by both sides, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. Specifically, the district court found that because Mr. Jeane alleged an affirmative defense, which was that he experienced a medical condition that was so sudden, unexpected, and unforeseeable that he could not have reasonably prevented the accident, he had to prove this condition by clear and convincing evidence. The district court ruled that Mr. Jeane did not meet this burden. In turn, counsel for Mr. Jeane appealed. 

    In personal injury law, the legal principle of foreseeability refers to the level of predictability when an accident occurs. If the injury that results from a party’s actions is considered foreseeable, then that party can be held liable for damages caused to the injured party. Conversely, the party may not be held responsible if the injury is unforeseeable. Foreseeability is an essential element in personal injury cases, so proving that a party’s actions were unforeseeable could be an affirmative defense that precludes that party’s liability. 

    On appeal, the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit recognized the record of supporting documents provided by both sides at the district court that it is possible Mr. Jeane’s actions were unforeseeable. Specifically, the Court wrote, “Ms. Shannon’s statement that she saw Mr. Jeane slumped over as his truck passed her supports Dr. Lutz’s opinion [“that Mr. Jeane suffered a sudden, unforeseeable cardiac arrhythmia that deprived his brain of oxygen and rendered him unconscious”].” Moreover, the Court emphasized that “the day before the accident,” Mr. Jeane was bragging about how he was cleared by his heart doctor and received a clear call from his blood sugar and diabetes reports, which “indicate[d] that any event like arrhythmia opined by Dr. Lutz was not foreseeable.”

    Therefore, this Court acknowledged the discrepancy in the record between Dr. Lutz’s affidavit provided by Mr. Jeane’s counsel and the supporting documents provided by the plaintiffs and concluded that since a genuine issue of material fact existed in the record, the district court erred in granting the plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment. Since a genuine issue material, fact precludes a court from granting summary judgment as stated in La. Code Civ.P. art. 966 (D)(1), the Court reversed the district court’s decision. 

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that it would be up to Mr. Jeane’s counsel to prove at trial whether the foreseeability of his actions were reasonable or his condition’s unforeseeability could absolve him of any liability altogether.

    In the intricate landscape of personal injury law, the concept of foreseeability stands as a pivotal determinant in the attribution of liability. This nuanced principle draws the line between incidents that could have been reasonably anticipated and those that appear as unforeseeable twists of fate. The case of Mr. Jeane vividly underscores the significance of foreseeability, as it oscillates between predictable and unexpected factors. As legal proceedings progress, the question of whether the foreseeable could have been truly unforeseen becomes a central enigma to unravel. The saga of Mr. Jeane’s tragic collision stands as a testament to the complex interplay of circumstances that mold the boundaries of liability, illustrating the need for experienced legal representation.

    Additional Sources: SARAH BARBER, ET AL. VERSUS LOUISIANA MUNICIPAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY GROUP SELF-INSURED FUND, ET AL.

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Gina McKlveen

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Foreseeability: Louisiana Department of Transportation Avoids Liability in Multi-Car Pile-Up Case

  • How Are Liability and Damages Allocated In A Complex Car Accident?

    Allocating fault in a car accident is especially difficult when involving multiple individuals. This case illustrates how the allocation of fault affects how damages are awarded and illustrates what type of expenses are compensable. 

    While driving on Highway 28 East in Louisiana, Erin Wright rear-ended Christina Dauzat. Before they reached the intersection where the accident occurred, an unrelated accident occurred involving Joanne Marlow and Darrell Paulk. Paulk refused to move his car, which resulted in one of the lanes of traffic being blocked. Before the accident, a truck driven by an unknown driver drove towards Dauzat as it tried to go around the Marlow/Paulk accident. 

    Dauzat filed a lawsuit against Wright and her insurer, State Farm. At a trial, the court allocated 80% fault to Wright, 10% to the unnamed truck driver, and 10% to Paulk. The trial court awarded general damages of $8,000 (after the 20% reduction from the fault of the unnamed truck driver and Paulk, neither of whom Dauzat filed a lawsuit against) and $9,741.51 in special damages. These damages did not include the $1,440.86 cost of transporting Dauzat via ambulance following the accident. Both Dauzat and Wright appealed.

    Both Dauzat and Wright argued the trial court erred in allocating the fault. Dauzat claimed Wright should have been found 100% liable for the accident, whereas Wright argued Dauzat should have been assigned some percentage of fault. La. C.C. art. 2323 governs how fault is allocated between different individuals. When a rear-end collision occurs, there is a presumption the driver who rear-ended the other was negligent and followed the other vehicle too closely. See Berthiume v. Gros. 

    The appellate court found the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s findings that Wright and the unnamed driver’s actions contributed to the accident. However, the appellate court disagreed Paulk had contributed to the accident. Although Paulk refused to move his car after he was in an accident, a subsequent accident was not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the Dauzat-Wright accident was not within the scope of the duty he breached. The appellate court also agreed Dauzat had acted reasonably and was not partially at fault for the accident. 

    Dauzat also argued the trial court erred in its award of $10,000 for general damages and failure to award the cost of her ambulance transport following the accident. Wright argued the general damages should have been even lower. Wright also argued the trial court erred in not reducing the special damages award based on the percentage of fault allocated to others. In its judgment, the trial court specifically noted Dauzat was not a credible witness. 

    Based on the testimony from Dauzat’s physicians and the trial court’s credibility determination regarding Dauzat, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s general damages award. However, the appellate court found Dauzat should have been awarded the $1,440.86 cost of the ambulance that transported Dauzat to the hospital following the accident. The appellate court explained even if this transportation was unnecessary, Wright was still liable as there was no evidence Dauzat acted in bad faith in requesting ambulance transport. Additionally, the trial court agreed under La. C.C. art. 2323(B), the trial court should have reduced the special damages award by the amount of fault allocated to others besides Wright, who were not parties in the lawsuit. 

    Certain aspects of the appellate court’s ruling ended up both hurting and helping both Dauzat and Wright. This case underscores the value of seasoned legal counsel, capable of dissecting the intricate threads of liability and advocating for comprehensive compensation. In this intricate choreography of fault and recovery, a skilled attorney can serve as a guiding compass, helping individuals navigate the tumultuous waters of multi-party car accident litigation.

    Additional Sources: Christina Mink Dauzat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Car Accidents: When Car Accidents Get Messy: How Clear Language and Resolved Claims Can Help You Win Your Lawsuit

  • What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible?

    What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible? One possible option is seeking coverage under your uninsured motorist insurance policy. However, questions can arise about what, if any, coverage you are entitled to if it appears the accident did not cause your injuries. Determining the scope of injuries caused by the at-issue accident can be especially complicated if you have previously been involved in other car accidents that injured you or if you have other preexisting conditions. The following case helps shed some light on these issues.

    Jacqueline Gaspard was rear-ended while she was stopped at a red light. She filed a lawsuit against the drivers and insurers of the cars that were also involved in the accident and Allstate Insurance Company, her uninsured motorist insurer. She claimed the damages exceeded the liability coverage of the other individuals involved in the accident. 

    The second vehicle’s driver behind Gaspard was found to be 100% at fault for the accident. She settled the claims against that driver and his insurer for $50,000, the limits of that driver’s liability policy. She then dismissed her claims against the vehicle’s driver and insurer. 

    Gaspard then proceeded with her lawsuit against Allstate. She submitted a demand for coverage under her uninsured motorist policy. She included documentation of her injuries and associated treatment. Allstate did not respond to her demand. The trial court ruled Gaspard’s injuries were an aggravation of injuries from a prior automobile accident she had been involved in. It awarded her $8,000 in general damages and $3,314.37 in medical expenses. Gaspard appealed.

    On appeal, Gaspard argued the trial court erred in finding most of her damages were aggravation of injuries from her prior accident. Gaspard had the burden of proving her injuries resulted from the at-issue car accident. Numerous medical doctors, including those that had treated Gaspard, testified at trial. The medical evidence showed Gaspard’s complaints to her doctor following the at-issue car accident were the same as those she complained about from her first accident before the at-issue accident. Although there was some varying testimony from the medical doctors about whether and to what extent the at-issue car accident had aggravated Gaspard’s injuries from her prior accident, the doctors noted even before the at-issue accident, Gaspard’s complaints and conditions had waxed and waned. The doctors did not attribute any changes in Gaspard’s condition to the at-issue car accident. Therefore, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that most of Gaspard’s alleged injuries from the at-issue car accident were aggravations of injuries from her first accident. 

    This legal journey is a testament to the multifaceted nature of car accident claims, where the interplay between past injuries and present damages can blur liability lines. In a landscape where preexisting conditions and prior accidents come into play, pursuing justice demands a comprehensive understanding of medical evidence, legal standards, and the nuances of insurance coverage. Gaspard’s experience underscores the importance of having a knowledgeable advocate by your side – one who can adeptly navigate these complexities and ensure that your rights are vigorously upheld in the face of adversity.

    Additional Sources: Jacqueline J. Gaspard v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Court Finds Uninsured Motorist Coverage Waiver Valid, Denies Coverage for Injured Worker Injured

  • Sufficient Evidence Essential To Establish Damages From Car Accident Lawsuits

    In the aftermath of a car accident, the quest for justice often extends beyond determining fault, delving into the intricate realm of calculating damages. Even when the liability is undisputed, securing compensation can be laden with legal complexities. The following case unveils the story of Shelley Cooley, a collision victim navigating the labyrinth of litigation to ascertain the rightful compensation for her injuries. The journey sheds light on the indispensable role of compelling evidence, from medical testimony to personal accounts, in establishing the magnitude of damages in the aftermath of an accident.

    Shelley Cooley was involved in a car accident where her car was hit from behind by a car driven by Timothy Adgate, who worked for the City of Shreveport. Cooley had to obtain medical treatment after the accident for pain in her knee, back, and neck. Cooley filed a lawsuit against Adgate and the City of Shreveport. The parties agreed the City of Shreveport was liable because Adgate was completely responsible for the accident while working as a police officer. The only issue at trial was the amount of damages owed to Cooley.

    Cooley was the only witness to testify at trial. Medical evidence was presented through the deposition transcripts of various doctors. The trial court ruled the accident had exacerbated Cooley’s pre-existing medical issues but declined to award any damages for future medical expenses because the evidence about future medical expenses was speculative. The trial court awarded Cooley $50,000 in general damages and $79,508.66 for past medical expenses. Cooley filed an appeal.

    On appeal, Cooley argued she should have been awarded more than $50,000 in general damages because her injuries from the car accident required medical treatment for over four years. Someone who is injured because of another is entitled to full compensation for the resulting damages. See La. C.C. art. 2315. General damages are not required to be exactly established and include things like inconvenience, loss of physical enjoyment, and mental and physical pain. See Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 

    The appellate court reviewed the evidence presented at trial, including Cooley’s testimony about the pain and suffering that resulted from the injuries caused by the car accident. Based on the evidence, the appellate court found the trial court’s award of $50,000 in general damages was not an abuse of discretion. 

    Cooley also argued the trial court erred in not awarding her any damages for future medical expenses. She claimed the medical evidence and expert testimony supported an award of damages for future medical expenses. To recover for future medical expenses, the plaintiff must establish that such expenses are probable with supporting medical testimony. See Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co. Because a tortfeasor (here, Adgate) takes the victim (here, Cooley) as they come, the fact Cooley had pre-existing medical issues at the time of the car accident did not preclude her from recovering for future medical expenses. 

    In reviewing the medical evidence presented, the appellate court found Cooley had provided sufficient evidence to establish she would likely have future medical expenses from her injuries in the car accident and the probable amount of those expenses. Therefore, the appellate court amended the judgment to award Cooley $269,129 for future medical expenses. 

    As seen here, sufficient evidence is essential to establish the damages to which you are entitled A good attorney can advise you on what evidence you should present to support your claim for damages. 

    Additional Sources: Shelley Cooley v. Timothy Adgate and City of Shreveport

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Evidence Required for Future Medical Expense Damages: Make No Mistake, Medical Testimony Is Required For Juries To Award Damages For Future Medical Expenses