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Category: Litigation

  • Employee Termination Upheld for Unauthorized Vehicle Use and Dishonesty

    Leotis Johnson, an employee of the Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans (S&WB), was assigned a company vehicle equipped with a GPS. S&WB policy prohibited personal use of company vehicles without supervisor authorization. Johnson was accused of using the vehicle for personal errands during work hours and lying about his whereabouts when questioned.

    The Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans dismissed Johnson due to unauthorized use of a company vehicle and non-compliance with established policies and procedures. Johnson challenged this decision and the Civil Service Commission’s supporting findings.

    The Court of Appeal Fourth Circuit upheld Johnson’s termination, stating that his actions constituted “cause” for termination as they were detrimental to the efficient operation of the S&WB. The court found that Johnson’s unauthorized use of the company vehicle for personal purposes during work hours was a clear violation of company policy. Additionally, his dishonesty in initially denying the allegations and providing false explanations further supported the termination.

    Key Takeaways

    1. Importance of Company Policies: Employers have the right to establish policies and procedures for using company property, including vehicles. Employees must adhere to these policies to avoid disciplinary action, including termination.

    2. Honesty is Crucial: When confronted with misconduct allegations, employees must be truthful. Dishonesty can be grounds for termination, especially when it obstructs an investigation or demonstrates a lack of trustworthiness.

    3. Burden of Proof: In cases of employee termination, the employer has the burden of proof to demonstrate that the employee’s actions were detrimental to the organization and justified the disciplinary action taken.

    4. Employee Rights: While employers have the right to discipline employees for cause, employees also have the right to appeal their termination through the Civil Service Commission. However, the Commission’s decision is given great deference and will only be overturned if it is arbitrary or capricious.

    This case reminds employees of the importance of adhering to company policies and being honest in the workplace. For employers, it highlights the need for clear policies and procedures and the importance of conducting thorough investigations when allegations of misconduct arise.

    Navigating the complexities of employment law and challenging a termination can be daunting. If you are in a similar situation where you believe your termination was unjust or the Civil Service Commission’s findings were erroneous, seeking legal advice is crucial. A knowledgeable employment lawyer can help you understand your rights, assess the strength of your case, and guide you through the appeals process. Don’t hesitate to contact a reputable law firm specializing in employment law to ensure your rights are protected and you receive the justice you deserve. Understanding your rights and taking timely action is essential to navigating employment disputes.

    Additional Sources: LEOTIS JOHNSON VERSUS SEWERAGE & WATER BOARD

    Written by Berniard Law Firm 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Employment Issues: When one employee attacks a supervisor, can a supervisor proceed with a lawsuit against the employer?  and When Can an Employer be Held Responsible for Employee’s Wrongdoing?

  • Coroner Not Liable for Burial of Foster Child’s Remains

    A recent Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Fourth Circuit decision has highlighted the complex legal issues surrounding the handling of deceased individuals’ remains, particularly in the context of foster care. The case, involving the parents of a minor child who passed away while in foster care, underscores the challenges in establishing liability against a coroner for the disposition of remains.

    In this case, the parents of Eli Simmons, a minor child who died while in foster care, sued various parties, including the Orleans Parish Coroner, alleging negligence in the handling of their son’s remains. The Coroner filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, dismissing the parents’ claims.

    The parents appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its decision. However, the Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the parents failed to provide sufficient evidence to support their negligence claims against the Coroner.

    Key Points of the Ruling:

    • Burden of Proof: The Court emphasized that in a summary judgment motion, the burden of proof initially rests with the mover (the party requesting the summary judgment). However, once the mover establishes that there’s no genuine issue of material fact, the burden shifts to the opposing party to present evidence demonstrating a factual dispute that warrants a trial.
    • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (NIED): The parents’ primary claim was for NIED, alleging that the Coroner’s actions caused them emotional distress. The court noted that to succeed in an NIED claim, the plaintiff must prove the defendant violated a legal duty and engaged in outrageous conduct.
    • Coroner’s Duties and Immunities: The court highlighted specific Louisiana laws outlining the Coroner’s duties and immunities. Louisiana law grants coroners immunity for discretionary acts within their lawful powers and duties. Additionally, no action can be taken against a cemetery authority (which includes the Coroner’s office in this context) for the remains left in its possession for over 60 days unless a written contract exists for their care.
    • Lack of Evidence: The court found that the parents failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding the Coroner’s alleged negligence or outrageous conduct.

    Coroners in Louisiana enjoy a degree of immunity that allows them to perform their duties without the constant threat of litigation. La. R.S. 13:5713. The immunity, however, isn’t absolute. It doesn’t protect them from claims arising from actions that are:

    • Outside the scope of their lawful powers and duties
    • Criminal, fraudulent, malicious, intentional, or grossly negligent

    In the Simmons case, the court found the Coroner’s actions fell within the scope of their lawful duties and were not unreasonable or outrageous, thus entitling them to immunity.

    This case highlights the complexities surrounding the handling of deceased individuals’ remains, particularly in cases involving foster children. While the parents’ grief is understandable, the court’s decision underscores the legal framework protecting coroners from liability in certain situations.

    The ruling also emphasizes the importance of understanding the burden of proof in summary judgment motions. If you are involved in a legal dispute, it’s crucial to consult with an experienced attorney to ensure your rights are protected and that you present sufficient evidence to support your claims.

    Additional Sources: PATRICK SIMMONS, SR., ET. AL VERSUS THE STATE OF LOUISIANA, ET AL

    Written by Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Blog Articles on Coroners  and Statutory Immunity: Coroner’s Outrageous Actions Result In Loss of Statutory Immunity in Louisiana Lawsuit and Understanding Statutory Employer Immunity in Workers’ Compensation Cases in Louisiana

  • Granddaughters and Medical Malpractice in Louisiana: Who Can Initiate the Claim?

    In the recent Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit, decision of Guffey v. Lexington House, the court delved into the complexities of prescription (the Louisiana equivalent of a statute of limitations) in medical malpractice cases. This ruling provides valuable insights into the interplay between the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (LMMA) and the state’s Civil Code, specifically concerning who can initiate a medical review panel and how that affects prescription for potential plaintiffs. This blog post will dissect the Guffey decision, analyze its implications, and offer guidance for navigating medical malpractice claims in Louisiana.

    Case Background

    Geneva Guffey, a nursing home resident, suffered a severe leg injury when a Lexington House employee dropped her during a transfer. She tragically passed away a few months later. Her granddaughter, Deana Fredrick, initiated the medical review panel process, a prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice lawsuit in Louisiana.

    Lexington House challenged Deana’s right to file the request, arguing she wasn’t a direct beneficiary under Louisiana law. The trial court and the Court of Appeal initially sided with Deana, allowing the medical review panel to proceed.

    The panel found that Lexington House had breached the standard of care. Subsequently, two of Geneva’s children filed a lawsuit. Lexington House responded with exceptions of vagueness and prescription, the latter being the focus of this appeal. They argued that the lawsuit was filed beyond the one-year prescriptive period and that Deana’s initial filing did not suspend prescription for the other potential plaintiffs. The trial court denied the exception of prescription, leading to this appeal.

    Court’s Ruling

    The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court’s decision, denying the exception of prescription. The court focused on the definition of “claimant” under the LMMA and concluded that there’s a distinction between the right to initiate the medical review panel process and the right to file a lawsuit after the panel’s decision.

    The court reasoned that the LMMA’s definition of “claimant” is broad, encompassing not just direct beneficiaries but also representatives of the patient or the decedent’s estate. This broad definition serves the LMMA’s purpose, which is to facilitate the efficient resolution of medical malpractice claims.

    The court also addressed the argument that allowing anyone to initiate the medical review panel process would render meaningless a provision allowing healthcare providers to raise an exception of no right of action. The court countered that the LMMA’s definition of “claimant” is specific enough to prevent frivolous claims.

    Key Takeaways from the Guffey Decision

    • Broad Definition of “Claimant”: The LMMA’s definition of “claimant” is inclusive, allowing not only direct beneficiaries but also representatives of the patient or the decedent’s estate to initiate the medical review panel process.
    • Suspension of Prescription: Filing a request for a medical review panel suspends prescriptions for all potential plaintiffs, even those not directly involved in the panel process.
    • Distinction Between Panel Initiation and Lawsuit: The right to initiate the medical review panel process doesn’t necessarily equate to the right to file a lawsuit after the panel’s decision. The Louisiana Civil Code’s provisions on wrongful death and survival actions determine the latter.

    Implications for Medical Malpractice Claims

    The Guffey decision clarifies several aspects of medical malpractice litigation in Louisiana. It underscores the importance of initiating the medical review panel process in a timely manner, as this suspends prescriptions for all potential plaintiffs. It also highlights the broad definition of “claimant” under the LMMA, potentially allowing a wider range of individuals to initiate the process.

    However, it’s important to remember that initiating the panel process doesn’t automatically guarantee the right to file a lawsuit. The right to sue is still governed by the Louisiana Civil Code, which specifies the classes of beneficiaries who can bring wrongful death and survival actions.

    If you are considering filing a medical malpractice claim in Louisiana, consulting with an experienced attorney is crucial. They can help you navigate the complexities of the LMMA, ensure compliance with procedural rules, and protect your rights throughout the process.

    Additional Sources: JAMES E. GUFFEY, ET AL. VERSUS LEXINGTON HOUSE, LLC 

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Prescription: Grieving Widow Granted Opportunity to Fight Prescription in Medical Malpractice Case and Trial Court Errs by Granting an Exception of Prescription to Insurance Company

  • Driver Not Liable for Passenger’s Injury in Accident Beyond His Control

    Sometimes, being a passenger in a car can be a frustrating and disturbing experience. This is especially true when actions beyond the passenger’s control, such as being involved in a collision, put his or her life in danger. When such a situation arises, the injured passenger will, understandably, seek compensation from the responsible party. However, if the person who caused the accident leaves the scene and is never apprehended by law enforcement, an injured person may turn their attention elsewhere for financial compensation. Such a situation arose following a car accident on a stretch of highway between Jennings and Lafayette, Louisiana. 

    Kyle Jordan was driving a rental car with Riley Moulton as a passenger. The vehicle was sideswiped, causing Jordan’s car to flip over and injure Moulton. The hit-and-run driver was never identified, so Mouton sued both Jordan and the rental car company, EAN Holdings, for damages. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that since Mouton admitted in his deposition that Jordan was driving safely at the time of the accident and did nothing to cause it, Moulton offered no evidence to support a theory of recovery against Jordan or EAN Holdings. The trial court granted the defendant’s motions for summary judgment. Mouton appealed to Louisiana’s Third Circuit Court of Appeal.

    The Appellate Court reviewed the facts of the case as laid out by Mouton himself in his deposition testimony. Mouton stated that Jordan had set the cruise control in the car to 70 MPH, consistent with the speed limit, and was “driving correct.” He further testified that the accident occurred when Jordan made a proper change into the left lane to pass a large truck.

    A driver in a Kia came up from behind and, in a dangerous and illegal move known as “shooting the gauntlet,” attempted to pass Jordan’s vehicle on the right-hand side between it and the truck Jordan was trying to pass. The Kia sideswipedan’s vehicle, sending it out of control. Jordan attempted to regain control but overcorrected and flipped the car. Mouton’s testimony made it evident that Jordan could not have done anything to avoid the accident.

    Summary judgment should be granted if “the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial.” Hardy v. Bowie, 744 So.2d 606 (La. 1999). In this instance, the Court noted, Mouton was unable to point to any evidence suggesting Jordan’s liability for the injuries he suffered in the crash.

    Mouton freely admitted in his deposition that Jordan was “driving as he was supposed to” by following the speed limit and remaining in his lane. Mouton also revealed that Jordan could not have taken any actions to avoid the accident. It was beyond his control, and the Kia driver was solely responsible for side-swiping Jordan. 

    Jordan also was not at fault for any action he may have taken after being sideswiped by the Kia under the sudden emergency doctrine. The doctrine provides that “one who finds himself in imminent danger, without sufficient time to weigh and consider all of the circumstances or means of avoiding danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to choose what subsequently appears to be the better method.” Bryn Lynn Corp. v. Valliere, 434 So.2d 600 (La. Ct. App. 1983).

    The Court determined that there was nothing Jordan could have done to avoid the accident, which occurred suddenly and unexpectedly; under the sudden emergency doctrine, he cannot be considered negligent for failing to regain control of the car. Instead, the driver of the Kia was solely at fault for the injuries Mouton suffered. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in Jordan’s favor.

    Similarly, the Court held that Moulton offered no theory of recovery against EAN Holdings, which simply rented a car to Jordan. When a car renter is in “exclusive physical control of the lease object,” negligence “cannot be imputed to the lessor.” Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. v. American Beverage Co., 137 So.2d 298 (La. 1962).  The Court noted that even if Jordan had been at fault for Mouton’s injuries, EAN Holdings would not have been liable under this “well settled” rule. Thus, the Court also affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of EAN Holdings.

    This case demonstrates two important principles. First, it shows how courts attempt to resolve disputes quickly and efficiently through summary judgment when a plaintiff fails to provide factual support for his theory of recovery. Second, it demonstrates the operation of the sudden emergency doctrine that limits a person’s liability when unexpectedly thrust into a dangerous situation caused by another party’s negligent or reckless actions. In what should be a comfort to motorists across Louisiana, the doctrine affords them some leniency for not acting perfectly reasonably when they are put in a situation for which they are not trained and have little or no experience. In this case, Jordan was not a stunt driver or car racer; the Court determined he could not be expected to know how to react perfectly when his car was sideswiped at highway speeds.

    Additional Source:  RILEY MOUTON VERSUS EAN HOLDINGS, LLC, ET AL.

    Written by Berniard Law Firm

  • When one employee attacks a supervisor, can a supervisor proceed with a lawsuit against the employer?

    Nurses fighting one another may sound like a scene from daytime television, but unfortunately, this also occurs in real time.  When one employee attacks a supervisor, can a supervisor proceed with a lawsuit against the employer?  A nursing home in Laplace, Louisiana, recently tried to be dismissed from a personal injury lawsuit regarding two of its employees, stating it could not be vicariously liable.   The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal judged this was a question for trial.   

    Two employees of Twin Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. (“Twin Oaks”) in the parish of St. John the Baptist were involved in an altercation in April 2012. A supervisor, Ms. Haynie, approached her employee, Ms. Alford, requesting that Ms. Alford report to her office. When Ms. Haynie turned to walk away, Ms. Alford struck her supervisor repeatedly in the head and neck from behind. Ms. Haynie sustained bruises, scratches, a black eye, and soft tissue damage.  Ms. Alford had numerous prior work violations and justified the attack by stating she wanted Twin Oaks to give her a reason to fire her.  

    Ms. Haynie filed a lawsuit against Ms. Alford and Twin Oaks in the Fortieth Judicial District Court Parish of St. John the Baptist. The District Court dismissed the lawsuit against Twin Oaks, stating that the nursing home could not be vicariously liable because Ms. Alford’s actions were not employment-rooted or incidental to employee performance.  

    The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal disagreed.  An employer may be held liable for an employee’s tortious act if the tortious act was primarily employment-rooted and incidental to the performance of the employee’s duties while occurring on the employer’s premises and during the hours of employment.  See LaBrane v. Lewis, 292 So.2d.216 (La. 1974).  An employer is not liable merely because an act happened on the employer’s premises during working hours. 

    Vicarious liability will be found only when the employee is acting within the scope and in furtherance of their employment duties.  See Baumeister v. Plunkett, 673 So.2d 994 (La. 1996).  However, the Fifth Circuit did note that not every factor above must be met, and each case’s particular set of facts should be carefully analyzed for employer liability.   

    The Fifth Circuit determined that Ms. Haynie presented enough material facts regarding employer liability that should be presented at a trial.  Thus, it was inappropriate for the District Court to dismiss Twin Oaks.  On the date of the altercation, Ms. Haynie was at the nursing home performing her duties.  Ms. Alford stated the attack was partly provoked by her assumption that she would soon be fired, which suggests it was employment-rooted.  Other facts indicated that the conflict between the two women was purely personal.   Either way, enough facts required a trial to determine whether liability for the injuries could be passed to Twin Oaks.   

    Vicarious liability can be tricky territory to tread without an excellent and skilled lawyer, no matter which side of the aisle you find yourself on. It is vital that anyone caught up in a dispute involving employer liability seek appropriate legal advice. 

    Additional Sources: Demetris Haynie and Curtis Young Sr. Versus Twin Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. and Annie Alford 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Employer Vicarious Liability: Court of Appeals Examines the Scope of Employment Requirement for Vicarious Liability

  • New Orleans Police Officer’s Termination from Traffic Accident Confrontation Upheld

    To ensure public trust in law enforcement, local government officials have the power to regulate police officers’ conduct both on and off duty. There are certain lines that police officers should not cross, even in their private lives. The following case shows how the New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) can terminate the employment of a long-serving police officer for fighting after a traffic accident and reinforce the high standard they hold their employees to.

    Officer Tracy Fulton of the NOPD was waiting at a stop light in his personal vehicle when he was hit from behind by a driver under the alias in court as E.C.. Officer Fulton left his car and began yelling at E.C. and the occupants of his vehicle. When Officer Fulton attempted to open the door of E.C.’s vehicle, E.C. drove off and went to his home. Officer Fulton called the police to report a hit-and-run and followed E.C., who was returning home. Officer Fulton then confronted E.C. again, and the argument eventually became a fight between the two men. 

    After the two men exchanged blows, they retreated to their vehicles to grab weapons, and the fight ended. After the fight, E.C. had a broken nose, a dislocated jaw, a concussion, and concussion-related symptoms. After an NOPD investigation, Officer Fulton was charged with second-degree battery and was also investigated and eventually fired. Officer Fulton was found not guilty of the battery charge at trial, but the termination was never reversed. Officer Fulton then appealed his termination to the New Orleans Civil Service Commission (“the Commission”).

    According to the Louisiana Constitution, the NOPD can discipline an employee for sufficient cause. La. Const. art. X, § 8(A). This termination stipulates that it must have a cause or a legitimate reason for the termination. La. Const. Art. X, § 12.  The standard for legal cause is whenever the employee does something that hurts the ability of the employee to effectively engage in public service. See Cittadino v. Dep’t of Police, 558 So.2d 1311, 1315 (La. Ct. App. 1990). Finally, the law in Louisiana allows disciplinary action even if a criminal case based on the same events is not successful. See Bailey v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 951 So. 2d 234, 240 (La. Ct. App. 2006).

    On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal upheld the Commission’s decision to terminate Officer Fulton’s employment. Officer Fulton attempted to explain his conduct as self-defense and argued that his actions were justified. This claim failed because the Commission determined that Officer Fulton was the aggressor. E.C. drove away after the initial confrontation, but the Fourth Circuit noted that E.C.’s behavior was not that of a driver committing a hit-and-run. E.C. stopped at a red light, which allowed Officer Fulton to gather E.C.’s vehicle information and license plate number.

    In fact, the Commission found that all of Officer Fulton’s actions after the accident were inappropriate, unnecessary, and threatening. Officer Fulton never withdrew and was continuously the threatening party; accordingly, he was not entitled to use self-defense. Instead, E.C.’s actions of engaging in a fight after being followed to his home were found to be justified. The Commission found that the evidence was overwhelming that Officer Fulton’s aggressive nature in this confrontation hurt his ability with the NOPD to conduct efficient and effective operations.

    The purpose of a police department is to protect and serve the members of a community. Officers getting aggressive with community members after a simple traffic accident can undermine all of the good work a police department provides. The NOPD and the Commission were correct in removing officers who could not handle themselves professionally, even if they were not on the clock. 

    Additional Sources: Tracy Fulton versus Department of Police

    Written by Berniard Law Firm 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Police Conduct: Eunice Police Chief Comments about Business Owners Found Defamatory

  • Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System Loses Battle Over Disability Insurance With East Baton Rouge Women

    On-the-job injuries can sometimes result in employment termination when the injury prohibits you from completing your work. When this happens, state-funded disability retirement benefits can keep former employees financially afloat; however, eligibility for such benefits depends on how long you have worked for the employer and when you file your claim.

    Bessie Hall worked for the State of Louisiana in East Baton Rouge for over seventeen years.  On July 13, 2012,  Ms. Hall suffered an on-the-job injury at the Louisiana Department of Children and Family Services. Because her injury prevented her from working, her employer terminated her in September 2013. 

    Over two years later, Ms. Hall applied for disability retirement benefits through LASERS, the Louisiana State Employees’ Retirement System. LASERS, however, found Ms. Hall ineligible for these benefits.  Ms. Hall sued the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge. The District Court held Ms. Hall was eligible for benefits, and LASERS appealed to the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal.

    The crux of this case was whether the District Court applied proper statutory interpretation. According to La. C.C. Art 10, “[w]hen the language of the law is susceptible to different meanings, it must be interpreted as having the meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” With this interpretive standard in mind, the Court of Appeal analyzed the construction and intent of the two statutes.

    This first statute, La. R.S.11:212, provides in section (A) that an employee injured in the workplace as “an active contributing member in active state service” and who “has at least ten years of creditable service” is entitled to disability benefits if he/she applies “while in service.” Section (C) provides for those who apply after termination, stating that such benefits are still available as long as “clear, competent, and convincing evidence [is shown] that the disability was incurred while the member was an active contributing member in active service.”

    The second statute, La. R.S.11:217 provides that an injured employer who has completed twenty years of service and is no longer in service is eligible for disability retirement benefits as long as his/her normal retirement benefits have not yet been vested. LASERS argued that these two statutes should be read together. In other words, an employer must first be eligible under La. R.S.11:217, and then La. R.S.11:212(C) provides an exception for applicants still in service. Because Ms. Hall had only worked 17, and not 20, years in state service, she should not have been eligible for disability retirement benefits.

    The Court of Appeal disagreed. It found that “laws should not be given an interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless.” Accordingly, LASERS’ reading of La. R.S.11:217 would render La. R.S.11:212(A) is meaningless because this statute determines an employer’s baseline eligibility. Ms. Hall would thus not be eligible under La. R.S.11:212(A) because she did not apply while in service.

    However, La. R.S.11:212(C) provides an exception, stating that an employer may apply after receiving termination if he/she gives evidence of service during the injury. This applies to Ms. Hall, meaning that she is eligible for benefits, and no other statute needs analyzing. The Court of Appeal found La. R.S.11:217 is inapplicable to this case because it covered something completely different: retirement vesting for employees whose injuries may or may not have occurred on the job and who had achieved twenty years of service. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal dismissed LASERS’ claims.

    Workplace injuries can change lives; however, eligibility for retirement disability benefits can ease resulting financial difficulties. For Ms. Hall, standard statutory construction confirmed her benefit eligibility, while LASERS’ incorrect interpretation cost the state in appeal costs. A good lawyer can assist with accurate statutory interpretation and help secure essential disability benefits.   

    Additional Sources: HALL v. LOUISIANA STATE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT SYSTEM

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Employment Benefits Disputes:  Lack of Substantial Evidence for Denial of Severance Pay Leads to Payment in Case Out of Baton Rouge

  • Permanently Disabled Individual Not Acting Under Scope of Employment In Workers’ Compensation Case

    Unfortunately, accidents at the workplace are not uncommon occurrences. What happens, however, when you are injured while traveling? Will you still receive workers’ compensation if you are not physically on the jobsite? The answers to these questions will depend on the facts of the case and whether you were acting within the scope of your employment. The following Caddo Parish case outlines this predicament.  

    It is undisputed that Mitchell Stringer was hired at Hand Construction, LLC, sometime after September 30, 2014, and that he was asked to attend a meeting at the company office by John Provost, Vice President for the company, in early October. However, the parties disagree on whether Stringer was terminated at the meeting, as testified by Provost and Adam Hubble, CEO for the company, or was told there would not be any more work for him, but that he would receive two weeks’ severance pay, as testified by Stringer. Stringer’s final paycheck included the date “October 9, 2015.” He was issued a check with “severance” in the ledger for the week ending in October 16, 2015. 

    It was also disputed as to whether or not the parties agreed that Stringer would fly to North Dakota to retrieve his vehicle and the company’s GPS equipment. Regardless, on October 8, 2015, Stringer flew to North Dakota to obtain his vehicle and company equipment. Two days later, while traveling from North Dakota to Louisiana, Stringer was involved and injured in a motor vehicle accident in Arkansas.

    As a result of his injuries, Stringer was hospitalized and underwent a minimum of ten surgeries. He also sustained permanently disabling injuries, although he was able to return to modified employment with an employer in Alabama in 2017. 

    Stringer ultimately brought a Disputed Claim for Compensation, where he requested, in part, wage benefits, payment of medical expenses, and authorization for additional medical treatment against Hand Construction, LLC. The Office of Workers’ Compensation, District 1-W for the Parish of Caddo, found that Stringer was told at the October meeting that he was no longer performing services for the company and subsequently entered judgment in favor of the company. Stringer then filed this appeal with the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal. 

    In order to bring a compensation action, the claimant must be able to establish an injury by an act arising out of, or in the course of, employment. La. R.S. 23:1031(A). Additionally, when reviewing, a court does not determine whether the Workers’ Compensation Judge was right, but only if the findings were reasonable. See  Buxton v. Iowa Police Dept..   

    The Court of Appeal found the main issue in this case to be whether Stringer was employed by Hand Construction, LLC at the time of the automobile accident in Arkansas on October 10th. After hearing the evidence, the Court of Appeal found that Stringer’s trip to North Dakota was primarily a personal mission, he was not paid for the trip, and his plan to send back the company equipment did not extend or renew the employment relationship. As such, the Court of Appeal found no manifest error in the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s findings that Stringer’s employment had been terminated at the early October meeting and, therefore, his accident and subsequent injuries did not arise out of, or were in the course of, employment with Hand Construction, LLC.    

    As seen by the outcome of this case, it is important to fully understand the status of your employment at all times. If you have any questions as to whether you were injured within the course of employment, however, contact a personal injury attorney with ample experience in these matters. 

    Additional Sources: MITCHELL STRINGER versus HAND CONSTRUCTION, L.L.C.

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Samantha Calhoun

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Workers’ Compensation: Worker Entitled To Workers’ Compensation From Injuries From Passing Out At Work — Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

    Are Mental Injuries Covered By Workers’ Compensation?

  • What is Decretal Language, and Why is it Important?

    In the legal world, every word holds significance. Clarity and precision are of the utmost priority because even the slightest bit of ambiguity can have dire consequences. This is a truth that Terry Gotch would later find out after he filed suit against Scooby’s ASAP Towing LLC following a vehicular accident in Louisiana.

    On February 8th, 2013, Joseph DeRousselle was backing out of a driveway and almost hit the car Terry Gotch was a passenger in. The driver took evasive maneuvers, which led to the vehicle leaving the road and crashing into a ditch. Gotch was injured as a result of the accident. At the time of the accident, DeRousselle was an employee of Scooby’s ASAP Towing. Gotch then filed a lawsuit against Scooby’s ASAP Towing, claiming vicarious liability of the employer for DeRousselle’s negligence. A judgment was made following a jury trial in favor of Scooby’s ASAP Towing, absolving them of any negligence, and Gotch’s claim was disregarded.

    Gotch, understandably unhappy with the verdict, orally moved for a mistrial. This motion was denied a short time later following a hearing. Still unsatisfied, Gotch filed an appeal on October 23rd, 2017. A written judgement was issued; however, it was insufficient in that it lacked decretal language.

    Decretal language is generally defined as the portion of a court’s decision in which an official statement as to what the court is ordering is contained. As outlined in Input/Output Marine Sys., Inc. v. Wilson Greatbatch, Tech., Inc., “An appellate court cannot determine the merits of an appeal unless a valid final judgment properly invokes their jurisdiction. That judgment must be precise, definite, and certain.” Further, “the specific relief granted should be determinable from the judgment without referencing an extrinsic source such as pleadings or reasons for judgment.” Input/Output Marine.

    Here, the trial court found no negligence on behalf of DeRousselle’s involvement in the car accident. A judgment was released in correspondence with that finding. Additionally, the trial court’s final judgment would also represent Gotch’s mistrial motion denial. However, the judgment does not indicate the trial court’s final disposition on the matter.

    Gotch conceded this judgment alone was insufficient and wanted his appeal to be dismissed and remanded to the trial court so they could enter a judgment containing the correct decretal language required. The appellate court did just that, dismissing the appeal without prejudice and remanding it to the trial court with the purpose of decretal language being added so Gotch could later appeal.

    This case outlines the importance of every word in a legal proceeding. If a court leaves out the proper decretal language, which is required, even seemingly obvious cases may not be reviewable on appeal. This is why it is essential to get a lawyer experienced in navigating the various intricacies of the legal system. A sharp eye can mean the difference between a quick, viable appeal and a much longer, dragged-out appeal.

    Additional Sources: TERRY GOTCH VERSUS SCOOBY’S ASAP TOWING, LLC, ET AL.

    Article Written By: T.J. Reinhardt

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Decretal Language and Judgments: Appealing a Court Judgment in Louisiana: Why Decretal Language Matters

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  • The Road Less Licensed: Bosley’s Driving School Chronicles

    Buckle up your seatbelts and get ready for a wild ride through the twists and turns of Bosley’s Driving School saga! Meet Mr. Bosley, the daring entrepreneur behind this driving school extravaganza, with locations in the charming towns of Donaldsonville and Gonzales, Louisiana. Now, picture this: Mr. Bosley is on a mission to teach the art of driving, but not just any driving – he dreams of offering the elusive 38-hour driver’s education course. But, oh, the drama unfolds when his dreams clash with the stern rules and regulations of the Louisiana driver’s education system. Despite a denial that would make even the bravest soul reconsider, Mr. Bosley and his team continued their quest, issuing certificates left and right. Little did they know, the authorities were hot on their tail, leading to a showdown of epic proportions. Fast forward to courtroom battles, administrative hearings, and a rollercoaster of legal twists that could rival any Hollywood blockbuster. Will Mr. Bosley’s driving school dreams come crashing to a halt, or will he find a way to steer his way out of this legal maze? Strap in and find out!

    Mr. Bosley owns and runs Bosley’s Driving School for drivers’ education classes. The driving school has two locations—one in Donaldsonville and the other in Gonzales, Louisiana. The Donaldsonville location was licensed to teach 6 hours of classroom instruction, while the Gonzales location was licensed to teach the full 14-hour driver’s education course. Neither location was licensed to teach the 38-hour course. Louisiana offers two types of driver’s education courses: (1) A 14-hour course for individuals over eighteen, which requires 6 hours of classroom instruction and 8 hours of behind-the-wheel driving, and (2) a 38-hour course for individuals under eighteen, which requires 30 hours of classroom instruction and 8 hours of behind -the -wheel driving. La. R.S. 32:402. 1.

    In October 2012, Bosley applied for permission to instruct the 38-hour driver’s ed course. On December 10, 2012, Bosley was notified via email that their application was denied because they needed to meet the curriculum requirements. Regardless of this denial, Bosley continued to issue certificates of completion of the 38-hour course to several students. When the State learned of this, they sent Bosley an order to cease further operations as a driving school and third-party tester in Louisiana. On March 27, 2014, the State notified Bosley that because he was providing students with the 38-hour driver’s education course despite needing to be licensed, his licenses to teach the 6-hour and the 14-hour courses were rescinded. Bosley filed an appeal and requested a hearing. 

    On February 20, 2015, an administrative hearing was held. The State’s revocations were affirmed. The court agreed that Bosley had conducted the 30-hour classroom portion of the 38-hour course despite not being licensed. Bosley pursued judicial review of the decision by the district court. The State filed a motion to dismiss for a no cause of action, which the district court granted.

    Bosley filed a devolutive appeal of the district court’s decision on July 29, 2015. On April 27, 2016, the case was reversed and remanded back to the district court, finding that the district court should have ordered a hearing on the merits and the administrative record needed to be incorporated into the court’s record. In April 2017, the district court affirmed the administrative court’s decision again and dismissed the matter with prejudice. 

    On September 19, 2017, the State filed a motion and order to dismiss the appeal and alleged that Bosley failed to appeal the district court’s decision. The State argued that the deadline to appeal was July 5, 2017, but Bosley did not appeal until July 11, 2017.

    According to the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1974 “the delay for applying for a new trial is seven days, exclusive of legal holidays. The delay for applying for a new trial starts the day after the clerk mails it in, or the sheriff has been served, the notice of judgment.” 

    In this case, the district court mailed its notice of judgment on April 28, 2017. The deadline to apply for a new trial was May 9, 2017. The time to file a devolutive appeal expired on July 10, 2017. Bosley filed a motion for devolutive appeal on July 11, 2017. Because Bosley did not appeal within the available time, the appeal must be dismissed as untimely.

    In the end, the legal gears ground to a halt, leaving Bosley and his driving school dreams in the dust. Despite their persistence and determination, the unforgiving hand of time caught up with them, leading to the untimely dismissal of their appeal. The tale of Bosley’s Driving School serves as a cautionary reminder that even the most spirited endeavors can be derailed by the unyielding hands of bureaucracy. And so, the wheels of justice keep turning, leaving behind a trail of lessons for all those who dare to dream beyond the boundaries of the law. And with that, our thrilling journey through Bosley’s Driving School comes to an end, leaving us with a tale of ambition, struggle, and the relentless pursuit of the road less traveled.

    Additional Sources: Bosley’s Driving School and O’Neal versus Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Needum Lekia

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