Category: Jones Act

  • Underwater Collision Sparks Legal Battle: Shell Offshore vs. Tesla and International

    In the depths of the Gulf of Mexico, a seemingly minor incident set off a chain of legal events that reverberated through the maritime industry. An underwater sonar device, or towfish, collided with the mooring line of a Shell Offshore drilling rig, causing significant damage. The resulting legal battle involved Shell, the company operating the sonar device (Tesla Offshore), and the vessel’s owner (International Offshore Services). This blog post explores the key issues of the case, the court’s rulings, and the implications for maritime operations.

    The Incident:

    Tesla Offshore was conducting an archaeological survey of the ocean floor using a towfish pulled by a vessel chartered from International Offshore Services. Despite having prior information about the location of Shell’s drilling rig, Tesla failed to share this with the vessel’s crew. The towfish struck one of the rig’s mooring lines, causing damage and disrupting Shell’s operations.

    The Legal Proceedings:

    Shell sued both Tesla and International for damages. A jury found Tesla 75% at fault and International 25% at fault. While the appeal was pending, Tesla settled with Shell. The district court then determined that Tesla was entitled to contribution from International toward the settlement.

    Key Legal Issues:

    • Towing Vessel Status: International disputed the court’s classification of its vessel as a “towing vessel,” which would require the captain to hold a specific license. The court upheld this classification, emphasizing that the vessel’s primary function was to pull the towfish.

    • Allocation of Fault: Tesla challenged the jury’s allocation of fault, arguing it should have been at least 50/50. The court rejected this, stating there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s decision.

    • Contribution Calculation: Tesla also challenged the calculation of International’s contribution to the settlement, particularly regarding a previous payment International had made to Shell. The court upheld the calculation, giving International credit for the earlier payment.

    Implications:

    This case serves as a reminder of the importance of clear communication and adherence to regulations in maritime operations. It also highlights the potential legal complexities that can arise from seemingly straightforward incidents. Companies involved in offshore activities must ensure they have proper licenses and share relevant information to avoid costly legal battles and disruptions to operations

    Additional Sources: SHELL OFFSHORE, INCORPORATED, Plaintiff v. TESLA OFFSHORE, L.L.C., Defendant – Appellee Cross-Appellant v. INTERNATIONAL OFFSHORE SERVICES, L.L.C.; INTERNATIONAL MARINE, L.L.C.,

    Written by Berniard Law Firm

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Maritime Law Issues: Navigating the Waters of Maritime Contracts: An Indemnity Puzzle and Seaman or Not? Court Reverses Summary Judgment in Deepwater Horizon Cleanup Worker Injury Case

  • Navigating the Waters of Maritime Contracts: An Indemnity Puzzle

    In contractual agreements, the validity of indemnity provisions can become a subject of contention between parties. But what happens when determining a contract’s maritime nature becomes pivotal in a case involving specialty services for drilling or production in navigable waters? As discussed below, this issue was scrutinized in a maritime appeal action filed with the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    Apache Corporation (“Apache”) had a blanket master services contract (“MSC”) with Specialty Rental Tools & Supply, L.L.P. (“STS”). This MSC Had an indemnity provision that ran in favor of Apache and its contractors. The work order didn’t require a vessel, nor was it anticipated that it would be needed to perform the job. Apache contracted with Larry Doiron, Inc.
    (“LDI”), to provide a crane barge that was needed for the operation. Unfortunately, a member of the STS crew was injured by LDI operators during crane usage, prompting LDI to file a limitation of liability proceeding as the crane’s owner and a complaint against STS to seek indemnity as per the MSC.

    The pivotal question was whether the MSC should be classified as a maritime contract. If deemed maritime, the general maritime law would govern the enforceability of the indemnity provision. The District Court ruled in favor of maritime law and granted indemnity to LDI from STS. That ruling was appealed. 

    The appellate court examined whether they should apply the maritime or Louisiana law to determine if the indemnity provision should be allowed in the MSC. The Court explained that they had originally used a six-factor test per the court in Davis & Sons, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. (“Davis & Sons”). The appellate court opined that most of the prongs of the test were unnecessary and excessively complicated the determination of whether the contract does fall within maritime law. Instead, the appellate court relied on Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Kirby and a simpler two-prong factor test, which is more straightforward.

    The appellate court adopted this Kirby test which just looked to two factors only (1) the contract and services related to maritime activities and (2) if the answer is “yes,” does the contract provide or do the parties expect that a vessel will play a substantial role in the completion of the contract? If so, the contract is considered to be of a maritime nature.

    The Court concluded that because the Kirby test focuses on the contract itself and the parties’ expectations, this was the proper approach, although some of the Davis & Sons factors can still be relevant. 

    Ultimately, the court concluded that the MSC in question was nonmaritime. The work commenced before the need for a vessel arose, and its involvement was minimal, unrelated to the anticipated scope of work. Therefore, the contract fell under the governance of Louisiana law, highlighting the significance of accurately determining maritime activities.

    While the definition of maritime activities may remain uncertain, this case offers a more streamlined approach to such determinations. Engaging the expertise of an experienced attorney becomes crucial when navigating the complexities of litigation, ensuring proper guidance in understanding which claims may prevail under Louisiana law.

    Additional Sources: LARRY DOIRON, INC. VS. SPECIALTY RENTAL TOOLS & SUPPLY, L.L.P.; OIL STATES ENERGY SERVICES, L.L.C.; ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Brianna Saroli

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Maritime Law: Injured on a Boat on Land, Can you File a Lawsuit with Maritime Claims? Admiralty/Maritime

  • Can I Recover under the Jones Act if Rough Seas Cause a Back Injury

    Large waves and rough seas make boat travel a harrowing experience. But what happens if you are at work and fall out of bed during those stormy seas? Is the captain or company you work for liable under the Jones Act?  The following case out of Louisiana helps answer the question; can I recover under the Jones Act if rough seas cause my back injury? 

    Richard Bosarge sued Cheramie Marine LLC (“Cheramie”) under the Jones Act after he allegedly suffered injuries aboard one of its utility vessels. See 46 U.S.C. § 30101. Before starting work, he had to complete a physical. During the physical, Bosarge responded he did not have any prior back pain or injuries, even though he had previously received medical care for his back pain. Nonetheless, Cheramie hired Bosarge to work as a relief captain. 

    Bosarge claimed he was injured due to the captain’s decision to travel through rough seas. He alleged the captain’s path caused him to come out of bed and get slammed down. Cheramie argued the waves were not that big, and Bosarge had not reported having an accident. The jury found Bosarge had not suffered an accident. Further, the jury also found Bosarge misrepresented or concealed facts during his pre-employment physical. 

    Bosarge appealed, arguing there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. However, because Bosarge did not move for a directed verdict, new trial, or judgment notwithstanding the evidence, the appellate court could not review whether sufficient evidence existed. See OneBeacon Ins. Co. v. T. Wade Welch & Assocs.

    On appeal, Bosarge also argued the district court had confused the jury with the word “accident” in the jury instructions. He claimed the word “accident” suggests the incident occurred without fault. The appellate court found the verdict did not need to be overturned solely because the district court judge had not exactly followed the Pattern Jury Instructions provided by the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court pointed to the definition of “accident” in the dictionary, which states the event can result from carelessness or ignorance. Additionally, Bosarge did not provide any evidence that an ordinary person’s use of the word “accident” assumes that no one is at fault. Therefore, in light of the district court’s broad discretion with respect to jury instructions, the appellate court ruled there was no error requiring the case to be reversed. 

    Bosarge also argued the district court should not have allowed Cheramie’s expert to opine about an MRI film from before the accident because he had not received this record before the trial. The appellate court ruled the district court did not err in allowing this evidence because the expert report had been disclosed months earlier. The district court also ruled the MRI films could not be admitted into evidence. 

    This case shows one can recover for injuries sustained during rough seas if one can prove the captain or company’s negligence. Unfortunately for Bosarge, he couldn’t convince the jury Cheramie’s captain was negligent in his actions. He also wasn’t successful in his attempt to overturn the jury’s decision through the appeal. With better facts or evidence, perhaps he could have prevailed. A good lawyer can help advise you on what you need to do prior to and during a trial to preserve possible arguments for appeal. For example, they can help you move for a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the evidence. They can also help advise you on appropriate jury instructions and admissible evidence. 

    Additional Sources: Bosarge v. Cheramie Marine, LLC

    Written by Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on the Jones Act: Personal Injury Case in Louisiana Appellate Court Examines Jones Act Seaman Status

  • Vicarious Liability Explored in Jones Act Case

    What is vicarious liability? Vicarious liability, simply put, is the common law principle that an employer may be liable for its employee’s negligence if that employee’s negligence occurred within the course or scope of his or her employment.

    In the Beech v. Hercules Drilling Company, L.L.C., case coming out of the Eastern District of Louisiana, vicarious liability principles came into play. In this case, certain bizarre events led the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to make a ruling as to whether Hercules Drilling Company should be held vicariously liable for the actions of Michael Cosenza, its employee, who accidentally shot and killed his co-worker, Keith Beech, while both were aboard a Hercules owned vessel.

    The facts of the case were not in dispute. Beech was a crane operator aboard a jack-up drilling rig that Hercules owned, while Cosenza was a driller aboard the vessel. On December 13, 2009, the fateful events that led to the aforementioned case, took place. Cosenza happened to own a firearm, which he accidentally took aboard the vessel; Hercules policy prohibited any firearms from being aboard their vessels. Not only did Cosenza bring a firearm aboard the vessel, violating the policy, but when he realized that he had inadvertently brought it aboard (he found it among his laundry) he did not inform anyone about it and placed it in his locker, further violating Hercules policy. Cosenza was aware of the policies regarding firearms.

    On December 13, Cosenza was assigned to work a night shift and was the only crewman on duty. His duties included the following: monitoring the rig’s generator; checking equipment; and reporting any suspicious activity or problems. While performing those duties, employees were encouraged by Hercules to stay in the break room, where they could watch television and interact with fellow crew members, while simultaneously monitoring the generator. If something went wrong with the generator the television would turn off.

    On that particular night, Beech was also aboard the vessel, although he was not actually on duty. However, since he was aboard the vessel, he was still subject to the call of duty. Both Beech and Cosenza were in the break room, watching television and talking to one another. Beech told Cosenza that he was considering buying a small firearm. As a result, Cosenza decided to show his firearm to Beech. He left the break room, retrieved the firearm from the locker and brought it back to the break room. He showed it to Beech, who inspected it but did not actually handle it. When Cosenza attempted to sit back down in the break room, his arm bumped a portion of the couch, causing the firearm to accidentally discharge, mortally wounding Beech. Beech’s widow, Mrs. Beech, subsequently brought a wrongful death action against Hercules under the Jones Act.

    What is the Jones Act? The Jones Act was enacted by Congress in 1920 in order to create “a negligence cause of action for ship personnel against their employers.” This statute’s existence is particularly important because without it there would be no other theories of recovery under which a seaman could recover for negligence on the part of his employer or fellow crew member. Before the Jones Act came into existence, seamen could recover under two theories of recovery, unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure, which were part of the general maritime law. “Unseaworthiness is a claim under general maritime law based on the vessel owner’s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea.” Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., while “A claim for maintenance and cure concerns the vessel owner’s obligation to provide food, lodging, and medical services to a seaman injured while serving the ship.”

    When Mrs. Beech brought the wrongful death suit against Hercules under the Jones Act, the district court granted judgment in her favor, awarding her $876,997.00 and as tutrix, guardian of her minor child, Jax Delton Beech, the amount of $317,332.00, making her recovery a total of $1,194, 329.00.

    Hercules appealed this decision, claiming that Beech and Cosenza were not acting in the course of their employment at the time of the accident, so the judgment should be reversed. Mrs. Beech cross-appealed because she said that the district court failed to include loss of fringe benefit damages in the damages award. After considering both sides, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, and here is why.

    To understand the appellate court’s decision, it is important to once more consider vicarious liability. Under this principle, the point of contention usually is whether or not the negligence that took place, occurred in the course of employment. In this case, that was the point of contention as well. The court actually had to determine whether Cosenza was acting in the course of his employment when he shot Beech.

    According to case law, the Jones Act does allow for employers to be vicariously liable for the negligence of their employees under the doctrine of respondeat superior as long as the neligence occurred “in the course of employment.”

    The court then had to determine what “in the course of employment” actually meant. Circuits were split on this. The court decided to go with the Seventh Circuit’s business interest test, deciding “that the test for whether a Jones Act employee was acting within the course and scope of his employment is whether his actions at the time of the injury were in furtherance of his employer’s business interests.” Therefore, when the test was applied to the facts of the case, the Court determined that Cosenza was not acting in the course of his employment. The Court found that Hercules’ business interests in regards to Cosenza required him to monitor the generator, check equipment, and report suspicious activity or problems. Further, Hercules had safety policies that supported its business interests in ensuring workers’ safety. The Court found that Cosenza’s leaving the break room to retrieve a loaded firearm and while he was suppposed to be performing the aforementioned actions, took him well outside the course and scope of his employment and was blatantly contrary to Hercules’ business interests.

    The Court also pointed out that if they had applied a different test from the Sixth Circuit instead, for instance, they would have still come to the same conclusion in regards to Cosenza. In other words, the Sixth Circuit had an incidental to job duties test. Under this test, the Court pointed out that an incident like the one at issue in this case is unheard of, and the testimony of multiple witnesses corroborates that; so Hercules could not have anticipated that type of behavior (employee having a loaded firearm at work). Therefore, even under this more liberal test, the Court would still have come to the same conclusion.

    This was an important and difficult case for the Court to consider. It is important to note that vicarious liability is a valid legal principle. However, it might not be as easy to recover under this principle as one might initially assume. Often, the biggest point of contention is whether the negligence occurred “in the course of employment.” Courts have grappled with that phrase and with determining what it means.

    If you are an employee that is facing a legal situation in which you have been injured during your time of employment and at your place of employment, and you feel that you have a valid claim under vicarious liability principles, it is vitally important that you contact an attorney immediately. Vicarious liability is a valid legal principle, but as the aforementioned case shows, it is not always easy to recover under it. Contact Berniard Law Firm if you are finding yourself in need of legal advice as pertains to vicarious liability.