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  • Could the Foreseeable Have Been Unforeseen? Deciphering Liability in Accidents

    Some accidents are unpredictable, while others appear to be accidents waiting to happen. Having reliable witnesses, qualified experts, and an excellent attorney in either unpredictable or predictable cases could be the dividing line in determining your liability when an accident arises. For Larry Jeane, Sr. (“Mr. Jeane”), the deceased party in a two-car accident along Louisiana Highway 107, whose vehicle crossed the centerline and collided with another car carrying six adults and one minor, the courts were positioned to consider his liability after the accident. 

    Mr. Jeane was transported by ambulance to Rapides Regional Medical Center (“RRMC”) after the accident. He reportedly had no recollection of the accident. Mr. Jeane had a history of heart disease and type-II diabetes, but it was likely his injuries from the accident that resulted in his death less than a week later. While at RRMC, his attending physician, Dr. Jeremy Timmer (“Dr. Timmer”), noted that Mr. Jeane had been on the phone with a friend and started talking “funny,” possibly due to low blood sugar when he collided with the other vehicle.  The seven passengers of that other vehicle, namely Sarah Barber, Jamie Turner, Racheal Spivey, Elizabeth Spivey, Dana Spivey, Wallace Spivey, Racheal Spivey, and Jamie Turner on behalf of the minor, Abigail Turner (collectively “the plaintiffs”) eventually sued Mr. Jeane’s estate and his insurance company for damages resulting from the accident. 

    Throughout the litigation, the plaintiffs then moved for partial summary judgment solely on the issue of liability. To support the motion, the plaintiffs submitted three supporting documents: (1) an affidavit from Sandra Shannon (“Ms. Shannon”), who was driving the vehicle directly in front of the plaintiffs and witnessed the accident; (2) an affidavit from Sarah Barber (“Ms. Barber”), who was driving the other vehicle involved in the accident; and (3) a record of the deposition taken of Pineville City Marshal, Sarah A. Smith (“Ms. Smith”), who responded to the scene after the accident occurred. Ms. Shannon’s affidavit stated that she saw “[Mr. Jeane] was slumped over” at the wheel as his vehicle “veered gently.” Ms. Barber testified in her affidavit that she saw Ms. Shannon’s vehicle swerve off the road “suddenly, without any prior warning” before she saw Mr. Jeane’s vehicle approaching her, but she could not avoid the collision. Finally, Ms. Smith noted that she did not witness the accident but rode with Mr. Jeane to the hospital when he told her he did not know what happened. 

    In addition to the statements mentioned above from witnesses, the plaintiffs also included the certified medical record of Dr. Timmer in support of their partial motion for summary judgment. In opposition, counsel for Mr. Jeane submitted an affidavit from Dr. Brabson Lutz (“Dr. Lutz”), an internal medicine and infectious disease physician and certified medical expert in Louisiana. After reviewing the supporting documents submitted by the plaintiffs, Dr. Lutz reached a different explanation of Mr. Jeane’s condition and conclusion for the accident. According to Dr. Lutz, prior health records pre-accident and laboratory reports post-accident indicated that Mr. Jeane suffered a cardiac arrhythmia that suddenly deprived his brain of oxygen, which caused him to lose consciousness. This condition, Mr. Lutz concluded, was unforeseeable.

    Once the district court reviewed the plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment, including the evidence presented by both sides, the court granted the plaintiffs’ motion. Specifically, the district court found that because Mr. Jeane alleged an affirmative defense, which was that he experienced a medical condition that was so sudden, unexpected, and unforeseeable that he could not have reasonably prevented the accident, he had to prove this condition by clear and convincing evidence. The district court ruled that Mr. Jeane did not meet this burden. In turn, counsel for Mr. Jeane appealed. 

    In personal injury law, the legal principle of foreseeability refers to the level of predictability when an accident occurs. If the injury that results from a party’s actions is considered foreseeable, then that party can be held liable for damages caused to the injured party. Conversely, the party may not be held responsible if the injury is unforeseeable. Foreseeability is an essential element in personal injury cases, so proving that a party’s actions were unforeseeable could be an affirmative defense that precludes that party’s liability. 

    On appeal, the State of Louisiana Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit recognized the record of supporting documents provided by both sides at the district court that it is possible Mr. Jeane’s actions were unforeseeable. Specifically, the Court wrote, “Ms. Shannon’s statement that she saw Mr. Jeane slumped over as his truck passed her supports Dr. Lutz’s opinion [“that Mr. Jeane suffered a sudden, unforeseeable cardiac arrhythmia that deprived his brain of oxygen and rendered him unconscious”].” Moreover, the Court emphasized that “the day before the accident,” Mr. Jeane was bragging about how he was cleared by his heart doctor and received a clear call from his blood sugar and diabetes reports, which “indicate[d] that any event like arrhythmia opined by Dr. Lutz was not foreseeable.”

    Therefore, this Court acknowledged the discrepancy in the record between Dr. Lutz’s affidavit provided by Mr. Jeane’s counsel and the supporting documents provided by the plaintiffs and concluded that since a genuine issue of material fact existed in the record, the district court erred in granting the plaintiff’s partial motion for summary judgment. Since a genuine issue material, fact precludes a court from granting summary judgment as stated in La. Code Civ.P. art. 966 (D)(1), the Court reversed the district court’s decision. 

    Ultimately, the Court concluded that it would be up to Mr. Jeane’s counsel to prove at trial whether the foreseeability of his actions were reasonable or his condition’s unforeseeability could absolve him of any liability altogether.

    In the intricate landscape of personal injury law, the concept of foreseeability stands as a pivotal determinant in the attribution of liability. This nuanced principle draws the line between incidents that could have been reasonably anticipated and those that appear as unforeseeable twists of fate. The case of Mr. Jeane vividly underscores the significance of foreseeability, as it oscillates between predictable and unexpected factors. As legal proceedings progress, the question of whether the foreseeable could have been truly unforeseen becomes a central enigma to unravel. The saga of Mr. Jeane’s tragic collision stands as a testament to the complex interplay of circumstances that mold the boundaries of liability, illustrating the need for experienced legal representation.

    Additional Sources: SARAH BARBER, ET AL. VERSUS LOUISIANA MUNICIPAL RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY GROUP SELF-INSURED FUND, ET AL.

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Gina McKlveen

    Other Berniard Law Firm Articles on Foreseeability: Louisiana Department of Transportation Avoids Liability in Multi-Car Pile-Up Case

  • How Are Liability and Damages Allocated In A Complex Car Accident?

    Allocating fault in a car accident is especially difficult when involving multiple individuals. This case illustrates how the allocation of fault affects how damages are awarded and illustrates what type of expenses are compensable. 

    While driving on Highway 28 East in Louisiana, Erin Wright rear-ended Christina Dauzat. Before they reached the intersection where the accident occurred, an unrelated accident occurred involving Joanne Marlow and Darrell Paulk. Paulk refused to move his car, which resulted in one of the lanes of traffic being blocked. Before the accident, a truck driven by an unknown driver drove towards Dauzat as it tried to go around the Marlow/Paulk accident. 

    Dauzat filed a lawsuit against Wright and her insurer, State Farm. At a trial, the court allocated 80% fault to Wright, 10% to the unnamed truck driver, and 10% to Paulk. The trial court awarded general damages of $8,000 (after the 20% reduction from the fault of the unnamed truck driver and Paulk, neither of whom Dauzat filed a lawsuit against) and $9,741.51 in special damages. These damages did not include the $1,440.86 cost of transporting Dauzat via ambulance following the accident. Both Dauzat and Wright appealed.

    Both Dauzat and Wright argued the trial court erred in allocating the fault. Dauzat claimed Wright should have been found 100% liable for the accident, whereas Wright argued Dauzat should have been assigned some percentage of fault. La. C.C. art. 2323 governs how fault is allocated between different individuals. When a rear-end collision occurs, there is a presumption the driver who rear-ended the other was negligent and followed the other vehicle too closely. See Berthiume v. Gros. 

    The appellate court found the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court’s findings that Wright and the unnamed driver’s actions contributed to the accident. However, the appellate court disagreed Paulk had contributed to the accident. Although Paulk refused to move his car after he was in an accident, a subsequent accident was not reasonably foreseeable. Therefore, the Dauzat-Wright accident was not within the scope of the duty he breached. The appellate court also agreed Dauzat had acted reasonably and was not partially at fault for the accident. 

    Dauzat also argued the trial court erred in its award of $10,000 for general damages and failure to award the cost of her ambulance transport following the accident. Wright argued the general damages should have been even lower. Wright also argued the trial court erred in not reducing the special damages award based on the percentage of fault allocated to others. In its judgment, the trial court specifically noted Dauzat was not a credible witness. 

    Based on the testimony from Dauzat’s physicians and the trial court’s credibility determination regarding Dauzat, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s general damages award. However, the appellate court found Dauzat should have been awarded the $1,440.86 cost of the ambulance that transported Dauzat to the hospital following the accident. The appellate court explained even if this transportation was unnecessary, Wright was still liable as there was no evidence Dauzat acted in bad faith in requesting ambulance transport. Additionally, the trial court agreed under La. C.C. art. 2323(B), the trial court should have reduced the special damages award by the amount of fault allocated to others besides Wright, who were not parties in the lawsuit. 

    Certain aspects of the appellate court’s ruling ended up both hurting and helping both Dauzat and Wright. This case underscores the value of seasoned legal counsel, capable of dissecting the intricate threads of liability and advocating for comprehensive compensation. In this intricate choreography of fault and recovery, a skilled attorney can serve as a guiding compass, helping individuals navigate the tumultuous waters of multi-party car accident litigation.

    Additional Sources: Christina Mink Dauzat v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Car Accidents: When Car Accidents Get Messy: How Clear Language and Resolved Claims Can Help You Win Your Lawsuit

  • Res Judicata Does Not Apply To Dismissal Without Prejudice

    In law, there is a saying that you do not get two bites from the same apple. This means if a court issues a final judgment on the merits of your claim, you cannot file another lawsuit against the same parties involving the same claim. Does a dismissal without prejudice bar you from filing another lawsuit?

    Robert Palermo and his wife filed a personal injury lawsuit against CanadianOxy and its insurers, including Certain Underwriters, for the injuries Palermo allegedly suffered from his on-the-job exposure to asbestos-containing materials. In response, Certain Underwriters filed an answer, raising various affirmative defenses and seeking contributions from several entities. Some of the third parties from whom Certain Underwriters sought contribution filed exceptions based on procedural issues, including improper service and lack of jurisdiction. The trial court granted these exceptions. 

    Certain Underwriters did not re-serve the third parties to remedy the improper service within the time specified in the trial court order, so the court dismissed the Certain Underwriters’ claims against the third parties without prejudice under La. C.C.P. art. 932(B). Certain Underwriters were granted leave to file a supplemental demand. Certain third parties then filed various exceptions, including an exception of res judicata. 

    Res judicata means a matter the court has already ruled on cannot be pursued again. The trial court granted the exception of res judicata, holding under La. R.S. 13:4231, Certain Underwriters could not file another third-party demand given the prior dismissal of their claims. Certain Underwriters appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting the exceptions of res judicata. 

    The appellate court considered whether the trial court erred in maintaining the third parties’ exceptions of res judicata, which barred Certain Underwriters from continuing to pursue their claims. Here, the trial court had previously granted a dismissal without prejudice. Although res judicata is intended to prevent re-litigation of claims that a court has already decided, it does not apply if there is doubt about whether a party’s substantive rights were previously finally resolved. 

    In this case, the plaintiffs’ main demand was still pending. Further, the initial dismissal of the third-party demands was without prejudice and based on procedural grounds (improper process), not substantive grounds. Therefore, it did not affect the parties’ substantive rights. Because the dismissal without prejudice did not address the merits of the claim, it was not a final judgment where res judicata could apply. A dismissal without prejudice does not bar another lawsuit based on the same cause of action. See La. C.C.P. art. 1673.  Furthermore, it would be useless to require Certain Underwriters to file a new lawsuit for their viable third-party demands. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of the exceptions of res judicata

    During litigation, the court will likely rule on a variety of motions. One of these could result in a dismissal without prejudice. Although a dismissal might sound final, a good lawyer can advise you on whether your potential claim is barred by res judicata because of a dismissal without prejudice. 

    Additional Sources: Robert Frank Palermo v. Century Indemnity Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Res Judicata: Ascension Parish Plaintiff has Lawsuit Barred due to Res Judicata

  • What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible?

    What happens if you are involved in a car accident where your damages exceed the auto insurance policy limits of the person responsible? One possible option is seeking coverage under your uninsured motorist insurance policy. However, questions can arise about what, if any, coverage you are entitled to if it appears the accident did not cause your injuries. Determining the scope of injuries caused by the at-issue accident can be especially complicated if you have previously been involved in other car accidents that injured you or if you have other preexisting conditions. The following case helps shed some light on these issues.

    Jacqueline Gaspard was rear-ended while she was stopped at a red light. She filed a lawsuit against the drivers and insurers of the cars that were also involved in the accident and Allstate Insurance Company, her uninsured motorist insurer. She claimed the damages exceeded the liability coverage of the other individuals involved in the accident. 

    The second vehicle’s driver behind Gaspard was found to be 100% at fault for the accident. She settled the claims against that driver and his insurer for $50,000, the limits of that driver’s liability policy. She then dismissed her claims against the vehicle’s driver and insurer. 

    Gaspard then proceeded with her lawsuit against Allstate. She submitted a demand for coverage under her uninsured motorist policy. She included documentation of her injuries and associated treatment. Allstate did not respond to her demand. The trial court ruled Gaspard’s injuries were an aggravation of injuries from a prior automobile accident she had been involved in. It awarded her $8,000 in general damages and $3,314.37 in medical expenses. Gaspard appealed.

    On appeal, Gaspard argued the trial court erred in finding most of her damages were aggravation of injuries from her prior accident. Gaspard had the burden of proving her injuries resulted from the at-issue car accident. Numerous medical doctors, including those that had treated Gaspard, testified at trial. The medical evidence showed Gaspard’s complaints to her doctor following the at-issue car accident were the same as those she complained about from her first accident before the at-issue accident. Although there was some varying testimony from the medical doctors about whether and to what extent the at-issue car accident had aggravated Gaspard’s injuries from her prior accident, the doctors noted even before the at-issue accident, Gaspard’s complaints and conditions had waxed and waned. The doctors did not attribute any changes in Gaspard’s condition to the at-issue car accident. Therefore, the appellate court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that most of Gaspard’s alleged injuries from the at-issue car accident were aggravations of injuries from her first accident. 

    This legal journey is a testament to the multifaceted nature of car accident claims, where the interplay between past injuries and present damages can blur liability lines. In a landscape where preexisting conditions and prior accidents come into play, pursuing justice demands a comprehensive understanding of medical evidence, legal standards, and the nuances of insurance coverage. Gaspard’s experience underscores the importance of having a knowledgeable advocate by your side – one who can adeptly navigate these complexities and ensure that your rights are vigorously upheld in the face of adversity.

    Additional Sources: Jacqueline J. Gaspard v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Uninsured Motorist Coverage: Court Finds Uninsured Motorist Coverage Waiver Valid, Denies Coverage for Injured Worker Injured

  • Final Judgment Required For Appellate Court To Consider Merits Of Case

    Words matter, especially when it comes to trial court orders. Without the proper language, a judgment is not an appealable, valid final judgment, so an appellate court cannot consider the merits of an appeal. 

    McKinley Taylor filed a lawsuit against Cajun Constructors, his former employer. He claimed Cajun Constructors owed him unpaid wages for his work as a carpenter. He claimed they had decided upon a daily per diem rate during his first week on the job. The trial court issued an untitled document, which appeared to be written reasons for a ruling, not a final judgment. The trial court found Taylor was not paid the agreed-upon per diem. The trial court also awarded Taylor penalty wages and attorneys fees under La. R.S. 23:632 because Cajun Constructors’ failure to pay him the per diem was not in good faith. Cajun Constructor appealed. 

    Cajun Constructors was ordered to show why its appeal should not be dismissed because there was no valid final judgment. In its response, Cajun Constructor acknowledged the trial court’s ruling did not contain the required language “ordered, adjudged and decreed.” See GBB Props. Two, LLC v. Stirling Props. LLC. Additionally, there was not a separate document from the trial court other than the written reasons for its ruling, as contemplated under La. C.C.P. art. 1918. Therefore, Cajun Contractors agreed the trial court’s ruling did not appear to be a final appealable judgment. The trial court also had not yet determined the amount of attorney fees to award to Taylor. Despite agreeing the trial court’s document was not an appealable valid judgment, Cajun Constructors explained it had filed the appeal to preserve its right to appeal. Cajun Constructors then requested the appellate court dismiss the appeal without prejudice and send the case back to the trial court to enter a valid, appealable final judgment. 

    In reviewing the trial court’s document, the appellate court noted the document was untitled. It also did not include the phrase “ordered, adjudged and decreed.” The appellate court concluded the document was only the trial court’s reasons for its ruling. The document did not provide the parties with adequate notice that it was a final judgment, so there was no final judgment from which Cajun Constructors could appeal. Because there was no final judgment, the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal. Therefore, the appellate court dismissed the appeal without prejudice and remanded it to the trial court so a final judgment could be entered within sixty days. 

    Here, Cajun Constructors filed an appeal even though it agreed there was no valid final judgment to preserve its right to appeal. A good lawyer can advise you on whether a similar strategy makes sense for you. Additionally, a good lawyer can help you review a prospective final judgment to ensure it includes the required language for an appellate court to consider the merits of an appeal to avoid the situation Cajun Constructors found itself in here. 

    Additional Sources: McKinley Taylor v. Cajun Construtors, Inc.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Final Judgments: Trial Courts Must Use Clear, Definite Language For a Final Judgment to be Valid and Appealable

  • Who Has a Right to Keep a Deposit in Failed Home Sale if the Financing Contingency Fails?

    Buying a house can often lead to significant stress, particularly due to the substantial financial commitments involved. A prevalent feature in real estate contracts is known as a “contingency.” One notable example is the financing contingency, which stipulates that the sale of a property is dependent on the buyer successfully obtaining a fitting mortgage. However, an intriguing scenario emerges: What transpires if a contract with a financing contingency unravels after the buyer has already submitted a deposit? The ensuing question arises – who rightfully lays claim to this deposited amount? The forthcoming legal case delves into this intricate web of uncertainties, providing insights that shed light on the matter.

    Andrea Saltau-Talbot wanted to buy a residential property in Alexandria, Louisiana. She entered an Agreement to buy the property and extended the closing date twice, but the sale never went through. Talbot and the sellers claimed they were entitled to the $30,000 deposit she had provided under the Agreement. The Agreement contained a financing contingency, but the blanks for the specific conditions included a “TBD.” Talbot claimed she had been unable to secure suitable financing, so she was entitled to have the deposit returned to her. 

    A lawsuit followed to determine who was owed the deposit. After a hearing, the trial court ruled the Seller was entitled to the deposit because Talbot had not proved she had made a good faith effort to obtain financing. Talbot appealed.

    On appeal, Talbot argued the trial court erred because the Seller was required to prove the Agreement had been breached in bad faith. However, the appellate court ruled because Talbot had initiated the claim under the financing provision that required her to make a good-faith effort to obtain financing under La. C.C. art. 1767 and La. C.C.P. art. 4651, she had the burden of proving she had acted in good faith.

    After determining Talbot had the burden of proving she acted in good faith in trying to obtain financing, the appellate court then turned to her argument that she was entitled to the deposit. At trial, Talbot had provided testimony about each lending institution she contacted in attempts to obtain financing. She explained the various reasons, including the location of the at-issue property, and why she could not get approved by any of these institutions for financing. The trial court also noted Talbot seemed like a credible witness. 

    Based on the record evidence, the appellate court held the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding Talbot had not provided sufficient evidence. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s ruling and entered a judgment Talbot was entitled to the return of the $30,000 deposit.  

    The Talbot case helped answer the question Who Has a Right to Keep a Deposit in Failed Home Sale if the Financing Contingency Fails? If the prospective buyer provides competent evidence of their efforts and rebuttable from banks, they keep it. If they can’t, then the seller should be able to keep the deposit. A good attorney can advise you on your rights and obligations before signing a real estate contract and ensure no incomplete sections, like the “TBD” in the financing contingency here. An attorney with real estate and litigation expertise can also help you evaluate your options if a sale falls through.

    Additional Sources: Noles-Frye Realty v. Holly Dixton, et al.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Home Sales: Louisiana Court Upholds “As Is” Home Sale in Case of Termite Infestation and Moisture Damage

  • Sufficient Evidence Essential To Establish Damages From Car Accident Lawsuits

    In the aftermath of a car accident, the quest for justice often extends beyond determining fault, delving into the intricate realm of calculating damages. Even when the liability is undisputed, securing compensation can be laden with legal complexities. The following case unveils the story of Shelley Cooley, a collision victim navigating the labyrinth of litigation to ascertain the rightful compensation for her injuries. The journey sheds light on the indispensable role of compelling evidence, from medical testimony to personal accounts, in establishing the magnitude of damages in the aftermath of an accident.

    Shelley Cooley was involved in a car accident where her car was hit from behind by a car driven by Timothy Adgate, who worked for the City of Shreveport. Cooley had to obtain medical treatment after the accident for pain in her knee, back, and neck. Cooley filed a lawsuit against Adgate and the City of Shreveport. The parties agreed the City of Shreveport was liable because Adgate was completely responsible for the accident while working as a police officer. The only issue at trial was the amount of damages owed to Cooley.

    Cooley was the only witness to testify at trial. Medical evidence was presented through the deposition transcripts of various doctors. The trial court ruled the accident had exacerbated Cooley’s pre-existing medical issues but declined to award any damages for future medical expenses because the evidence about future medical expenses was speculative. The trial court awarded Cooley $50,000 in general damages and $79,508.66 for past medical expenses. Cooley filed an appeal.

    On appeal, Cooley argued she should have been awarded more than $50,000 in general damages because her injuries from the car accident required medical treatment for over four years. Someone who is injured because of another is entitled to full compensation for the resulting damages. See La. C.C. art. 2315. General damages are not required to be exactly established and include things like inconvenience, loss of physical enjoyment, and mental and physical pain. See Bellard v. American Cent. Ins. Co. 

    The appellate court reviewed the evidence presented at trial, including Cooley’s testimony about the pain and suffering that resulted from the injuries caused by the car accident. Based on the evidence, the appellate court found the trial court’s award of $50,000 in general damages was not an abuse of discretion. 

    Cooley also argued the trial court erred in not awarding her any damages for future medical expenses. She claimed the medical evidence and expert testimony supported an award of damages for future medical expenses. To recover for future medical expenses, the plaintiff must establish that such expenses are probable with supporting medical testimony. See Menard v. Lafayette Ins. Co. Because a tortfeasor (here, Adgate) takes the victim (here, Cooley) as they come, the fact Cooley had pre-existing medical issues at the time of the car accident did not preclude her from recovering for future medical expenses. 

    In reviewing the medical evidence presented, the appellate court found Cooley had provided sufficient evidence to establish she would likely have future medical expenses from her injuries in the car accident and the probable amount of those expenses. Therefore, the appellate court amended the judgment to award Cooley $269,129 for future medical expenses. 

    As seen here, sufficient evidence is essential to establish the damages to which you are entitled A good attorney can advise you on what evidence you should present to support your claim for damages. 

    Additional Sources: Shelley Cooley v. Timothy Adgate and City of Shreveport

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Evidence Required for Future Medical Expense Damages: Make No Mistake, Medical Testimony Is Required For Juries To Award Damages For Future Medical Expenses

  • Attack Of The Campaign Ads: What Constitutes Defamation In Political Ads?

    Personal attacks often take center stage in the tumultuous arena of modern political campaigns, leaving no stone unturned and no reputation untouched. Yet, amidst this well-trodden path of character assaults, a unique legal battle emerges, where the crosshairs were not directed at a political rival but rather a candidate’s ex-spouse. In a case that blurs the lines between public discourse and private matters, the spotlight falls on the intersection of defamation claims and the exercise of free speech. Can a campaign ad’s accusations against an ex-spouse be enough to launch a successful legal battle?

    Nicholas Schittone filed a lawsuit against Brooke Stoma, Candyce Perret, and Perret for Judge Campaign, LLC for defamation related to a commercial advertisement that ran on television and radio related to Perret’s candidacy in an election for an open judgeship position on the Third Circuit Court of Appeal in Louisiana. Schittone claimed the advertisements included defamatory statements that accused him of being abusive to his child and ex-wife, Stoma. He admitted his name was not used in the advertisement but claimed the content made it obvious to those who knew him that the accusations related to him. 

    The defendants filed a special motion to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971 and claimed Schittone’s lawsuit should be dismissed because he could not meet his burden that he was likely to succeed in his claim on the merits. The trial court denied the defendant’s special motion to strike, finding Schittone was not running for office, so the issues in the campaign were not of public interest or concern, so the commercial did not relate to their exercise of free speech. The trial court also awarded Schittone attorneys’ fees. The defendants filed an appeal.

    On appeal, the defendants argued the trial court erred in finding the lawsuit did not arise from an act related to the exercise of free speech and in denying their special motion to strike. Under La. C.C.P. art. 971, a lawsuit arising from a person’s exercise of free speech is subject to a special motion to strike unless it is shown the plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits of the case. The appellate court explained La. C.C.P. art. 971 applies to narrow situations to avoid chilling people’s First Amendment rights. See Stabiler v. Louisiana Business, Inc.

    The appellate court explained although the commercial mentioned a private issue, the main fore of the at-issue speech related to the campaign for a judicial office, which was of public concern. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the speech in the commercial was not the subject of a special motion to strike. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment denying the defendants’ special motion to strike. 

    The appellate court could not analyze Schittone’s probability of succeeding on the merits of his claim because no evidence had yet been presented. So, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Schittone had presented sufficient evidence to establish his probability of success on the merits and the award of attorneys’ fees.

    The case of Nicholas Schittone and the campaign ad that thrust his personal life into the public sphere serves as a reminder of the intricate balance between free speech and defamation claims. In the arena where political ambitions clash, and the battleground is strewn with cutting and calculating words, the First Amendment finds itself both shield and sword. When defamation rears its head, seeking legal guidance becomes imperative. A seasoned attorney can unravel the complexities, clarifying the avenues of recourse, such as the unique mechanism of a special motion to strike. So, if your reputation finds itself under assault or if you stand accused in the tumult of public discourse, remember that legal expertise can be the compass guiding you through the uncharted waters of speech, opinion, and justice.

    Additional Sources: Nicholas J. Schittone v. Brooke R. Stoma and Candyce Perret

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Defamation: Court Dismisses Priest’s Defamation Suit Because of Its Likelihood of Failure

  • The Consequences of Ignoring Court Notices in Louisiana

    If you receive notice of a court hearing, you must pay attention to it. The following case shows the potential adverse consequences if you ignore a court hearing notice. These can include a warrant being issued for your arrest or having your lawsuit dismissed. However, the case also unveils a glimmer of hope for those entangled in such legal dilemmas, offering a glimpse into the avenues available to those who believe justice has been denied.

    Rita and Summer Brown were arrested for outstanding warrants from their failure to appear at a judgment debtor rule hearing. After their arrest, they filed lawsuits against the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Jerry Larpenter, and an unnamed insurance company, seeking damages for false arrest. The claims against the Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Office were dismissed. The lawsuit against Larpenter went to trial. The court ruled in favor of Larpenter. The Browns then appealed. 

    The Browns argued they had never been served the notice for the judgment debtor rule court hearing, so they were unaware they were required to appear in court. They also claimed they were unaware of the subsequent warrants for their arrest after they failed to appear at the hearing. 

    A process server testified he had personally served the Browns at their home. The process server’s supervisor also testified he had never received any complaints about the process server’s work. Despite the conflicting testimony about whether the Browns had been properly served, the appellate court found the evidence supported the finding that the Browns had been properly served the notice of the hearing for the judgment debtor rule court date. Nonetheless, they failed to appear. 

    In making this determination, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations. See Stotbart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and Development. Additionally, the arresting officer testified he had followed the normal procedure in executing the Browns’ arrest warrants. Therefore, the appellate court held the Browns’ arrests were proper and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 

    The saga of Rita and Summer Brown is a reminder that vigilance in legal matters is paramount. From their bewildering arrests due to missed court appearances to the intricate dance of lawsuits and appeals, the narrative underlines the potential pitfalls of disregarding court notices. In a world where credibility and evidence intertwine, even conflicting testimony couldn’t obscure the central lesson: the court’s decisions are based on timely information and adherence to legal processes. 

    Whether you find yourself questioning the validity of an arrest or the adequacy of notice, a proficient lawyer can be your staunch advocate in the pursuit of justice. So, as the gavel falls and the legal tapestry unfolds, remember the power of attention, the gravity of consequences, and the potential for restoration through legal guidance.

    Additional Sources: Rita Brown v. Terrebonne Parish Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Jerry J. Larpenter, and XYZ Ins. Co.

    Article Written By Berniard Law Firm

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on False Arrest: Police Department’s Improper Arrest Target of Louisiana Woman’s Claim

  • Unveiling the Struggle for Accessibility: Lawsuit Dismissal Sheds Light on Systemic Challenges

    Imagine the hardships of being denied basic necessities solely because of a disability. In such cases, how can individuals with disabilities navigate the legal system to seek justice and equal treatment? These questions gain significant relevance when we examine recent allegations of denied accommodations and rights violations. This situation sheds light on the challenges confronted by individuals with disabilities and raises important considerations regarding the responsibility of institutions to provide reasonable accommodations. The pursuit of justice and equal rights is a fundamental principle in any democratic society, yet there are instances where individuals encounter substantial obstacles, particularly in cases involving accessibility rights.

    Sherman Mealy, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, faced significant difficulties while in East Baton Rouge Parish Prison. After his release, he filed a lawsuit against Sheriff Sid J. Gautreaux III, the City, and Parish. Mealy alleged that he was denied wheelchair-accessible showers and had to rely on other inmates for assistance. He also claimed that he was denied crucial medical supplies, resulting in physical injury, property damage, and emotional distress.

    Mealy’s lawsuit was based on violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 aim to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities. These laws ensure equal access to public services, prohibit disability-based discrimination and enable individuals to seek remedies for rights violations. Mealy argued that the defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability. Denying him wheelchair-accessible showers and essential medical supplies worsened the challenges he faced during his incarceration. 

    Both defendants moved to dismiss. The district court partially granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and allowed certain claims to proceed. However, the City and Parish appealed the decision. The City and Parish argued Mealy did not sufficiently plead discrimination and they were not responsible for running the prison. 

    However, the appeals court reasoned those arguments go to the core of the case, which revolves around whether the City and Parish discriminated against Mealy by failing to reasonably accommodate him. Pan E. Expl. Co. v. Hufo Oils. The district court’s order rejecting those arguments was intermingled with the factual and legal issues surrounding Mealy’s case. The appeals court held the denial of the motion to dismiss is not effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment, as it will merge into the final judgment. The appeals court had the authority to direct the district court to dismiss if there was an erroneous denial. Therefore, lacking jurisdiction, the appeal was dismissed.

    The dismissal of Sherman Mealy’s lawsuit based on jurisdictional grounds highlights the intricate and intertwined nature of the legal arguments surrounding his claims. Mealy’s allegations of discrimination and the failure to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability lie at the heart of the case. While the City and Parish contended that Mealy had not adequately pleaded discrimination and they were not responsible for the prison’s administration, these arguments were deemed inseparable from the factual and legal issues surrounding the case. Ultimately, the lack of jurisdiction led to the dismissal of the appeal, emphasizing the importance of addressing accessibility rights and ensuring equal treatment and opportunities for individuals with disabilities within the legal system.

    Additional Source: SHERMAN MEALY, v. THE CITY/PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE 

    Written by Berniard Law Firm Blog Writer: Juliana Greco 

    Additional Berniard Law Firm Article on Louisiana Civil Matter Cases : Proving ADA Violations: Sufficient Evidence is Required for Discrimination Lawsuits and Appellate Court Says Pro Se Plaintiff Can Proceed With State Law Discrimination Claims Against Tulane Hospital