gets.primecure.net

Category: Class Action

  • The Advocate Highlights Jeff Berniard’s Expertise in Smitty’s Supply Explosion Case

    Fire and smoke rise from a chemical plant following the Smitty’s Supply explosion in Tangipahoa Parish.
    The Advocate recognized attorney Jeff Berniard for representing families impacted by the Smitty’s Supply chemical plant explosion and fire.

    The Advocate recently recognized Attorney Jeff Berniard and the Berniard Law Firm for their role in representing families displaced by the Smitty’s Supply explosion and fire in Tangipahoa Parish. Read the full Advocate article here.

    The feature highlights Berniard’s track record of success in large-scale litigation. Over his career, he has served as class counsel and lead counsel in numerous high-profile cases, including lawsuits involving chemical leaks, defective products, insurance bad faith practices, and environmental disasters.

    His legal experience includes being appointed to plaintiff steering committees and class counsel roles in major cases such as:

    • Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill (MDL 2179) – Representing victims of one of the largest environmental disasters in U.S. history.

    • Chinese Drywall Litigation (MDL 2047) – Representing homeowners across Louisiana and beyond who faced toxic building materials.

    • Insurance Bad Faith Class Actions – Representing over 70,000 policyholders after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

    The Advocate’s recognition underscores the trust that courts, the media, and affected families place in Berniard’s ability to advocate for justice in the aftermath of industrial and environmental disasters.

    “Our mission has always been to stand up for people against powerful companies and insurers,” Berniard said. “Being recognized in The Advocate for our work on behalf of Tangipahoa Parish residents is a reminder of why we fight these battles every day.”

    You can contact the Berniard Law Firm’s office today to talk about your legal rights as a result of the Smitty’s Fire and lawsuits. Call our office today at 504-521-6000.

    See Also: Attorney Jeff Berniard Featured on WGNO for Leadership in Smitty’s Supply Class Action Lawsuit

    What You Need to Know About the Smitty’s Supply Explosion and Fire in Tangipahoa Parish

  • Berniard Law Firm Takes Legal Action for Families Displaced by the Smitty’s Supply Fire

    Thick smoke and flames rising from the Smitty’s Supply lubricant plant in Roseland, Tangipahoa Parish, after the August 22, 2025 explosion and fire.When the Smitty’s Supply facility erupted in flames on August 22, 2025, residents within a one-mile radius were ordered to evacuate. Families were forced from their homes, many for several days, unsure of when it would be safe to return. In the aftermath, thick soot, oily residue, and chemical contamination settled on homes, vehicles, and property—leaving long-term damage and raising serious questions about insurance coverage.

    The Berniard Law Firm has filed a class action lawsuit against Smitty’s Supply, Inc. seeking justice for affected residents. The petition alleges negligence, gross negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, arguing that Smitty’s failure to properly store and manage dangerous chemicals directly caused the disaster.

    Residents have reported:

    • Difficulty cleaning soot and ash from their homes and vehicles.

    • Property losses and decreased home values.

    • Health effects such as headaches, stomach aches, respiratory irritation, and anxiety.

    • Out-of-pocket expenses for relocation, cleanup, and repairs.

    While many homeowners will turn to insurance for relief, coverage disputes are likely. Insurers may attempt to minimize payouts or deny claims by pointing to exclusions for chemical damage, pollution, or industrial accidents. The lawsuit filed by the Berniard Law Firm seeks to ensure that residents are not left carrying the financial burden of Smitty’s negligence.

    Our legal team is actively investigating claims and working to protect the rights of those affected. If you or someone you know was displaced or suffered losses from the Smitty’s fire, you should understand both your legal and insurance rights.

    For a free consultation, contact the Berniard Law Firm today at (504) 521-6000 or online at GetJeff.com

  • Expert Witnesses Key To Establishing Damages From Industrial Fire

    In a world where news headlines often feature calamitous industrial disasters, it’s hardly surprising to find legal battles trailing in their wake. The following case involves multiple individuals who filed lawsuits against the owner of a facility in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, that had a large fire. 

    A fire at a facility owned by Multi-Chem Group caused multiple explosions, which released chemicals. Following the fire and explosions, multiple people filed lawsuits against Multi-Chem and others, alleging they had been exposed to hazardous materials. The multiple lawsuits were consolidated into three groups based on the distance the injured party was located from the fire source. At trial, the parties presented expert testimony about whether the plaintiffs were exposed to hazardous materials from the Multi-Chem fire and if they suffered damages due to the exposure. The trial court held that the plaintiffs had established exposure and awarded damages to the three groups. The damages included medical expenses, general damages, and mental anguish related to the fear of developing cancer. Multi-Chem filed an appeal. 

    On appeal, Multi-Chem argued the trial court erred in admitting and excluding certain expert testimony. Article 702 of the Louisiana Code of Evidence governs expert testimony. At trial, the trial court evaluated the expert witnesses’ relevant credentials when deciding whether and to what extent to credit the expert witnesses’ testimony. The court also analyzed the underlying data the experts used as the basis for their opinions. Therefore, the appellate court found Multi-Chem’s argument that the trial court erred in which expert testimony it admitted and excluded lacked merit. 

    Multi-Chem also argued the plaintiffs did not establish their exposure caused their damages. Mutli-Chem claimed the expert acknowledged that sampling of the air did not reveal hazardous chemical levels. However, the expert also testified the chemicals could have caused harm by adhering to and absorbing into the particulate matter from the fire. The expert also testified some of the at-issue chemicals could cause future injuries, including cancer. Based on the expert witness’s testimony, the appellate court concluded the trial court did not err in finding the plaintiffs established general causation.

    Multi-Chem also argued the trial court awarded excessive and unsupported damages. When appellate courts review a trial court’s award of general damages, it considers whether the trial court abused its discretion when assessing and awarding damages. See Purvis v. Grant Parish Sch. Bd. The appellate court reviewed testimony from witnesses in the different groups of plaintiffs about what they had suffered due to the fire and related chemical exposure. The appellate court deferred to the trial court’s determinations that these witnesses’ testimony was credible and held the trial court’s award of damages was supported by the record. However, the appellate court did reverse damages awarded to certain plaintiffs for fear of developing cancer because the relevant witnesses did not testify about their fear of developing cancer, so there was a lack of supporting evidence. 

    When dealing with a complex lawsuit, a good lawyer can advise you on needed expert testimony and help identify qualified expert witnesses. As seen here, testimony from the expert witnesses was essential for the plaintiffs to prevail on their claims and support the damages they were awarded on appeal.

    Additional Sources: Robert J. Broussard, et al. v. Multi-Chem Group, LLC

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Expert Witnesses: Exposure to Radioactive Materials: Substantiating Injury Claims with Evidence and Expert Witnesses

  • Class Action for Data Breach Fails in Louisiana Due to Lack of Actual Damages

    As more and more aspects of our lives are conducted online, data breaches have become an increasingly troubling prospect. If you have been involved in a data breach, you have likely worried about potential adverse effects and the possibility that you could become a victim of identity theft. However, the mere fact that a person’s information is compromised in a data breach does not necessarily mean victory in a lawsuit for damages. 

    Walter Bradix worked for Advance Auto Parts (“Advance”), which informed him by mail in March of 2016 that employee information held by Advance, including his own, had been inadvertently disclosed to a third party. This included personal information such as names, social security numbers, and salary details. Advance provided affected employees with identity protection services for two years and advised them to be vigilant for any signs of identity theft. 

    Subsequently, Bradix noticed two unidentified inquiries in his credit report. He also experienced anxiety over the data breach due to his fear of identity theft. Bradix filed a class action lawsuit in Louisiana state court against Advance on behalf of himself and “similarly situated employees” whose information was affected by the breach. He claimed that Advance negligently allowed the information to be stolen, was grossly negligent in handling the information, violated its fiduciary duties, and invaded employees’ privacy. 

    The case was removed to the U.S. District Court of the Eastern District of Louisiana (“EDLA”), where Advance filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and lack of standing. The EDLA found persuasive the fact that Bradix did not even allege that the two unidentified credit inquiries had harmed his credit score. Finding it had no subject matter jurisdiction, the EDLA remanded the case to the state court to determine if there was an applicable remedy under Louisiana law.

    In the state trial court, Advanced filed peremptory exceptions of “no right and action” and “no cause of action.” Under Louisiana law, a peremptory exception of no right of action applies when the plaintiff’s claim is legally nonexistent. See La. C.C.P. art. 923. To assert a claim, a party must have standing, which requires that the person have an actual and real interest in what he is asserting. See La. C.C.P. art. 681. The trial court granted Advance’s exceptions and dismissed the lawsuit. Bradix appealed, arguing that he had standing based on the harm he suffered from the unidentified credit inquiries and his anxiety.  

    Louisiana’s Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal noted that Bradix did not allege that anyone had successfully stolen his identity but that he might suffer identity theft at some time in the future. Nor, as the EDLA pointed out, did Bradix allege that his credit score had been negatively affected by the credit checks or that the checks were in any way related to the data breach. Therefore, the Court concluded that Bradix did not allege a sufficiently particular injury but only a theoretical future injury.  

    Furthermore, under Louisiana law, the plaintiff must show that he suffered actual damages to prevail in a claim involving negligence, gross negligence, invasion of privacy, or breach of fiduciary duty. The Court found that Bradix did not prove that he had suffered any actual damages but merely alleged speculative future harm. Based on these conclusions, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of an exception of no right of action in favor of Advance. 

    This case shows the potential pitfalls of litigating a data breach. Though the possible negative effects are real, the mere occurrence of a breach is not enough for recovery at law. A breach victim must show he suffered actual damages — in the form of a reduced credit score, actual identity theft, or some other harm — to have his day in Court. Anyone involved in a data breach who wishes to pursue litigation for damages should consult an experienced attorney. 

    Additional Sources: BRADIX v. ADVANCE STORES CO.

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Security Breaches: Security Breach Case Fleshes Out Requirements for Successful Suit

  • Unfair Trade Practices in Louisiana and Home Foreclosure

    Like many states, Louisiana has an unfair trade practices act. In Louisiana, it is known as the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. Just as the name implies, this law is meant to protect consumers from the unfair, misleading, or fraudulent acts of those provide services, goods, and financing. Any contract or agreement entered into in violation of this law is void. However, the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“Law”) has a serious limitation; it does not apply to a financial institution that is federally insured, including most banks and lending institutions.

    The Law’s limitation means that an average mortgage arrangement from a large or national financial institution will not be affected by the protection that the Law affords. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit provides an example of this exception in a recent decision. In that case, a woman arranged for a home mortgage through Bank of America. Bank of America then assigned the mortgage to Wells Fargo. Both of these companies are large financial institutions that are federally insured.

    When the woman defaulted on her mortgage, Wells Fargo sought to foreclose on her home. She applied for assistance from a federal government program called Home Affordable Modification Program (“HAMP”) during the foreclosure process. HAMP is designed to help modify mortgages for those who are in foreclosure proceedings so that they can keep their homes and pay a more affordable monthly payment. While the woman’s HAMP application was pending, the foreclosure proceeding was supposed to be put on hold. However, despite this application, her home was sold at a foreclosure sale before she received word back from HAMP to determine whether he application had been approved. She also claimed that she did not receive notice of the sale. Essentially, she argued that her home was sold out from under her without her knowledge.

    She attempted to sue both Bank of America and Wells Fargo. She argued that Bank of America should not have allowed Wells Fargo to purchase the mortgage. She also argued that the foreclosure proceedings violated the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. However, the state court determined that even if they did violate the Law, the Law did not apply to them because of the financial institutions exception.

    After a loss in state court, the woman appealed the case to the federal district court. However, the district court pointed out that it cannot sit as a court of appeals for state-exclusive actions. That means that the federal district court cannot hear a case where the only arguments are based on state law. Instead, a district court can only hear a case where there is some sort of federal jurisdiction based on either federal law or involves parties from different states, unless Congress has authorized the district court to act otherwise. Nonetheless, where a case questions the procedures of the state court, instead of applying substantive state law, then the federal court could hear the case. For example, if the woman argued that he procedure violated her constitutional rights, then the district court would likely be able to hear the case. This concept is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the court explains, “Reduced to its essence, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine holds that inferior federal courts do not have the power to modify or reverse state court judgments except where authorized by Congress.”

    In this case, the woman complained that the proceedings in the state court were incorrect; therefore, she was not just asking the district court to review the state court decision. As a result, the district court had the authority to review the case. Despite that fact, the woman failed to state a claim because both Bank of America and Wells Fargo are federally insured financial institutions that are not subject to the Louisiana Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law. That meant that the Court of Appeals had to affirm the lower court, and the woman failed in her efforts to appeal.

    It may have been possible to assert other arguments based on federal law, but the woman failed to do so. In fact, there were several arguments that the woman waived because she failed to timely assert them. In an appeal, if you do not assert every argument that you have in your opening brief, then you effectively lose the ability to use that argument at any point in the rest of the appeal. In this case, this may have been crucial to the woman’s case because she failed on the arguments that she presented originally (the state law claims). That point highlights the importance of competent attorneys who can argue effectively for you.  (more…)

  • Understanding the Direct Action Statute and Insurance Disputes

    Louisiana has a Direct Action Statute that allows injured third parties to sue an insurance company directly when the insurance company’s insured causes an injury. For example, if you are involved an automobile accident where you are not at fault, you can sue the at-fault driver’s insurance company directly instead of suing the at-fault driver themselves. The Direct Action Statute is beneficial because it gives injured third parties access to the entity that will actually pay compensation for the injuries. It can be especially helpful where the insured fails to file a claim with their insurance company themselves. However, the injured third-party’s ability to sue the insurance company directly is limited by the insurance contract between the insurance company and the insured.

    Despite the fact that the insurance contract is between the insurance company and the insured, an injured third party must still comply with most of the terms of the contract. This overarching rule applies specifically to whether the policy covers the insured and whether the policy covers a particular event. The insurance company will ask: Did this person have coverage when this accident happened? and Does this policy cover this type of event? For example, in insurance contracts limited to specific times, the insurance company will not cover a claim that occurred outside the time frame of the contract, regardless of who brings the claim. In a related example, automobile coverage that is limited to only certain vehicles will cover only those vehicles, regardless of who brings the claim. That is, the injured third party can have no greater rights than the insured would have had if he or she brought the complain themselves.

    In a United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, the court determined that specific requirements of the contract also extend to injured third parties. That case involved a “claims-made-and-reported” policy. That type of policy not only requires that a claim arise within the policy period, but also that the insured (or another party under the Direct Action Statute) had to have reported the claim within the policy period. This type of notice requirement helps insurance companies avoid claims that are reported years after they happen; instead, this policy requires notice within a certain amount of time.

    The case in the Fifth Circuit involved a Lawyers Professional Liability Policy that covered Titan, L.L.C. (“Titan”) for a period of one year. The policy stated that it would cover damages and expenses resulting from “a claim that is both first made against [Titan] and reported in writing to [CNA] during the policy period.” The policy requires that Titan must “immediately give written notice to [CNA] during the policy period . . . of any claim made against [Titan].”

    A lawsuit was filed against Titan while Titan was issuing title insurance policies on behalf of First American. The claim was filed within the policy period, but it was not reported within the policy period. Since Titan was acting on behalf of First American, First American was also injured by Titan’s actions. In order to avoid some liability, First American notified the insurance company (CNA) of the suit, but it was about six months after Titan’s policy had expired.

    The court determined that since neither Titan nor First American gave “written notice . . . within the policy period” as the policy required, then First American did not have a claim, regardless of the Direct Action Statute in Louisiana. Essentially, the court determined that the reporting requirement that Titan was subjected to also applied to First American, who was not a party to the insurance contract. Although First American may have been unaware of the terms of the contract, the court determined that to rule otherwise would give First American broader powers against the insurance company than Titan would have had.

    As someone that might be injured by an insured, it is important to make yourself aware of potential pitfalls like these in the insurance policy. Reporting claims right away can help avoid this type of situation. Navigating insurance contracts and insurance claims can be tricky. Contact The Berniard Law Firm at 1-855-550-5000, and we would be happy to help you with your legal questions and concerns.

  • Hurricane Lawsuits Demonstrate Value of Proper Representation

    In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the Louisiana legislature set deadlines for the filing of claims for damages resulting from the hurricanes. These dates were September 1, 2007 for claims of damage resulting from Hurricane Katrina and October 1, 2007 for claims of damage resulting from Hurricane Rita. Any claims filed beyond these dates would be subject to the exception of prescription, meaning that any legal remedies stemming from such damages would be extinguished. Under certain circumstances, however, Louisiana law allows for the suspension of prescription. For members of an ongoing class action in Louisiana state court, the deadline to file individual claims based on the same damages is suspended.

    The countdown for the valid filing of individual claims begins to run again when a class member elects to be excluded from the class action or is notified that he or she has been excluded from the action, or is notified that the action has been dismissed. Once the countdown starts to run again, it resumes with how much time was left before the commencement of the class action. For instance, if there were two months remaining to file an individual claim of damages at the time a class action was started, the countdown for a class member’s individual claim would resume with two months remaining upon the member’s exclusion or the dismissal of the class action. This would hold true no matter how much time had elapsed since the class action’s commencement. However, it is crucial to note that such suspension of prescription is only allowed for class actions in Louisiana state court.

    In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court case, a couple in Harvey, LA filed an individual claim for property damages resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita more than two years after the deadline set by the legislature. Because the couple were members of a recently dismissed class action in federal court seeking the same damages, they argued that the countdown for the filing of their individual claim had been suspended. The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled, however, that only class actions filed in Louisiana state court (rather than federal class actions, or class actions in another state’s court system) could suspend the deadline for filing claims under Louisiana law. This meant that the couple’s individual claim had long expired unless they could prove membership in a class action in Louisiana state court for the same damages during that period.

    This case underscores the importance of having an attorney capable of managing individual and class action lawsuits. If handled improperly, plaintiffs may exhaust both the option for class action and individual relief, and be left with no way to recover for damages.

  • An Examination of Interlocutory Appeals and Collateral Order Doctrine

    In April 2010, an offshore drilling rig, the Deepwater Horizon, exploded and sank into the Gulf of Mexico. Eleven workers died and crude oil from the well spilled into the Gulf for months after the accident. The result was a mass of litigation involving multiple defendants. In order to deal with the extensive facts and individuals involved in this case, like many other cases, the parties can appeal just one issue of the case if the lower court denies or grants a judgment on that particular issue.

    Normally, a decision must be a final one in order to be appealed. That generally means that the case has concluded and the lower court has rendered a judgment. That way, the appeals court considers all of the facts involved, but can still allow the lower court to do most of the fact analysis. However, there are some occasions where an appeal on just one issue is allowed. This is known as an interlocutory appeal, and it falls under the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine assumes that some decisions are “final in effect although they do not dispose of the litigation.”

    In order to use the collateral order doctrine, the lower court must have 1) conclusively determined the disputed question, 2) resolved an important issue that is completely separate from the final decision in the case, and 3) the issue must also be effectively unreviewable on appeal in a final judgment. “Effectively unreviewable” means that the court of appeals will have no way to review the decision of the lower court once the lower court makes a decision on this particular issue. Generally, if the decision could be appealed in some other way than the interlocutory appeal, then the court will not use the interlocutory appeal.

    In the oil spill case, parties assumed that one worker in particular held a great deal of information because he was the BP Well Site Leader on duty aboard the rig at the time of the accident. However, the Site Leader had an undisclosed medical condition that prohibited him from testifying or answering written questions. The Site Leader explained his medical condition to the judge on two separate occasions, but did not disclose the information to the parties.

    Since the parties believed that he was such a valuable witness, they really wanted to obtain information from him. As such, another judge ordered an independent doctor to examine him and ordered the Site Leader to produce his medical records to the independent doctor. The Site Leader protested because he was concerned about sharing his personal information. This order is a discovery decision, and discovery decisions are appealable after the final decision of the court based on the use of inadmissible evidence.

    One of the Site Leader’s major arguments, however, was that releasing his personal medical information would cause a great deal of harm to him personally, and there is no method on appeal to reverse that type of harm. Nonetheless, the court determined that district courts can “burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of the final district court judgment.” Therefore, even though there may be harm that cannot be reversed for the Site Leader, the court will still allow the medical information to come in because the final verdict could change on appeal if the information is removed later. To use another example, the court explains that even if the information is privileged, that does not make it appropriate for an interlocutory appeal.

    The court only briefly considered the rights of the Site Leader and his concern about protecting his personal information. In that discussion, they explain that they weighed the costs of sharing his information with the benefits of having his testimony at trial and determined that the benefits outweighed the costs.

    As result, the court determined that it could not use the collateral order doctrine and that the interlocutory appeal was inappropriate. Therefore, the court dismissed the appeal and allowed the bulk of the case to continue in the lower court.

    Civil procedure issues can be a delicate balance between protecting the case and protecting the individuals involved in the case.

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  • Louisiana’s Act 312 and its Impact on the Environment and Oil Exploration

    La. R.S. 30:29 (“Act 312”) was in enacted in 2006 and became effective in June of that year. Act 312 provides a procedure for the remediation of oil field sites as well as oil exploration and production sites. Generally, remediation is “the action of remedying something, in particular of reversing or stopping environmental change.” Before the Louisiana legislature enacted Act 312, most remediation requirements were through private party contracts; therefore, Act 312 did not change the normal trial procedures established by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure.

    The Louisiana Supreme Court recently discussed Act 312 at length, explaining what it did change, in a case involving the Vermilion Parish School Board. The Court explained that Act 312 was enacted because of serious concerns with the state of the land and ground water after an area was used for oil exploration and production. Parties would use the land and ground water under a mineral lease for several years, and leave the property in terrible shape by the time that they were done. Mineral leases allow the parties to contract for only the minerals or the potential oil that is located on that property. The party with the mineral lease, then, does not rent the entire property, but just the ability to find minerals or oil within or upon that property.

    Before Act 312, parties could still sue if one party left the land in terrible shape. Occasionally, however, it does not make sense economically to force a party to fix the land they damaged. Instead, the renting party would have to give the “landlord” the difference between the value of the land when they received it and the value of the land when it was returned after the lease, under a tort law theory. However, the person who owned the land, the “landlord,” was not required to use the funds to fix damage done to the land. As a result, property that had serious environmental problems often went without remediation because the landlord was not required to fix it. This creates health and safety concerns for the general public.

    When parties file under Act 312, a notice is sent to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources, Commissioner of Conservation (“DNR”) and the attorney general. The court cannot issue a judgment unless this notice is filed. After the notice is filed, the DNR and the attorney general can intervene in the case if they so choose; they also retain the ability to bring an independent action through civil or administrative means. Then, the matter proceeds to trial as any normal case would.

    At the trial, the fact finder will determine if there actually is any environmental damage and whether the defendant or defendants were responsible for that damage. If the fact finder finds that there is environmental damage and the defendant is responsible, then the defendant is required to form a “remediation plan.” The remediation plan is submitted to the court for approval; the plaintiff is allowed to submit a suggested remediation plan to the court as well.

    Then, the DNR will hold a public hearing on the submitted remediation plans. The DNR will then determine the most feasible plan to accomplish the remediation of the environmental damage, keeping the health, safety, and welfare of the public at large in mind. After they approve the plan, the plan is sent to the court for further review. Within a certain time frame, parties can submit alternations, comments, or new plans to the court during this time as well. Unless the parties prove that another plan is more feasible, the court will allow the plan approved by the DNR to move forward. In addition, the court will determine how much of the damages amount will be required to be used exclusively for remediation. Then, the legally responsible parties will deposit funds into the court’s registry for remediation purposes.

    One of the many issues in the case involving the Vermilion Parish School Board was whether private parties could seek additional damages apart from the required remediation funds. The Court determined that Act 312 specifically provided that private parties would not be limited by the remediation plan. That is, if they wanted to seek damages beyond what would be required to correct the environmental damages, such as punitive damages (damages that are meant to punish the offending party), then Act 312 did not limit them from doing that.

    The Berniard Law Firm specializes in oil claims, including their effects on the environment. If you have questions about Act 312 or think your mineral lease has been violated, contact The Berniard Law Firm today.

  • Environmental Damage Appeal Focuses on Mineral Lease, Oil

    In January, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered an appeal from the Vermilion Parish School Board. The appeal centered on environmental damage to land that was subject to a mineral lease. The mineral lease allowed those leasing the land to look for and remove any mineral, including oil, that they found on the land. However, once they did this, they left the land in a state that was environmentally hazardous.

    Louisiana has special procedures for dealing with restoring land so that we do not harm the environment, specifically when removing oil. The remediation of the land, this restoring process, was one of the major issues in the Vermilion Parish case. The defendants included Union Oil Company of California, Union Exploration Partners, Carrollton Resources, LLC, Chevron USA, Inc., and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.

    The Court faced two major issues in this case. The first was whether the parties could receive damages in excess of the amount it would take to restore the property, thereby correcting the environmental damage. The Court determined that the language of the legislation (La. R.S. 30:29) was clear and that the parties could receive a larger amount.

    Under Louisiana law, when a case arises where a party is required to correct an environmental wrong, the funds are deposited into the court’s registry. The court will then disperse the funds to repair the land. This is a relatively new development because this act was put into effect in 2006. The legislature was concerned that parties who received funds to help correct the damage done to their land would not use it for that purpose if they were not so required. Leaving property that is damaged could create serious issues for the health, safety, and welfare of the surrounding population.

    The legislation focuses on the role of the fact finder in determining whether there was environmental damage, and how much that environmental damage will cost to fix. As such, the court determined that the case should continue so that the fact finder could make those determinations.

    The second issue was whether Chevron should be dismissed from the case. According to the facts, Union Oil had the mineral lease first, but Chevron subsequently acquired Union Oil and all of their assets, including the lease. As such, Chevron became responsible for any environmental damage that Union Oil may have caused. Chevron admitted responsibility initially, but then denied that they should be legally responsible later.

    Chevron explained that while Chevron Corp. owns both Chevron USA and Union Oil Company of California, the two sections do not overlap. That is, Union Oil had $18 billion in assets, and should they be found liable for environmental damage, the amount that they will pay will come from their assets and not Chevron’s. Chevron explained that those assets were never transferred out of Union Oil, so Union Oil remained somewhat independent even after Chevron acquired them.

    Therefore, Chevron argued that Chevron USA should be removed from the case so that those assets are not adversely affected. Nonetheless, Frank Soler, the senior liaison in the subsidiary governance unit of the corporate governance department for Chevron Corp. admitted that Union Oil does not have any employees and there may be service agreements between the two sections for day-to-day activities.

    The Plaintiffs in the case were only allowed to discover a very limited amount of information from Chevron regarding this case. The court restricted the information until they determined whether or not Chevron should remain in the case a defendant. As such, many facts remained unknown regarding the relationship between Chevron and Union Oil. Therefore, the court determined that Plaintiffs should be allowed to gather more information and the case should continue.

    Both of these issues failed the summary judgment test. The test is whether there is an absence of material facts in the case. If there is such an absence, then the court will only determine the questions of law and one side will receive a summary judgment. In this case, however, the court determined that there may be facts in dispute because they did not have enough information; therefore, the case continued.

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