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Category: Workplace Accidents

  • What Is An Occupational Disease Under The Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act?

    If you have experienced symptoms from working in a moldy work environment, you might think you are entitled to recover from your employer. However, navigating the Workers’ Compensation system can be challenging partly because of the distinct and often complicated vocabulary in the statutes. This case involves defining an occupational disease under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

    Angela Lyle worked in the payroll department at Brock Services. Her office was in a trailer in Norco, Louisiana, at the Valero plant. Lyle claimed she saw mold throughout the trailer that increased over the two years she worked at the site. She suffered from fatigue, burning eyes, sores, and other symptoms. After suffering a nosebleed, she underwent a medical evaluation. Testing confirmed mold was present in the office, so Lyle’s trailer was replaced. Once the trailer was replaced, some of Lyle’s symptoms went away, but others persisted, and new symptoms emerged. 

    She resigned and was diagnosed with sarcoidosis in her lungs and lymph nodes. She then filed a claim with the Workers’ Compensation, claiming she had suffered an occupational disease and was entitled to damages. The workers’ compensation judge denied her claim as neither her mold exposure nor the development of sarcoidosis qualified as an occupational disease or accident under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. Brock filed a summary judgment motion, arguing Lyle could not establish sarcoidosis was an occupational disease. The workers’ compensation judge granted Brock’s summary judgment motion, finding Lyle’s sarcoidosis was not an “occupational disease. Lyle appealed, arguing the workers’ compensation judge ignored the definition of an “occupational disease” under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act.

    La. R.S. 23:1031.1(B) defines an occupational disease under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The court considers an employee’s work-related duties to determine if an illness is an occupational disease. On appeal, Lyle argued in a recent court case, Arrant v. Graphic Packaging International, Inc., the Louisiana Supreme Court held causation was the primary determinant of whether a claim is compensable as an occupational disease. She argued that this connection between the employment environment and the claimant’s illness was different from the prior duties-based approach, which required a causal link between the claimant’s illness and the claimant’s work-related duties. 

    The appellate court disagreed with Lyle’s interpretation of Arrant and held there had to be a causal link between Lyle’s illness and her work-related duties. Therefore, the appellate court agreed with the workers’ compensation ruling that granted Brock’s summary judgment motion and dismissed Lyle’s claim. 

    If you or a loved one have experienced an illness you think resulted from your job, a good attorney can advise you on the requirements to prevail in a claim under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. This can include presenting evidence to support a causal connection between the illness and your job duties. Otherwise, even if you have been working in a potentially harmful environment, like Lyle’s moldy trailer office, you might be unable to recover.

    Additional Sources: Angela Douglas Lyle v. Brock Services, LLC

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Causation in Workers’ Compensation Claims: The Challenge of Establishing Causal Links in Workers’ Compensation Claims

  • Contra Non Valentem Inapplicable To Lawsuit From Lung Cancer Death

    Even in cases involving tragic factual situations, strict procedural requirements must be followed to prevail on your claim. This case involves the time limits in which you must file a lawsuit and the principle of contra non valentem, which is a rule that the time limit in which someone has to file a lawsuit does not start if the other person was hiding information that would allow them to bring their claim.

    This case involves the tragic death of a husband and father, Julius Lennie. Tuboscope employed him for over thirty years. Various oil companies hired Tuboscope to clean and refurbish pipes and tubes used in the oilfield. The clean process involved the emission of a naturally occurring radioactive material. In 2010, after retiring, Lennie was diagnosed with lung cancer and died shortly thereafter. Almost four years later, his spouse and children filed a lawsuit against various companies that had hired Tuboscope.

    His surviving family claimed Lennie had been exposed to dangerous levels of radiation while working, which caused his cancer and death. They alleged the companies knew naturally occurring radioactive materials were dangerous but had not warned Lennie or taken appropriate corrective actions. The Lennies argued they had filed the lawsuit after reading an article about radiation exposure in pipe yards, so they were not on notice of their claims until September 2013.

    The companies argued the Lennies’ lawsuit should be dismissed because they had not filed it within the one-year period required in La. C.C. art. 2315.1. The Lennies argued they had no actual or constructive knowledge of their claims until they read the newspaper article in 2013. The Lennies argued their claims had not prescribed, under the theory of contra non valentem. The trial court found the Lennies had not established contra non valentem. The Lennies appealed.

    The Lennies did not dispute they had filed their lawsuit almost four years after Lennie’s death. However, they argued contra non valentem was an exception to La. C.C. art. 3467, which states legislation can create an exception to the time period in which to file a lawsuit. The appellate court explained for contra non valentem to apply, the companies would have had to done some act to prevent the Lennies from filing their lawsuit. This conduct must involve concealment, fraud, ill practices, or misrepresentations. The Lennies pointed to the companies’ lobbying efforts and publications involving naturally occurring radioactive materials as evidence they were trying to conceal the link between these materials and cancer.

    However, other evidence indicated the companies had been involved with screening methods for naturally occurring radioactive materials dating back over a decade. The State of Louisiana had also adopted applicable regulations. Therefore, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s holding the Lennies had not provided sufficient evidence that the companies were trying to conceal the applicable causes of action from them, so contra non valentem did not apply. 

    This case illustrates one exception that can prolong how long you have to file a lawsuit. A good lawyer can advise you on the required time limits for filing different types of lawsuits and the exceptions that might apply to prolong this period. 

    Additional Sources: Patricia Lennie, Brett Lennie, and Marcella Fueslier v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Prescription: Time is of the Essence When Understanding Prescription and Timing of a Case

  • Understanding Statutory Employer Immunity in Workers’ Compensation Cases in Louisiana

    Statutory employer immunity is critical in determining liability and compensation for workplace injuries in workers’ compensation. The following case is an example where the court had to decide whether the defendant was entitled to statutory employer immunity under the dual contract theory provided for in La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2). We will examine the facts of the case, the arguments presented by both parties and the court’s decision. We will also examine the legal framework surrounding statutory employer immunity and its impact on workers’ compensation cases.

    The case involves Patrick Cummins, a worker hired by a subcontractor to perform its contract with R.A.H. Homes and Construction, LLC (“R.A.H.”), the defendant. The homeowners had contracted R.A.H. to construct a single-family home, including the installation of an attic HVAC system. Cummins became seriously injured when the attic access ladder malfunctioned, and he fell while performing the work required under R.A.H.’s contract with the homeowners.

    Cummins sued several defendants, including R.A.H., in tort, alleging that R.A.H. was directly responsible for the improper installation of the attic ladder that led to the accident. In response, R.A.H. asserted an affirmative defense of statutory employer immunity under La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2), claiming that a statutory relationship existed through the two-contract theory.

    The two-contract theory allows a contractor (in this case, R.A.H.) to claim statutory employer immunity if it entered into two separate contracts: one with the homeowner and another with the subcontractor performing work on the project. For this defense to apply, the work or services provided by the subcontractor must be contemplated or included in the contract between the principal and the homeowner.

    Cummins argued that R.A.H. was not his statutory employer under La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(3) because no written contract expressly recognized R.A.H. as his statutory employer. However, the court disagreed, citing the dual-contract theory and the absence of a written contract requirement under La.R.S. 23:1061(A)(2). It emphasized that R.A.H. had two separate contracts – one with the homeowners and another with the subcontractor, United, for whom Cummins worked. Because the work performed by United was provided for in the contract between R.A.H. and the homeowners, the court found a statutory relationship between R.A.H. and Cummins.

    Statutory employer immunity is essential to workers’ compensation laws, ensuring that workers injured on the job receive compensation while limiting employers’ liability. By providing exclusive remedy protection, the law aims to avoid lengthy tort litigation and to facilitate a more efficient and streamlined resolution of workers’ compensation claims.

    The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision and upheld R.A.H.’s entitlement to statutory employer immunity under the two-contract theory. The case is a valuable example of how statutory employer immunity works in workers’ compensation cases, highlighting the importance of contracts and the interplay between the parties involved. As statutory employer immunity laws can vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is important to understand the specific provisions applicable in a given case to ensure a fair and equitable resolution for all parties involved.

    Additional Sources: APPEAL FROM THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. C-2016-4264

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Oprah Jerome

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Workers Compensation: Should an employer continue to pay Workers’ Compensation Benefits even after an employee has fully recovered?

  • Mere Possibility is Not Fact: Baton Rouge Negligence Claim Falls to Summary Judgment

    Summary judgment is designed to enable judicial expediency and cost-effectiveness in the courts. It is an important and complicated procedure that can occur repeatedly during litigation. When summary judgment is asserted repeatedly in the same case, how do parties prevail in their attempts to get or defeat summary judgment motions? The following case helps answer that question. 

    Ozark Motor Lines transported a packed Ozark trailer from Restoration Hardware to Baton Rouge. In Baton Rouge, Exel Inc. received the trailer, and Exel employee, plaintiff, Alex Talbert, was injured by the boxes being unloaded from the trailer. Talbert then brought a personal injury suit against Restoration Hardware and Ozark for damages, arguing that the trailer was negligently packed and thus caused Talbert’s injuries. 

    Restoration Hardware was dismissed from the lawsuit, and later, Ozark moved for summary judgment twice. The trial court denied the first motion, but the second motion was granted after Ozark submitted additional documents to the court. Talbert appealed the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for Ozark, arguing that issues of material fact remained and that the court should not have heard Ozark’s second motion. 

     Appellate courts conduct a new assessment of evidence to decide whether the trial court’s summary judgment is appropriate. Summary judgment is an appropriate ruling if all the evidence shows no genuine issue of material fact exists. La. Code Civ. P. art. 966(A)(3). The party moving for summary judgment has the responsibility to show the court that no issues of material fact exist on the record. This responsibility, however, only applies to the issues that the moving party must show at trial. After the moving party shows the court that one or more elements of the other party’s claims lack support, the other party must provide evidence that summary judgment is still inappropriate. La. Code Civ. P. art 966(D)(1). 

    Talbert had the burden of proving Ozark’s breach of duty and the standard of care to support his negligence claim. The five requirements of this showing include (1) the defendant had a duty to conduct a standard of care, (2) the defendant did not meet this standard, (3) the defendant’s conduct actually caused the plaintiff’s injuries, (4) the defendant’s conduct legally caused the plaintiff’s injuries, and (5) the existence of actual damages. Bufkin v. Felipe’s Louisiana. The existence of duty is a question of law, and in negligence cases, there is a largely universal duty for the defendant to use reasonable care to avoid injury to others. Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc.

    Talbert argued that the second motion brought by Ozark was barred by issue preclusion because the motion was the same as the first denied motion. La. R.S. 13:4231. However, under Louisiana law, denial of an initial summary judgment motion does not prohibit a second summary judgment motion. Bozarth v. State LSU Medical Center/Chabert Medical Center. The appellate court rejected this argument. 

    Talbert also appealed, arguing the trial court incorrectly determined that no issues of material fact remained. Specifically, Talbert argued that there was still a genuine dispute as to whether Ozark had a duty to inspect the trailer’s safety and whether Ozark breached such a duty and caused Talbert’s injury. Ozark, in response, argued that there was no evidence of any duty, breach, or causation, particularly because Ozark was not involved in or present at the unloading of the trailer at Exel in Baton Rouge. 49 C.F.R. 392.9 provides that inspection duties do not apply to sealed commercial motor vehicles, and Ozark posited that the trailer was sealed such that Ozark did not have a responsibility to inspect the sealed trailer. 

    Testimony from Exel confirmed that the trailer was still sealed upon its arrival and that Exel has a policy to inspect the trailer once it is opened. Testimony from Ozark employees stated that Ozark’s driver was not permitted to inspect the trailer after picking it up for transport. Testimony from Restoration Hardware stated that Ozark drivers could inspect the trailer if they asked for Restoration Hardware’s consent, but that is extremely rare. 

    Based on the evidence, the court found that Ozark had no duty to inspect the trailer or the security of the trailer’s contents. The trailer was sealed, Ozark was instructed not to open the trailer, and Ozark’s only role in these events was transporting a sealed trailer. Talbert presented evidence that the trailer may have been poorly loaded; however, it takes more than a mere possibility to prove facts and defeat summary judgment. Hawkins v. Fowler. Because Ozark presented evidence that it did not owe Talbert a duty to inspect the trailer, and Talbert failed to provide support for the duty and standard of care elements,  the court affirmed summary judgment for Ozark. 

    Additional Sources: Talbert v. Restoration Hardware, Inc. 

    Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Motions for Summary Judgment: Appellate Court Affirms Second Motion for Summary Judgment After Rejecting the First

  • When is a Parent Company Responsible for the Safety of its Subsidiaries?

    When an individual sustains an injury while on the job, the anticipation of receiving workers’ compensation to tide them over during their recovery is natural. Regrettably, situations arise where companies are unwilling to shoulder this responsibility. The scenario becomes more intricate when a parent company distances itself from its subsidiary’s actions, attempting to evade liability for workplace injuries. This particular Louisiana Court of Appeals case delves into corporate responsibility, illuminating the circumstances under which a parent company is held accountable for the safety measures enacted by its subsidiary entities.

    Plaintiff, Truman Stanley, III, had his arm tragically severed at work when a defective oxygen cylinder exploded, and steel fragments broke off. He filed a personal injury lawsuit against Airgas USA seeking tort recovery. He later amended his complaint to include Airgas Inc., the parent company of Airgas USA, claiming it developed safety procedures and protocols and instructional materials/safety training that was inadequate and flawed, creating an unsafe workplace. Therefore, Stanley believed Airgas, Inc. should be liable in tort. The parent company moved for summary judgment stating it was immune from tort liability under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation exclusive-remedy provision. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant and granted summary judgment. Stanley appealed, claiming the trial court erred in finding the parent company immune from tort liability.

    Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1032 contains the exclusive-remedy provision under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act, which states the employer and anyone who may act as the employer are immune parties. However, for the immunity to apply, it “must have been engaged at the time of the injury in the normal course and scope of the employer’s business.” Under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:13, an employer’s legal duties that cannot be delegated include providing safe working conditions for employees. That being said, providing a safe work environment falls within the course and scope of every employer’s business. If the parent company took on Airgas USA’s role, Airgas Inc. would be immune from tort liability.

    However, a parent company has no duty or liability for the subsidiary’s actions and is not responsible for the working conditions. Airgas Inc. provided evidence that it had no involvement in the day-to-day management of Airgas USA. In addition, there was no evidence Airgas Inc. took over any obligation to ensure employee safety for Airgas USA. Finally, Stanley failed to prove an essential element of his claim, that Airgas Inc. assumed the duty for Airgas USA to ensure a safe work environment. The duty to show factual support to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for summary judgment was shifted to Stanley, and his failure to do so led the court to uphold the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant summary judgment. 

    This case highlights the importance of when a parent company, like Airgas Inc., is responsible for the safety protocols and conditions in place at its subsidiaries. It also highlights the importance of genuine issues of material fact when it comes to summary judgment cases. Injured workers often expect workers’ compensation from their company, but it is important to understand who may be responsible for the injuries.

    Additional Source: Truman Stanley III v. Airgas, Inc. 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Alivia Rose

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article: When Can I File a Tort Lawsuit against my Employer if I am Hurt at Work in Louisiana?

  • How do Conditions on Payments in Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Work?

    Louisiana’s Workers’ Compensation fund exists to pay employees injured at work.  Payment can be used for medical care and lost wages.  When parties sign a settlement agreement on payment terms, an employee may assume payment is imminent.  In a recent case from Rapides Parish, an employee discovered some conditions in a settlement may delay payment.  

    Mary Ortega sustained an injury while employed by Cantu Services.  Ortega filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation, and the parties entered a settlement agreement.  The parties settled for $120,000.  $56,049 of the total was allocated to a Medicare set-aside agreement (MSA) to cover future medical expenses related to the work injury. The MSA was filed with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) for approval.  The parties agreed that if CMS did not approve the full amount in the MSA, the employer would adjust the amount paid in monetary benefits, so Ortega would still receive $120,000.  Several months after signing the agreement, Ortega had not received any payments.   She filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement plus a request for fees and penalties before the Office of Workers’ Compensation.   

    The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) denied Ortega’s request because payment under the settlement agreement was conditioned on first getting approval from the MSA.   Pending approval suspended the statutory requirement of payment within thirty days.    Ortega appealed to the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal.     

    The main issue on appeal was whether pending approval of the MSA was a condition that suspended any payments to Ortega.  Ordinarily, Louisiana law requires payment following final judgment or settlement to be made within thirty days.  However, nonpayment due to conditions over which the employer had no control prohibits nonpayment penalties.  See La. R.S. 23:1201(G). A suspensive condition suspends enforcement of an obligation until a certain event occurs.  See La. C.C. 1767.   A suspensive condition that depends solely on the whim of the obligor voids the condition.  See La. C.C. 1770.  The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal found that in a case factually similar to Ortega’s, pending CMS approval of an MSA suspended, the obligation to fund the MSA account until approved.  See Harrelson v. Arcadia.  

    In Ortega’s case, the settlement agreement specifically allocated $56,049 to the MSA, contingent on CMS’ approval.  The Third Circuit agreed with the WCJ that this was a suspensive condition out of the employer’s control.  The parties agreed that if the full amount submitted in the MSA was not approved, the monetary award would be adjusted so Ortega would still receive $120,000. The Third Circuit noted as a practical matter, the employer would not know how much to disburse until CMS approved a total for the MSA monetarily.  Ortega’s attempt to enforce the settlement agreement was denied.   

    Terms of a settlement agreement must be adhered to, and an experienced lawyer can help decipher and appropriately advise on those terms.  In this case, the settlement agreement specified a condition that had to be met before payment disbursement.  A careful understanding and explanation by an excellent lawyer is required to understand conditions to payments in workers’ compensation cases.    

    Additional Sources: Mary Ortega v. Cantu Services, Inc. et. al.

    Written By: Stephanie Burnham 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Workers’ Compensation: Is Strict Compliance With Settlement Agreement Terms Required?

  • Louisiana Court Denies Workers Compensation for Injured Minor

    Injury in the workplace can usually be avoided with proper safety measures in place. Safety measures, however, become hard to enforce when minors and adults work in conjunction. This was the case for Austin Griggs, an illegally employed minor injured in a forklift accident while working.

    Bounce N’ Around Inflatables, LLC (BNA) supplies rentable party inflatables for personal or corporate events. When not in use, the inflatables are stored on racks that are 10 feet high. To move the inflatables, a battery-operated pallet jack was required. Griggs began working for BNA at the age of 14. BNA employed about 12 minors at the time Griggs was injured. Griggs testified that he had never been told that a work permit was required to work at BNA.

    On the day of injury, Griggs was helping another employee pick up and sort the inflatables. This required Griggs to get the inflatable onto the forklift, and then the other employee would use the forklift to move the inflatable into the rack. During this process, Griggs was required to use his weight to counterbalance the inflatable as the forklift lifted the inflatable upwards. Griggs testified that this was standard practice at BNA. During the lift, Griggs fell off the forklift. Then, the inflatable followed, landing on Griggs’s lower back. 

    When Ms.Griggs picked up Griggs from work, she immediately took Griggs to Ascension Urgent Care. Griggs was diagnosed with a closed metatarsal fracture and told to seek further evaluation and treatment with an orthopedist. Thus, Ms. Griggs took Griggs to Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic the following morning. Ms. Griggs called the owner of BNA to confirm that Griggs could be treated with BNA’s insurance through Louisiana Commerce & Trade Association Self-Insurers’ Fund. During the call, BNA’s owner instructed Ms. Griggs not to mention the forklift usage when utilizing the insurance. Griggs was seen by a doctor who later installed fixation hardware to Griggs’s fractured foot. 

    As a result of Grigg’s injuries, Ms. Griggs filed a lawsuit against BNA and their insurer. The trial court issued a judgment, holding that Griggs was illegally employed and engaged in illegal activities at the time of injury. The trial court found that Griggs could proceed with a tort claim despite this. This holding relied upon the reasoning in Ewert v. Georgia Casualty & Surety, Co. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Griggs for $125,000 for general damages and $ 24,517.93 for special damages, plus legal interest and all costs of the proceedings. The trial court further found that BNA’s insurer was entitled to reimbursement from Griggs for the sums paid for medical expenses, mileage, and lost wages, totaling $ 25,867.93.

    On appeal, BNA argued that the trial court’s general damages determination was an abuse of discretion and that the court improperly allowed Griggs to make a tort claim. Without the ability to make a tort claim, Griggs would be required to make a claim through the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. This Act, however, would not allow Griggs to make a claim because he was illegally employed and committing an illegal act when he was injured. The First Circuit agreed with BNA and reversed the trial court’s holding. The monetary damages were reversed, and all legal fees incurred on appeal by BNA were assessed to the Griggs family. 

    Austin Griggs’s case underscores the intricate nature of legal proceedings involving minors in the workforce and the complexities of tort claims in such scenarios. The appellate litigation brought forth various aspects of the case, including the implications of Griggs’s illegal employment status on his ability to pursue claims through the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. The First Circuit’s decision highlighted the importance of understanding the legal landscape and the potential consequences of both plaintiff’s and defendant’s actions. When faced with complex legal scenarios like the Griggs case, securing the guidance of a proficient attorney becomes crucial in deciphering the nuances of the law and navigating the multifaceted terrain of appellate litigation.

    Additional Sources: Griggs v. Bounce N’ Around Inflatables L.L.C. 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Writer Riley Calouette

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Workers Compensation: How Can You Get Workers Compensation When Your Employer Won’t Pay It?

  • Lafourche Parish Court Demonstrates the Importance of Employee-Employer Relationship in Workers’ Compensation Cases

    Unfortunately, accidents in the workplace are not uncommon. What happens, however, if you unknowingly signed an agreement making your employer immune from a liability claim? The following Lafourche Parish case outlines this predicament. 

    In September 2013, Neville Patterson signed multiple documents with Raceland Raw Sugar, LLC (RRS) and Raceland Equipment Company, LLC (REC) to haul sugar cane for the former. Included in this paperwork was an indemnification agreement identifying Patterson as the contractor and RES and RRS as statutory employers. 

    Two months later, Patterson created N-A-N Trucking, LLC (N-A-N) and started to operate his truck. Following this development, RRS began making checks from hauls payable to N-A-N. These checks were endorsed by Patterson, who continued to receive driver wages from REC. 

    The following month, Patterson was unloading the trailer at the RRS mill when a cable broke, forcing the trailer to fall on the truck and injure his back and neck. Patterson then filed a claim for damages, naming REC and RRS as defendants, asserting he was an employee of N-A-N, and claiming the accident that caused his injuries resulted from RRS’ and REC’s negligence. RRS and REC responded by claiming that Patterson was REC’s direct employee and RRS’ statutory employee, barring his claims via the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act. 

    The 17th Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lafourche denied the motion submitted by RRS and REC, noting conflicting evidence on whether Patterson was a direct employee of REC and inconsistent evidence on whether the indemnification agreement showed that he was N-A-N’s employee or a contractor with REC and RRS. REC and RRS then renewed their motion for summary judgment. 

    In their renewal, RRS and REC claimed that Patterson was an independent contractor of both companies via a written agreement compliant with Louisiana law, conveying statutory employer status on RRS and REC and making them immune from civil tort liability. Patterson then argued that he was an employee of N-A-N and no contract existed between RRS and N-A-N. 

    The District Court then dismissed Patterson’s claims and granted summary judgment, finding the indemnification agreement signed by Patterson demonstrated a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employment relationship. The court also found Patterson, who had the burden of proving the relationship was severed when he formed N-A-N, failed to deliver any proof the contract was revoked under law. Patterson then filed an appeal with the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal. 

    Under La. R.S.23:1061, a statutory employer relationship does not exist unless a written contract between the principal and a contractor recognizes the principal as the statutory employer. Additionally, the contractually recognized relationship can be overcome by showing the work performed was not an integral or essential part of the generation of the principal’s goods, products, or services. Further, the employer seeking to avail itself of tort immunity holds the burden of proving it. See Fleming v. JE Merit Constructors, Inc.

    The Court of Appeal found that Patterson entered into an indemnification agreement in his capacity, which listed him as a contractor. Additionally, because the agreement recognized RRS and REC as statutory employers and Patterson as an owner/operator, the Court of Appeal found it was unnecessary to enter into an additional contract following the formation of N-A-N. Next, as the court found the agreement between Patterson and RRS and REC conveyed a statutory employer status, there existed a rebuttable presumption of a statutory employer relationship. The Court of Appeal found Patterson failed to deliver proof to rebut this presumption by showing that hauling sugar cane to a sugar mill was not crucial to the ability of the principal to produce its products, goods, or services. As such, the District Court’s judgment was affirmed. 

    This case shows the importance of hiring an experienced attorney to review all employee-employer documents before signing them, as you may be entering into a relationship agreement that would bar you from receiving compensation in the case of an accident. The right attorney can also help you provide the evidence necessary to prove your lawsuit.  

    Additional Sources: NEVILLE PATTERSON VERSUS RACELAND EQUIPMENT COMPANY, LLC AND RACELAND RAW SUGAR LLC D/B/A RACELAND SUGAR MILL

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Samantha Calhoun

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on the Importance of Evidence in Workers’ Compensation Lawsuit: Workers’ Compensation Lawsuits and the Battle for Evidence — Louisiana Personal Injury Lawyer Blog

  • Can A Sexual Harassment Claim Succeed Where Boss Instructs Employee To Date A Prospective Client?

    When you think about sexual harassment claims, the first thing that likely comes to mind is a superior harassing another employee. However, what happens if the superior instructs another employee to date a prospective client? 

    Tyanne Davenport was hired to be the administrator at an Edward Jones Office. On multiple occasions, the office owner insulted, shouted at, and used profanity to describe Davenport. The owner’s comments eventually became sexual in nature. When the owner learned a wealthy prospective client wanted to date Davenport, the owner told Davenport to date the prospective client to receive a big bonus. Davenport said she already had a boyfriend and was not interested in dating the prospective client. The owner told her this about three additional times within the next month. One of the financial advisors made a comment about Davenport sending the prospective client some nude photos, which embarrassed and offended Davenport. Davenport never dated the prospective client. 

    Davenport reported the incident with the comment about nude photos to the district manager, who forwarded the complaint to an associate relations representative. Davenport filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Although she referenced the incident involving comments about nude photos, she did not reference the manager’s offers to pay her a big bonus if she dated the prospective client. Over the next few months, Davenport met with a therapist who advised the company Davenport should not go back to the same office because of trauma from the incidents. She requested a transfer to another office, which was denied. Davenport eventually resigned. 

    After she resigned, Edward Jones sent her letters about possible employment options, including transferring to a different branch or looking into other positions. Davenport turned down these offers and went to work for another company. The EEOC then gave her a right-to-sue notice. She filed a lawsuit, alleging quid pro quo and hostile work environment sexual harassment claims under Title VII and related state law claims. Edward Jones filed a summary judgment motion, which the trial court granted in full. Davenport appealed the constructive discharge and bonus-based quid pro quo claims. 

    On appeal, Davenport first argued the trial court erred in dismissing her constructive discharge quid pro quo claim because she was constructively discharged after refusing to date the prospective client. Edward Jones argued she had not exhausted her administrative remedies and could not provide evidence to establish a reasonable person would have felt the need to resign because of the work conditions. Here, Davenport did not allege anything suggesting she had suffered such severe harassment a reasonable person would have felt the need to resign. She only alleged other employees had discussed nude photos in front of her. She did not link this incident to her decision to resign from Edward Jones. Therefore, the appellate court agreed the trial court had properly dismissed her constructive discharge quid pro quo claim.

    Davenport also argued the trial court erred in dismissing her bonus-based quid pro quo claim because the owner promised her a “big bonus” if she dated the wealthy prospective client. The appellate court agreed denial of a bonus could be a tangible employment action for quid pro quo claims. See Russell v. Principi. Although Davenport claimed to have been promised a bonus, she did not provide sufficient evidence that such a bonus was available or that she was eligible for and denied such a bonus. Therefore, the appellate court also agreed the trial court properly dismissed Davenport’s bonus-based quid pro quo claim. 

    As Davenport learned here, it is essential to provide sufficient evidence to succeed in a sexual harassment case. If you feel like you are dealing with sexual harassment at work, it is essential to consult with a good attorney who can advise you on a potential lawsuit. 

    Additional Sources: Tyanne Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co. 

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Title VII Claims: Unveiling the Shield: Understanding Retaliation Protections and Discrimination Claims under Title VII

  • Double Recovery in Helicopter Injury Case?

    If you do a favor for your boss outside of work and are injured, can you still sue for workers’ compensation benefits? This is a complex question dependent on the facts of a case. Workers’ compensation is only available for injuries suffered during employment. If the court finds that the favor was outside the scope of employment, an injured employee may only recover tort damages. In the following case, the appellate court reversed a finding of workers’ compensation in favor of tort liability. In this case, the injured worker fought against a reduction of award to offset the workers’ compensation benefits already paid to the plaintiff. 

    LaFayette truck driver Tommie Hebert was employed by Industrial Helicopters, Inc. as a commercial fuel transporter for nearly 30 years. Industrial Helicopters primarily served as an aerial herbicide application company. The owner of Industrial Helicopters also owned Game Management, Inc. Game Management leased hunting land and operated deer tracking and capturing surveys. His boss’s son asked Herbert to work as a deer netter on a Game Management helicopter survey. During the survey, Herbert fell from the helicopter to the ground and was seriously injured. The status of workers’ compensation became muddled because of the dual businesses. 

    Hebert was originally granted workers’ compensation benefits because he was found to be within the scope of his job at Industrial Helicopters when he fell. On appeal, Hebert was conversely found to be outside the scope of employment during the deer netting. Industrial Helicopters was only liable for tort damages based on this finding. Hebert additionally motioned for his court costs to be paid by the defendant. 

    Employers that pay out workers’ compensation benefits and are also found liable for tort damages are entitled to an offset of costs. Gagnard v. Baldrige. A credit may be given towards tort damages to the extent that workers’ compensation has been paid. Louisiana legal principles bar double recovery on a single claim. Albert v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. Court costs assessed by lower courts may only be overturned upon a finding of abuse of discretion. Trahan v. Plessala. 

    Industrial Helicopters had already paid the workers’ compensation damages while the appeal was being litigated. The Court, therefore, held that the defendant was entitled to a full credit to offset the assessed tort damages. Herbet had already recovered workers’ compensation damages equal to the tort damages found on appeal and was therefore barred from double recovery.  The Court also found that the lower court had abused its discretion in ruling Herbet responsible for his court costs. Therefore, Herbert had prevailed on the tort claim and should not have been required to pay his court fees.

    This case may initially read as an injustice to Hebert, a long-time employee severely injured while doing a favor for his boss’s son. However, in this case, the complicated legal proceedings obscure that Hebert was fully compensated for his injury through workers’ benefits. General notions of judicial fairness implore courts to balance the interests of all parties, even in favor of a corporation over an individual. Though Hebert did not receive his sought double recovery, he was successful on his court costs claims and likely received just compensation for his injuries. 

    Additional Sources: HEBERT V. RICHARD

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Corrinne Yoder-Mulkey

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Articles on Workers’ Compensation: When Can I File a Tort Lawsuit against my Employer if I am Hurt at Work in Louisiana?