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Category: Dow Norco Leak

  • Summary Judgment Summarily Dismissed by Third Circuit in Vehicle Accident Case

    A summary judgment is rendered when a trial court decides that there are no genuine issues of material fact that need to be determined. “Manifestly erroneous” is the high standard under which summary judgments are reversed on appeal. Summary judgments are cheaper and less time consuming than full blown trials; they are a means toward the end of judicial expediency, a goal that becomes increasingly important to our judicial system over time. Despite the importance of this procedural device, many cases do not call for summary judgment. Sometimes trial courts grant full or partial summary judgments in error and are reversed. That is what occurred in the case of Jagneux v. Frohn, which you can read here.

    The defendants in this case convinced the trial court that no issues of fact existed that required litigating. Their legal journey was not over though due to the plaintiff’s appeal. The court of appeals applied the standard promulgated by the Louisiana Supreme Court. This Louisiana Supreme Court’s standard initially places the burden of proof on the party that is moving for a summary judgment. The moving party must prove that one or more elements of the adverse party’s claim or defense lacks any factual support on the record so far. The opposing party is then granted an opportunity to prove that there have been facts alleged that support that party’s position. At the time of summary judgment the record is sparse so a granting of summary judgment represents a finding by the court that no facts supporting a particular party’s, in this case the plaintiff’s, position.

    The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision in this case because it found that the issue of whether Mrs. Kling, a defendant in this case, was the driver of the white SUV at the time that it, at least partially, caused the accident at issue in this case. Because there was conflicting evidence about where Mrs. Kling was and whether or not she was actually in control of the car at the time of the accident, summary judgment was not the right choice in this case. The trial court is not to weigh the merits of the case when addressing summary judgment. Summary judgment is only appropriate in cases where no potentially meritorious case is presented by one of the parties.

    Judicial efficiency is a desirable goal at this point in history. America is an incredibly litigious society and with good reason. Science and technology move faster now than ever before and this leads to more pernicious injuries becoming increasingly common. Society functions better when injured people are compensated. This is even more true when injured people are compensated quickly and at minimal expense to society. However, as important as these goals are, the pursuit of the truth is the most important aim of our justice system. When the truth of a matter is in question, it falls to our trial courts with their judges and juries to put together an authoritative version of events. This version, when properly decided, becomes the truth for all intents and purposes. When there is no need to conduct an exhaustive search for truth, summary judgment becomes necessary and expedient.

    Summary judgments take up less of a court’s time than a trial. Because of this, summary judgments allow a court to hear more cases in less time. This benefits society as a whole. Frequently, American and Louisiana courts have a substantial backlog of cases. This prevents swift access to the justice that many people require. Summary judgment and other procedural and dispute resolution devices that avoid full trials aid in mitigating this abundant caseload. The case of Jagneux v. Frohn was not one in which summary judgment was appropriate but many cases are decided this way every day saving time, money and stress for our judges and juries.

    For help navigating the legal system and potentially winning a summary judgment of your own, call the Berniard Law Firm toll-free at 504-521-6000.

  • Class Action Rules Difficult to Understand, Important for Successful Litigation

    The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 was passed in an effort to prevent class action lawsuit abuse. CAFA changed the practice of class action litigation in state and federal courts. This change was accomplished by CAFA’s jurisdictional alterations in both the diversity and removal components of the traditional framework of class action practice, i.e. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

    In Williams v Homeland Insurance, the Fifth Circuit applied the “local controversy” exception of CAFA to the facts of the case, determining that a class arbitration is not, nor does it preclude a class action. Williams provides a lesson in the application of the elements of CAFA and an understanding of CAFA’s features. The decision also demonstrates yet another unique feature of Louisiana law that distinguishes it from the law of all of the other jurisdictions in the United States: the Louisiana Direct Action Statute.

    CAFA changed the rules for federal diversity jurisdiction and removal. The Act enables large class action law suits to be filed in and/or removed to federal court. CAFA changed the numerosity requirement of Rule 23 from by raising the requirement from 40 class members to more than 100 class members; the citizenship requirement of Rule 23 by relaxing the diversity criteria, i.e. any class member must be diverse from any defendant; and the amount-in-controversy (from one named plaintiff having a claim of more than $75,000) to the total of $5 million. In addition, CAFA incorporated looser removal rules: in diversity cases any defendant can remove the case (including in-state defendants); any defendant can remove without the unanimous consent of the other defendants; there is no 1 year limit on the timing for removal of the case to another court’s jurisdiction; and the decision to grant or deny a remand is subject to appellate review.

    CAFA “essentially makes the resolution of large class actions with minimal diversity a federal court matter”, while reserving “for the states certain types of large class actions arguably more local in nature. Four key exceptions to CAFA’s jurisdictional expansion accomplish this reservation of state authority.” The exception discussed in Williams is the “local controversy” exception.

    The local controversy exception requires the district court to decline its jurisdiction under CAFA:
    (A)(i) over a class action in which-
    (I) greater than two-thirds of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed;
    (II) at least 1 defendant is a defendant-
    (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the plaintiff class;
    (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and
    (cc) who is a citizen of the State in which the action was originally filed; and
    (III) principal injuries resulting from the alleged conduct or any related conduct of each defendant were incurred in the State in which the action was originally filed; and
    (ii) during the 3–year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.
    When the Fifth Circuit looked at George Raymond Williams vs. Homeland Insurance Company of New York, Homeland Insurance was appealing the “district courts remand of a class action to Louisiana state court.” George Williams had brought a class action in Louisiana state court, representing a class of medical providers against 3 Louisiana defendants: Med-Comp USA, Risk Management Services, and SIF Consultants of Louisiana. The plaintiffs contracted with Med-Comp (an operator of a PPO network) for “discounted rates” and SIF and RMS applied Med-Comp’s discounts when administering worker’s compensation claims for Louisiana employers. A year later, Williams joined 3 non- Louisiana defendants: “Corvel Corporation and its insurers Homeland Insurance Company and Executive Risk Specialty insurance.”

    Corvel and the plaintiffs agreed to settle their claims. However, before the settlement was approved in state court, Executive Risk removed the case to Federal court, claiming federal jurisdiction under CAFA. This action demonstrates the new removal rules of CAFA, e.g. that removal does not require unanimity amongst defendants as it does under the prior and traditional rules.

    Williams and Corvel responded by moving that the case be remanded back to state court under the “local controversy” exception of CAFA. The district court found that Williams satisfied all of the elements of the “local controversy” exception and remanded the case to state court. Homeland appealed this decision to the Fifth Circuit and the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand under CAFA’s “local controversy” exception: de novo. If any of the elements of the “local controversy” exception are not met, remand would be improper. Homeland disputed all of the elements of the exception.

    First, Homeland disputed that less than 2/3 of the plaintiff class were citizens of the state of Louisiana, and thus did not meet that requirement of the local controversy. The total number of class members numbered 1,388, many of which were registered corporations in the state of Louisiana. In its argument in front of the district court, Williams argued persuasively that 1055 of these plaintiffs met the criteria for membership in the class, i.e. that they were citizens of Louisiana. In front of the Fifth Circuit, Homeland was claiming that the plaintiff class represented either 45.4% or 65.4% Louisiana citizenship. Homeland argued that in either circumstance, the percentage did not rise to the appropriate level required by CAFA. Homeland arrived at the 45.4% by identifying many of the business organizations that made up the plaintiff class as inactive corporations, and removing them from the total number of plaintiff members. This argument was denied because “inactive corporations remain citizens of their state of incorporation.” The 65.4% was a number arrived at by Homeland though a mathematical error, and was dismissed appropriately
    Williams’ claims meet the second group of elements of the “local controversy” exception pretty simply because Med-Comp is a local defendant, and Williams seeks “thousands of discounts, including discounts applied by other defendants.” The exception requires a “local defendant, from whom significant relief is sought, and whose conduct forms a significant basis for the claims asserted.” Med Comp clearly fulfills these criteria.

    The third element that the “principle injuries resulting from each defendant’s alleged or related conduct must have occurred in Louisiana” was found to be fulfilled by the district court because, “the record showed that a supermajority of plaintiffs are Louisiana citizens, who rendered services in Louisiana and who allege that the defendants violated the Louisiana PPO act.” The defendants are alleged to have “violated the Louisiana PPO Act” and the injuries occurred “by the failure to provide notice at the point of medical service in Louisiana.”

    It is this discussion of the fulfillment of the third element of the “local controversy” exception that provides the context and opportunity for the digression into a discussion of a unique feature of Louisiana law: the Louisiana Direct Action statute. “Louisiana is one of the few states in the country with a direct action statute. A direct action statute allows an injured person (the plaintiff) to sue the insurance company of the person or entity who caused their injury directly.”

    The direct action statute is mentioned in relation to the defendant Homeland and the fact that Homeland’s conduct “must have occurred in Louisiana,” the requirement of CAFA. “Although Homeland is an out-of-state defendant who insured the out-of-state Corvel, the CAFA exception is satisfied because Homeland’s related conduct as insurer includes Corvel’s failure to notify in Louisiana.”

    The claims asserted against Homeland are described by the Fifth Circuit as “unique” in nature because the “sole claims against Homeland are by virtue of the Louisiana Direct Action statute and based on the conduct of Homeland’s insured.” These claims would clearly not be possible in most states because most states do not have a direct action statute.

    The Fifth Circuit does not elaborate on, or even mention the rarity of a direct action statute. However, the statute is important to take notice of out of the discussion of the Fifth Circuit because it plays a very important part in Louisiana insurance law. “There may be no other Louisiana statute which has so affected the development of an area of the law as has the Direct Action Statute. ” The Direct Action statute is not of primary importance in the discussion in Williams v Homeland Insurance, but it is important exactly because it does permit claims to be made against Homeland that otherwise could not be made directly.

    The last element of the “local controversy” exception provokes the most interesting feature of the Fifth Circuit’s discussion, and provides the context for the major holding of the case: “a class arbitration is not a class action”. The element of the exception is as follows: “during the 3–year period preceding the filing of that class action, no other class action has been filed asserting the same or similar factual allegations against any of the defendants on behalf of the same or other persons.”
    The parties disputed whether a class arbitration qualified as a class action. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit addressed the question. The district court had determined that the two were different because an arbitration involved out-of-court resolutions to disputes, while a class action involved in-court resolutions to disputes. The Fifth Circuit decided that “a class arbitration is not a class action, and consequently, a prior class arbitration does not frustrate the CAFA exception.” The Court looked at the CAFA definition of “class action,” i.e. “any civil action filed under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar State statute or rule of judicial procedure.” Homeland argued for an “expansive reading” of the definition to “encompass arbitrations”, but the Court determined that this expansive of a reading would “require district courts to exercise original jurisdiction over any arbitration that satisfies CAFA’s threshold requirements. We hold that a class arbitration is not a class action, and consequently, a prior class arbitration does not frustrate the CAFA exception.”

    Williams v Homeland Insurance is an interesting case because of the important holding that makes the distinction between class arbitrations and class actions. This decision will not only provide precedent for Louisiana, but will provide persuasive law for other jurisdictions. This holding will probably be followed in other jurisdictions. The discussion reveals the features and dynamics of CAFA, which has made a significant impact upon class action jurisprudence in Louisiana and the nation as a whole. Lastly, the discussion in Williams reveals the unique and distinguishing feature of Louisiana insurance law: the Direct Action Statute.

  • Happy Holidays from the Berniard Law Firm

    On behalf of the Berniard Law Firm, we hope that all of our friends and followers have had a relaxing and restful holiday. Posting will resume on Tuesday

  • A Happy Holidays to All Friends of the Berniard Law Firm

    The Berniard Law Firm would like to wish everyone a Happy Holiday.

    Regular posting will resume in 2012! Have a happy, and SAFE, holiday season!

  • Federal 5th Circuit Decides Excess Insurers Are Not Required To Pay Pre-Judgment Interest

    In order to avoid extreme costs incurred from accidents, some businesses purchase two types of insurance policies. The first and most common type of insurance is primary insurance. Under this policy, business assets and liabilities are covered in exchange for the payment of a premium. This coverage, however, is capped in order to protect the insurance company from excessive claims. For this reason, many businesses, especially those dealing with expensive equipment and goods, will carry a second insurance policy that provides coverage beyond what is offered through the primary insurer. These policies are known as excess insurance. Premiums for these excess policies are often lower and provide a much higher cap on claim amounts. Excess insurers are able to provide such cheap, yet extensive coverage because the chance of such a catastrophic accident occurring that exhausts the primary insurance cap is minimal. However, as is evident in Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. American Commercial Lines, L.L.C., where multiple boats collided on the Mississippi River, maritime accident costs sometimes extend beyond primary insurance coverage, bringing questions of how excess insurance money should be handled by courts.

    When insurance disputes arise, many times the insurance company will concede the full policy amount, deposit it with the court, withdraw from the proceedings, and leave the claiming parties to battle out their rights to the money in court. Statutory provisions guide the timeline for when primary insurance policies must be deposited with the court, but what is the protocol for an excess insurer that wants to follow the primary insurer’s footsteps? This was the main question in the American Commercial Lines case. The plaintiffs sued the excess insurers claiming that the excess insurers deposited the policy amount with the court too late, resulting in the loss of hundreds of thousands of dollars in interest that could have been distributed amongst the victims. In deciding the case the court had to analyze a couple different issues.

    The first issue dealt with determining what law applies to the case. Since the case involves maritime insurance, the court had to decide between maritime law and state law. Statutes provide that if no federal maritime law controls the issue, then state law applies. Because no specific maritime provision covers when an excess insurer should deposit policy amounts with the court, Louisiana court applies. This means, as mentioned above, that excess insurance will not kick in until after all primary insurance funds have been exhausted. This essentially answers the question the second issue poses: when does the excess insurer need to deposit policy amounts with the court?

    Though there is some precedent for not allowing an insurer to unreasonably delay depositing with a court and creating unjust enrichment as a result of such delay, the court must still adhere to the contract created between the excess insurers and the policy holders. Through these contracts, policy holders have agreed that excess insurance will not be paid until all primary policy amounts have been exhausted. The court in American Commercial Lines held that policy holders cannot place undue burdens upon excess insurers that were not bargained for in the contract. For this reason, excess insurers are not required to deposit policy amounts with the court at the time of initial court actions. Excess insurers can instead wait until all primary policy money has been paid out before taking action.

    Insurance law is complicated and, though this single aspect seems straightforward, it is best left to a licensed attorney. If you have any questions regarding an insurance dispute, please contact the Berniard Law Firm for a consultation.

  • Understanding Class Action Lawsuits in Louisiana

    Class actions are a common and popular legal tool for cases involving a large group of people who share the same grievance against a defendant. Specifically, the plaintiffs have to have a real and actual interest in order to join a class action. An issue may arise however, if a plaintiff’s interest is called into question. In particular, whether the plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted against a defendant. Essentially, the plaintiff’s have to share the same type of complaint and injury in order to form a proper class action. Many times, defendants will allege that the class action was improperly certified (allowed) in order to invalidate any complaints against them.

    In a recent Second Circuit Court of Appeal Case in Louisiana, the court explored the certification of a class action in order to determine whether or not it was proper. The facts of the case include the plaintiff, representing a class of individuals, who all share a grievance against a funeral home, owners of the funeral home, and numerous banks. The gist of their complaint is that the funeral home sold prepaid funeral expenses to the plaintiffs and other putative class members. The owner of the funeral home then deposited their payments into certificates of deposit (COD) with one or more of the banks named as defendants. The bulk of COD’s were under names which included the Funeral Home, followed by either “payable on death,” or “for the benefit of” followed by the name of the individual whose prepaid funeral funds were being held on deposit. The issue became that without presentation of a death certificate as required by Louisiana statute, the law governing prepaid funeral services, and in breach of the banks’ contracts, namely, the certificates of deposit, the funeral home was allowed by the banks to withdraw the funds which they converted and appropriated for their own use. The plaintiffs argue that by accepting the deposits, the defendant banks became commonly liable with the funeral home. Yet, the appellate court is charged with the responsibility to determine whether the class action should be certified, despite the fact the trial court denied the class’s certification.

    A class action must have certain definite characteristics. First, the class must be so large as to make individual suits impractical. Second, there must be a legal or factual claim in common between all the plaintiffs involved. Third, the claims or defenses must be typical of the plaintiffs or defendants. Fourth, the representative parties must adequately protect the interest of the class. Further, in many cases, the party seeking certification of a class must also show that common issues between the class and the defendants will predominate the proceedings, as opposed to individual fact-specific conflicts between class members and the defendants and that the class action, instead of individual litigation, is a superior vehicle for resolution of the disputes at hand. Here, the class certification, the plaintiffs sought to certify a class defined as “all individuals from whom the funeral home appropriated and converted funds collected by them for prepayment of funeral expenses.” Additionally, the motion asserted common questions of law and fact including:

    1. whether the funeral home appropriated and converted funds of the class members in violation of La. R.S. 37:861;
    2. whether the defendant banks released the class members’ funds in violation of La. R.S. 37:861 and the banks’ contracts; and
    3. whether the defendant banks released funds belonging to the class members without obtaining death certificates.

    The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion for certification of a class action as a result of a weighing and balancing determination. The trial court found that the plaintiff’s did not satisfy the class action requirements, stating that the evidence was insufficient to show that the class was so numerous and geographically dispersed that joinder would be impracticable, that the class representatives would adequately represent the putative class members, or that their claims are typical of those of the putative class members. Essentially, the trial court felt that each claim was too individual, and that it would be difficult to consolidate the claims and form one basic legal grievance against the defendant funeral home. The appellate court analyzed each of the trial court findings in order to determine whether or not the plaintiffs actually had a class action, concluding that they indeed did not have a proper class action.

    The appellate court concluded after exploring all of the factors that the plaintiffs failed to fulfill all of the requirements to have a proper class action. Specifically, the plaintiffs never alleged a relationship with the banks involved with the funeral home. Absent any connection of dealings with the banks, the plaintiffs do not have a real and actual interest in a suit against the banks. Only those persons whose prepaid funeral funds had been deposited by the funeral home with a specific bank would have a real and actual interest in a suit against such bank. Further, the appellate court denies class certification based on the plaintiffs argument that a plaintiff may have standing to sue a defendant with whom he has had no business contact or dealing, if the defendant’s conduct is part of a conspiracy. Yet, no conspiracy was alleged among the defendants named in the action. In conclusion, the appellate court, as did the trial court, found that the plaintiffs did not belong to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action asserted against the banks in the suit. Thus, the class action was denied. Class actions are a great tool for many cases, however, they must be properly formed and fulfill all of the legal requirements in order to move forward.

  • Fire Rages After New Iberia Chemical Plant Explosion

    With little details available, the residents of New Iberia sit and wait to find out more about an explosion that took place at the Multi-Chem plant. Conflicting reports exist regarding harm caused by the incident, though the most recent release states all plant employees are accounted for and there were no reported injuries.

    A 1-5 mile evacuation has taken place with residents encouraged to leave or, at worst, remain inside.

    More information will be available on our Personal Injury blog as it becomes available.

  • Chemical Release Ruling a Helpful Guide for Recent Spills/Leaks

    In Oakdale, Louisiana, on March 8th, 2000, a pressurized tank owned by Arizona Chemical Co., Inc., containing a heat transfer fluid over-heated. The tank had a safety shut off valve which failed, resulting in the short-term release of chemical vapor into the air. The vapor, containing biphenyl and phenyl oxide, drifted toward the home of a nearby resident, Ms. Edna Miller. The release was short lived and was contained within 30 minutes but caused very real damages. Edna and Bruce Miller sued Arizona Chemical Co, Inc., for personal injuries following the chemical release. As a result, Edna Miler was awarded $12,5000 in damages. However, Bruce Miller’s claim was denied as a verdict in favor of Arizona Chemical was issued.

    Both parties appealed the decisions in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed Edna Miller’s award for $12,500 and refused to award her additional damages. Bruce Miller’s claim on appeal was also denied, and he was awarded no damages. Edna Miller was awarded damages while her son Bruce was not because he could not meet his burden of proof to show that the chemical release caused him any harm.
    At the time of the exposure Edna was inside her home. Her son Bruce was at work, as a groundskeeper at a nearby high school. Mr. Miller left work to check on his mother when he heard about the chemical release. He found Edna outside on the lawn, nauseous, and about to leave the area. He helped her into her car and she drove away. Bruce Miler stayed on the property for several minutes, went in the house, had a glass of water and washed his face. He said his eyes and throat were burning and he felt shortness of breath.

    Later that day Mrs. Miller visited the emergency room with heart palpitations, shortness of breath and nausea. She was released when she no longer had symptoms from the chemical release. Arizona Chemical company paid her medical bill and the bills of four other people that day who complained of symptoms related to the chemical release. Mr. Miller did not seek medical attention that day. He stated that five hours after the exposure he developed a rash on his hands. This rash was later found to be caused by his taking Celebrex and by his long time smoking habit, not from the chemical release. He has suffered skin rashes many times before in his life.

    In order to recover damages for personal injury the injured party must prove that the other party was the primary, if not only, cause of the injury. Mr. Miller’s treating family practitioner testified that his breathing problems, rashes, and other symptoms were related to the chemical exposure. However, the physician did not know until the day of trial what chemical the Millers were exposed to, nor the type of ailments that particular substance could cause. The doctor said that the timing of the chemical release and Mr. Miller’s symptoms were what led him to that conclusion. The Defendant presented opinions of expert toxicologists who testified that Mr. Miller’s continuing symptoms could not have been caused by the brief transient exposure to the chemical vapor on March 8, 2000. Because Mr. Miller could not show that the cause of his symptoms was due to the chemical release, the Court of Appeals affirmed that he was not entitled to damages from Arizona Chemical Co., Inc.

    Showing that an action by one party caused injury to someone can be complicated. The inured party must prove that their injury was caused by the other party and that the injury caused them some harm. In this case Mrs. Miller suffered some harm, but not harm requiring compensation more than the $12,500 the court said. Mr. Miller was not able to meet his burden of proof showing that the chemical release was the cause of his injuries and thus failed at his claim.

    If you have suffered an injury due to chemical release or some other action of another party, you may be entitled to damages if you can meet the proper burden of proof. Whether or not a party has met their burden of proof is a question for the judge or jury and is essential to receiving compensation for personal injury. If you or someone you know has suffered an injury due to another party, an experienced attorney can help you determine if you may be able to meet the burden of proof to be awarded damages by the court.

    (more…)

  • Louisiana Residents With Personal Injury Questions

    For those Louisiana residents, whether you live in Lake Charles, Shreveport, Baton Rouge, New Orleans, Kentwood or any other of the great cities across this state, looking for more information on their possible personal injury claim, check out our blog dedicated to these legal matters:

    Louisiana Personal Injury Blog

    This blog discusses the legal issues relating to Admiralty/Maritime law, Animal/Dog Bites, Car Accidents, Chemical/Industrial Spills, the intricacies of Expert Testimony, Insurance Disputes, employee rights under the Jones Act, Legal Duty, Civil Lawsuits, Criminal prosecution, Medical Malpractice, Mesothelioma/Asbestos, Motorcycle Injury, Negligence, Offshore Accidents, Product Defects, Chinese Drywall, Strict Liability, Workers’ Compensation and Wrongful Death. All of these issues are crucial to citizens rights and residents of Louisiana.

    To better understand the complexity of the law, contacting an attorney is crucial. However, to get a better understanding of the general issues, we hope this resource is invaluable. Feel free to browse this legal resource dealing with a variety of harms or damages you may have suffered in order to understand how your issue matches up with the law.

    If you would like to speak with an attorney, check out our contact information. We represent Louisiana residents across the state and would be happy to discuss with you how to move forward with your unfortunate circumstances.

  • Dow Experiences Another Chemical Leak in Southeast Louisiana

    Dow Chemical, who experienced a chemical leak at their facility in Hahnville last summer, has reportedly had another incident at one of their Southeast Louisiana facilities. Breaking news from WWL reports

    Officials in St. Charles Parish report a chemical leak at a facility in Norco.

    It has crews evacuating some homes, closing 2 schools and shutting down roads.

    Scott Whelchel is the emergency operation director for St. Charles Parish.

    “We got a call this morning from Dow Chemical who actually has a unit within the Shell facility on the eastbank of our parish, and they had a unit that had a malfunction,” he told WWL First News. “What we are dealing with is a pool of the product within that unit. What will happen is that as it comes into contact with humidity, it will release a cloud of hydrogen chloride.”

    Whelchel says the chemical that leaked is titanium tetrachloride.

    As of now the incident appears to be under control. However, such chemical leaks are extremely dangerous and have been drawing the ire of environmental groups across the state and Gulf Coast for their frequency and possible harm to the public and surrounding plants, waterways and animals.

    More information will be posted on this blog as it becomes available. For more information on our firm’s work with the Hahnville leak, check our section on the matter here or look at our articles relating to the incident on our blog here.